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Abstract
Slurs are derogatory words; they seem to express contempt and hatred toward marginalized
groups. They are used to insult and derogate their victims. Moreover, slurs give rise to
philosophical questions. In virtue of what is the word “chink,” unlike “Chinese,” a
derogatory word? Does “chink” refer to the same group as “Chinese”? If “chink” is a
derogatory word, how is it possible to use it in a non-derogatory way (e.g., by Chinese
comedians or between Chinese friends)? Many theories of slurs answer these questions by
assuming that slurs communicate derogatory messages. However, little attention has been
paid to the speech acts slurs are used to perform. In this dissertation, I argue that slurs are
illocutionary force indicators: words to perform the speech acts of derogation. “Chink” is
a derogatory word because its use is to derogate the Chinese, just like the phrase “I promise”
has the use to make a promise. To derogate the Chinese is to enforce a norm which assigns
to them an inferior normative status. Slurs are also propositional indicators: words that
contribute to the truth-conditions. “Chink” has the same referent as “Chinese,” its neutral
counterpart. Appealing to speech act theory enables my theory to answer questions about
slurs, e.g., slurs can be used in non-derogatory ways because the felicity conditions of
derogation are not met. To illustrate the advantage of my theory, I will explain how other
theories of slurs fall short because they take positions opposite to mine on certain issues.
For instance, Mark Richard’s theory, unlike mine, takes utterances of slurs to have no truth
ii

values. It follows from his theory, I will argue, that lying with “Chang is a chink” is
impossible. Finally, I will defend the force indicator theory from common objections. My
force indicator theory provides a case study of the use theory of meaning and a framework
for political philosophers to study the harm of slurs.

Keywords
Slurs, Speech Acts, Illocutionary Force, Illocutionary Force Indicators, Derogation,
Offensive Language, Hate Speech, Philosophy of Language
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Summary for Lay Audience
Slurs are very puzzling. As derogatory words, they are used to insult and express hatred
and contempt toward marginalized groups. But in other contexts, they seem to be able to
do the opposite. For example, bigots call sexual and gender minorities “queer” to insult
them. However, since the 1980s, activists have been proudly labeling themselves “queer”
in order to challenge discrimination. Slurs raise many philosophical questions. Why is a
slur like “queer” a derogatory word? How can a derogatory word like “queer” be used to
show pride? The most common answer is that the use of the word “queer” is to describe
the bad things about a person, such as being odd, strange, and eccentric. But this does not
easily explain why “queer” can be used in a non-derogatory way. To challenge this answer,
I argue that the use of a slur like “queer” is not just to say something about people; its use
is to do something to them, that is, to derogate them. To derogate people is to make them
inferior. A derogatory word like “queer” can be used proudly by activists, just like a dagger
can be used on a cutting board as a cooking tool, despite its standard use as a weapon. This
picture of slurs helps us to better understand their harms and how to regulate offensive
language.
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1 Introduction1
1.1 The Need for a Theory of Slurs
Slurs are terrible words. They are said to be “among the most rhetorically powerful and
insidious expressions in a language” (Camp 2013, 330). In particular, slurs are considered
“derogatory expressions, understood to convey contempt and hatred toward their targets”
(Hom 2008, 416). They are “meant to insult or disparage” (Hom 2012, 383). These
observations are not merely theoretical; they are rooted in real-life experiences of
oppression. In his book on the N-word, Randall Kennedy recounts his mother’s experience
of slurs during the years of Jim Crow segregation:2

“Yet it was a word—this word n**ger—that lay at the core of a
recollection that revealed to me the pain my mother continues to feel on
account of wounds inflicted upon her by racists during the era of Jim
Crow segregation. Several years ago I asked her to tell me about her
earliest memory of the color line. She began laughingly, telling me about
how, in Columbia, she had often accompanied her mother to white folks’
homes to pick up and return laundry. Although they typically traveled on
public buses, my mother had failed to notice that her mother, Big Mama,
always took her to the back of the bus where Negroes were segregated.
One day, Big Mama asked my mother to run an errand that required her
to catch a bus on which they had often ridden together. This errand
marked the first time that my mother rode the bus on her own. She stood
at the correct stop, got on the right bus, and deposited the appropriate
1

Warning: This dissertation contains examples of offensive language. I apologize for any potential offense this could

cause.
2

Some slurs such as the N-word are far more offensive and toxic than others, such that even mentioning them may be

harmful. I will avoid spelling the full word, when these slurs are mentioned in the text.
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fare. Being a bit scared, however, she sat down immediately behind the
bus driver. After about a block, the driver pulled the bus over to the curb,
cut the engine, and suddenly wheeled around and began to scream at my
mother who was all of about eight or nine years old—‘N**ger, you know
better than to sit there! Get to the back where you belong!’” (Kennedy
2003, xii)

This recounting illustrates just how harmful slurs can be. If slurs are so horrible and
nasty, why should we study them? It seems that we already know enough about them; they
are just terrible words to hurt people. What more needs to be said? In particular, why do
we need a theory to explain them? I believe there are both practical and philosophical
reasons for developing a theory of slurs.
The practical reason is that a better understanding of slurs makes us better informed
when confronting real-life controversies about slurs. Slurs cause legal and political trouble.
“The Slants,” an Asian American rock band, attempted to register the slur as their
trademark but got turned down (Chappell 2017). They fought the trademark case in the
Supreme Court and eventually won the case. However, the issue remains: how should the
law regulate slurs? Should there be exceptions where certain groups are allowed to use
slurs against themselves? Alternatively, should slurs be totally banned and ideally purged
from the vocabulary of English? Answers to these questions should be informed by a theory
of slurs which explains how slurs harm people.

3

In addition to legal issues, there are political controversies over whether certain words
count as a slur. For example, there is a debate over whether the acronym “TERF” (which
stands for “Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist”) is a slur (Flaherty 2018). Some take
“TERF” to be a slur for a subgroup of feminists, while some consider it an innocent word
to challenge transphobia. When people disagree over whether a word is a slur, how should
such disagreement be settled? Can there be a test for slurs? Again, a good theory of slurs
may help us in addressing these puzzles.
Beyond the practical reasons, there are philosophical reasons for developing a theory
of slurs. The theory would address two issues in philosophy of language.
First, slurs seem problematic for the dominant approach to meaning in philosophy of
language. Let us call this approach “the thing theory of meaning.” According to the thing
theory, the meaning (or the semantic content) of an expression is the thing it stands for.
Within this approach, different semantics (or theories of meaning) assign different things,
such as individuals, functions, truth-conditions, sets of individuals, and sets of possible
worlds, as the semantic content. I shall omit the details here since this is a broad approach
rather than a specific theory.
However, this approach seems to be at odds with explaining the uses of certain words.
What kind of things do words like “hello,” “goodbye,” and “damn” stand for? These words
surely have meanings, but they do not seem to be standing for anything. The dominant
approach largely neglects these words in theorizing about meaning. For instance, Frege
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(1956, 295) famously banishes words such as “alas,” “thank God,” and “still” from the
realm of thoughts, the meanings of sentences. They make no difference to thoughts because
they merely act on the feelings, instead of contributing to truth. Because of such neglect,
Wittgenstein (2009) criticizes this approach as “the Augustinian picture of language,” and
Austin (1961) describes it as “the descriptive fallacy.”
Slurs also seem to challenge this dominant approach of the thing theory. Compare the
slur “chink” with its neutral counterpart “Chinese.” It appears that both stand for the same
group of people, i.e., the Chinese.3 Nonetheless, their meanings seem to differ; it would
be a mistake to teach an English learner that “chink” and “Chinese” are synonymous in
English. Where does such a difference in meaning come from, if not from their referents?
A natural answer is that the difference comes from their different uses. “Chink” is used for
derogating the Chinese and expressing contempt, hatred toward them, whereas “Chinese”
lacks this use.
Therefore, theories of slurs are significant because they support an alternative
approach to meaning, i.e., the use theory of meaning. This theory can be elegantly captured
by its slogan, “meaning is use.” For instance, the meaning of “chink” should be explained
in terms of its use, that is, the use to derogate people or to express contempt and hatred.
There are recent attempts at reviving the use theory of meaning. Alston’s theory tries to

3

This claim may strike you as controversial. For more detailed analysis see section 2.4.
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identify the meanings of sentences with their illocutionary act potentials, i.e., the speech
acts the sentence is used to perform (Alston 2000). Moreover, inferential role semantics
defines the meaning of a sentence in terms of its use in making inferences, i.e., its
inferential role with regard to other sentences (Brandom 1994). Even the proponents of the
thing theory have been experimenting with “use-conditional meaning,” i.e., the condition
under which an expression is appropriately used (Kaplan unpublished, Predelli 2013). Slurs
might serve as evidence for these use theories because they are better at explaining the
meaning of slurs. For example, inferential role semantics has been applied to slurs (§ 5.3).
Second, theories of slurs are also significant for related areas such as moral language
(e.g., “right,” “wrong”), thick concepts (e.g., “brave,” “cruel”), evaluative terms (e.g.,
“delicious”), swear words (e.g., “damn,” the F-word), general pejoratives (e.g., “asshole”).
Crudely speaking, these expressions also seem to express emotive or evaluative attitudes
like slurs.4 A theory of slurs might be extended to explain these expressions.
Take moral language for instance. In meta-ethics, hybrid theorists combine
expressivism with cognitivism and hold that moral terms have both a descriptive content
and an expressivist element. For instance, to say something is “wrong” amounts to saying
that it is prohibited by a certain moral standard and expressing one’s attitude of endorsing

4

In what sense do these words express emotive attitudes? I shall leave the term “express” undefined so as to allow two

possibilities: 1) a speaker uses the word to express an attitude; and 2) the word itself, not the speaker, expresses the
attitude as a part of its semantic content. I do not intend to take a position about the nature of expressivist language here.
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that moral standard (Copp 2001). Many hybrid theorists believe that moral terms function
like slurs (Boisvert 2014, Copp 2014).
Another example is the literature on “expressives” (Potts 2007, Schlenker 2007).
Many philosophers and linguists believe that slurs behave just like all other expressives
(e.g., “damn,” “asshole”). They take “expressives” to be a kind of expression that
incorporates sub-kinds such as swear words, general pejoratives, and slurs. Therefore, slurs
should receive no sui generis treatment; they should be explained just like all other
expressives. These theorists usually just give a general theory of expressives and then apply
it to slurs.
However, this seeming similarity gives rise to further questions, which could be
answered by a theory of slurs. Do slurs genuinely function in the same way as these
expressions? Does a theory of slurs give us a “free” explanation for moral language and
thick concepts? If not, how do slurs behave differently than these related expressions?
What is the origin of such a difference? Theories of slurs are crucial for answering these
questions. If our explanation of slurs applies to other expressions, developing a theory of
slurs can be the stepping stone toward a unified framework of expressivist language. Even
if slurs turn out to be very different from other expressives, it is still philosophically
rewarding to study their differences.

7

1.2 The Basic Idea of the Force Indicator Theory
Imagine a hateful person who walks up to and starts yelling at Chang. He hates Chang as
a Chinese person and finds Chang’s very presence unpleasant. He calls him a “chink” and
shouts, “You do not belong here because you are a chink!” What is going on in this situation?
What makes the word “chink” in this context derogatory and hurtful? Some believe that
calling Chang a “chink” is to tell people something about him, e.g., the hateful speaker is
describing Chang as a “devious, slanty-eyed Chinese…who should be discriminated
against.” Others think that calling Chang a “chink” is for the speaker to show people his
contempt of him, just like frowning at Chang or raising a middle finger. The job of slurs,
for many people, is communication; the hateful speaker uses “chink” because he wants
people to learn something about Chang (besides his ethnicity). I disagree.
Here is the basic idea of my alternative view. Calling Chang a “chink” is not merely
telling people something about him or showing the speaker’s feelings; it is doing something
to Chang (and other Chinese), that is, an act of derogation.5 To derogate Chang with a slur
is to enforce the norm of racism, in which the Chinese are treated as an inferior group. In
other words, labeling Chang as a “chink” is for the hateful speaker to allow other people to
discriminate against him, to reject his right to be respected, and to deny his worth as a
human being, etc. This is why slurs are used to enforce racism and commit hate crimes.
5

Derogation cannot be reduced to (merely) an act of asserting something or expressing a feeling. In other words,

derogation is a declarative illocutionary act, rather than an assertive or expressive act. For the nature of derogation, see
section 4.1.
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For those who find this description of the basic idea too vague, allow me to expand
on the details. Many theories of slurs have been proposed. Most theories share the same
picture that slurs communicate certain derogatory “messages” about certain groups.6 The
messages are said to be either propositional (e.g., the proposition that the Chinese are
devious … and should be discriminated against) or non-propositional (e.g., hatred or
contempt). These messages are taken to be communicated via truth-conditional contents
(Hom 2008, 2010, 2012), conversational implicatures (Bolinger 2015, Nunberg 2018),
conventional implicatures (Whiting 2013, Williamson 2009, Sennet and Copp 2017), or
presuppositions (Schlenker 2007), etc. Arguably, this picture fails to capture what is
essential to slurs; their use is to derogate certain groups of people. Derogation is not merely
a matter of communication; it can be better understood by considering what speech acts
speakers perform.
To provide an alternative, I will develop an illocutionary force indicator theory of
slurs (“force indicator theory” for short). The basic idea is to explain slurs in terms of what
they are used to do, i.e., to derogate their targets. One of the key lessons from the speech
act theory is that language is not merely for describing; it is also used to perform (nonconstative) speech acts (Austin 1961). For example, “Hello” is used for greeting people,
and “I promise” is used to make promises. These words that are used to perform speech

6

I choose the vague term “message,” instead of “content,” so as to avoid excluding non-propositional theories like

Whiting’s conventional implicature theory (Whiting 2013). For the definition of the “content,” see section 2.5.
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acts are called “illocutionary force indicators” (or “illocutionary force devices”). The force
indicator theory takes slurs to be analogous to force indicators (or performatives) like
“hello” and “I promise”; a slur like “chink” is the word to derogate the Chinese.
The force indicator theory takes slurs to be illocutionary force indicators of
derogation.7 For example, the force indicator “chink” in the utterance “Chang is a chink”
makes it explicit that this utterance should be taken as an act of derogation. That is, it has
the illocutionary force of derogation. Derogation is a declarative illocutionary act (such as
approving, naming, resigning, and blessing), the point of which is to enforce a norm which
assigns an inferior normative status on a target. For instance, to derogate the Chinese is to
assign them an inferior status which is deprived of rights to be respected, eligibility to
certain career opportunities, freedom from discriminations, etc. In addition to being force
indicators, slurs are also propositional indicators that contribute to the propositional
contents of utterances. “Chink” makes the same contribution to the propositional content
as its neutral counterpart, “Chinese.” The details of this theory will be developed in chapter
4.
Before ending this section, I must clarify the scope of the term “slur.” One might
complain that I am only addressing slurs like “chink” and “queer,” while ignoring “slurs”
such as someone’s false claim that “Bob cheats on his wife!”. The ordinary usage of “slur”

7

Slurs are not the only force indicators of derogation. For instance, the force might be indicated by a negative tone or a

gesture.
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in English is ambiguous between two senses. In the first sense, it refers to what are called
“slurring words,” or “slurring expressions.” Certain words, linguistic expressions, or
lexical items are called “slurs.” It is in this sense that people describe words such as “chink,”
“cracker,” “queer” as “slurs.” In the second sense, “slur” has been commonly used for
“slurring speech” or “slurring acts,” as reported in “John slurred the integrity of Bob” or
“her article is a slur on their reputation.”
I use the term “slur” in the sense of “slurring expressions,” not in the sense of “slurring
acts” or “slurring speech.” That is, it stands for a kind of word or lexical item (e.g., ethnic
epithets), rather than a kind of speech or utterance. In this thesis, I will use “slurs” and
“slurring expressions” interchangeably; readers should always read “slur” as “slurring
expressions.” My theoretical reason to use the term in the first sense is simply to maintain
consistency with the literature on slurs. The philosophical debate focuses on “slurs” in the
first sense. “Slur,” in the second sense, despite its significance, is a separate issue.

1.3 Outline of the Chapters
Many issues have to be addressed in order to develop an illocutionary force indicator theory
of slurs. What are the phenomena or features of slurs that a theory has to explain (chapter
2)? Since the force indicator theory is based on speech act theory, how should we
understand basic notions such as illocutionary act, illocutionary force, and force indicators
(chapter 3)? After addressing these background questions, this dissertation will proceed to

11

address the following questions. What exactly is the illocutionary force indicator theory
(chapter 4)? What are the alternative theories to the force indicator theory, and why should
my theory be favored (chapter 5)? Can such a theory withstand the objections against it
(chapter 6)?
An overview of the following chapters is helpful here. I will summarize the key ideas
of each chapter. This should serve as a roadmap to guide readers.
Chapter 2 surveys the features of slurs, as well as the questions corresponding to those
features.8 Throughout the literature, theorists have proposed many features to be explained.
For instance, slurs are said to exhibit features such as derogatory power (§ 2.2),
offensiveness (§ 2.3), truth-conditional contribution (§ 2.4), independence (§ 2.5),
descriptive ineffability (§ 2.6), and perspective dependence (§ 2.7), etc. An essential job of
theories of slurs is to explain the puzzling features of slurs.
However, there is no consensus over what the list of features should include.
Moreover, the selection and categorization of features are arbitrary and messy. Some
features ultimately collapse into others. For instance, explaining the so-called
“appropriation of slurs” (§ 2.10) involves no more than answering the questions about
historical variability (§ 2.8), and non-derogatory utterances (§ 2.9). Additionally, some
features conflate different issues together under a single label. For example, explaining

8

I shall use the term “slur” in the sense of slurring expressions (e.g., ethnic epithets), rather than slurring acts or slurring

speeches. Therefore, these features are features of linguistic expressions like “chink,” and “honky.”
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what is commonly called “derogatory power” (§ 2.2) involves answering two different
questions identified below.
To provide a clear and systematic survey, each section of chapter 2 will reformulate a
feature of slurs into corresponding questions. For example, section 2.2 will introduce the
derogatory power of slurs by disambiguating two questions: (Q1) “In virtue of what is a
slur such as ‘chink’ a derogatory word?”, and (Q2) “In virtue of what is an utterance like
saying that ‘Chang is a chink’ derogatory?”.9 Section 2.4 will present the truth-conditional
contribution by asking question (Q5) “Does a slur like ‘chink’ make the same truthconditional contribution as its neutral counterpart ‘Chinese’?” Subsequent sections will
reformulate other features into corresponding questions such as question (Q6) “Why is the
derogatory dimension of ‘chink’ independent from its descriptive meaning?”, and (Q7)
“Why cannot the derogatory dimension of ‘chink’ be satisfactorily paraphrased in purely
descriptive terms?”. Section 2.14 will list all the questions introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 3 provides the necessary theoretical background for the force indicator theory
by introducing the basic notion of speech act theory. Illocutionary acts, such as ordering,
apologizing, asserting, promising, are the acts of doing something in saying something (§
3.1). They have two major components, illocutionary forces and propositional contents.
9

What question (Q1) asks for is to find the element or the mechanism, in virtue of which a slur like “chink” is derogatory.

Potential answers include truth-conditional contents, conventional implicatures, etc. It is not asking for evidence for
proving that “chink” is derogatory, e.g., that “chink” is marked as offensive in the Oxford English Dictionary, and that it
is censored by FAA in public media. It is also not asking how did the word “chink” historically acquire the element that
makes it derogatory, e.g., the etymology of “chink.” For clarifications on the nature of this question, see section 2.2.
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For instance, the illocutionary act of promising that I will give you money has the
illocutionary force of promising, as well as the propositional content that I will give you
money. But how are illocutionary force and propositional content determined?
Illocutionary force indicator and propositional indicators are the linguistic expressions
that help determine the force and the content respectively (§ 3.2). Suppose I make a promise
by saying, “I promise that I will give you money.” The force of the promise is determined
by “I promise,” the force indicator, while its propositional content is determined by the
propositional indicator, “I will give you money.” However, one can still raise a further
question: how exactly does a force indicator (in a sentence type) determine the illocutionary
force (of an utterance)? In section 3.3, I will show that force indicators provide a default
interpretation in determining the illocutionary force of an utterance.10 For instance, an
utterance that contains “I promise” is interpreted as a promise by default, unless there are
defeating factors such as insincerity and sarcasm.
In chapter 4, I will develop the illocutionary force indicator theory of slurs in detail. I
will show that a slur like “chink” is an illocutionary force indicator of the illocutionary acts
of derogation (§ 4.1). Slurs like “chink” are also propositional indicators which make the
same truth-conditional contribution as their neutral counterparts like “Chinese.” This force
indicator theory requires an explanation of the illocutionary acts of derogation. I take

10

For the nature of the “default interpretation,” see section 3.3.
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derogation to be a kind of declarative illocutionary act, the point of which is to enforce a
norm which assigns an inferior normative status on a target group (§ 4.2). In section 4.3, I
will characterize how slurs determine the illocutionary force of derogation. Although slurs
are neither sufficient nor necessary for derogation, they help to determine the illocutionary
force by providing the default interpretation (of utterances of that general kind).11 That is,
utterances that contain slurs are interpreted as derogation by default unless there are
defeating factors. In section 4.4, I will address the offensiveness of slurs. In addition to
providing illocutionary force, a slur produces the perlocutionary effects of causing offense.
This force indicator theory provides a better explanation of the features of slurs. In
section 4.5, I will apply the force indicator theory to explain the features of slurs. It has no
difficulty in explaining features such as derogatory power, offensiveness, truth-conditional
contribution, independence, etc. Why is “chink” a derogatory word? “Chink” is derogatory
because it is an indicator for the illocutionary acts of derogation. Why is it impossible to
paraphrase “chink” in a purely descriptive way? Illocutionary force simply cannot be
paraphrased into propositional contents. The force indicator theory is at least adequate in
its explanatory power.
Chapter 5 introduces the existing theories of slurs in the literature, such as the truthconditional content theory (§ 5.1), the conventional implicature theory (§ 5.2),

11

Readers may be curious about the sense in which the interpretation provided by the slur is the “default” one. For

clarifications on “default interpretation,” see section 3.3 and section 4.3.
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inferentialism (§ 5.3), etc. These theories offer a variety of explanations for slurs. Some of
these theories appeal to “semantic” properties such as semantic contents and truth. For
example, Christopher Hom’s truth-conditional content theory takes slurs to have
derogatory truth-conditional contents. Inferentialism takes the meaning of slurs to be
determined by inferential rules that license inferences to derogatory statements. Some
theories explain slurs in terms of pragmatic factors. For instance, the conventional
implicature theory takes slurs to convey derogatory conventional implicatures.12 There are
also theories that appeal to extra-linguistic explanations. The prohibitionist theory (§ 5.4),
for example, explains slurs in terms of the social prohibition on using them. These theories
serve as the theoretical alternatives to my illocutionary force indicator theory. Contrasting
them with the force indicator theory helps to elucidate my position.
In each section in chapter 5, I will introduce a theory and then raise my arguments
against it. I believe the existing theories in the literature ultimately run into various
problems. For example, Hom’s truth-conditional content theory has difficulty in explaining
how non-assertions like “Is Chang a chink?” can be derogatory, where the derogatory truthconditional content of “chink” is not attributed to Chang. The conventional implicature
theory cannot accommodate the possibility of derogating Koreans with “chink” because
the conventional implicature of “chink” is always about the Chinese. I hope my arguments

12

It is controversial if conventional implicature is pragmatic or semantic. I do not intend to defend a particular view of

the semantic/pragmatic boundary here.
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against these theories justify rethinking slurs from the alternative picture of illocutionary
force indicators.
Chapter 6 defends the force indicator theory from potential objections. For instance,
it might be argued that derogation is not an illocutionary act because it is impossible to
derogate by saying “I hereby derogate you” (§ 6.1). Another objection is that slurs
embedded in complex sentences remain derogatory (e.g., “If chinks celebrate Lunar New
Year, then…”), whereas embedded force indicators cease to provide illocutionary force
(e.g., “If I promise to give you money, then ...”) (§ 6.2). In addition, it might be objected
that the slur “chink” cannot make the same truth-conditional contribution as “Chinese” (§
6.4). Consider examples like “Institutions that treat the Chinese as chinks are morally
depraved,” where replacing “chink” with “Chinese” seems to change the truth value.
Objections like these challenge my force indicator theory. In each section, I will introduce
an objection and respond to it.

1.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have explained the reasons for developing a theory of slurs (§ 1.1). The
practical reason is that such a theory is helpful for addressing controversies such as the
legal regulation of slurs. The philosophical reason is that a theory of slurs seems to
challenge the thing theory of meaning and offer a prototype for other expressivist
expressions. I have also introduced the basic idea of my force indicator theory; slurs are
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the words to perform the speech act of derogation (§ 1.2). An outline has also been provided
for each chapter of the dissertation (§ 1.3). With this background in place, we are ready to
introduce the features of slurs to be explained.
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2 Features of Slurs
The puzzling features of slurs give rise to many questions. Take the slur “chink” for
instance. Unlike the neutral word “Chinese,” “chink” is a derogatory word. For instance,
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “chink” as “an insulting and contemptuous term
for a person of Chinese birth or descent.”13 In other words, “chink” has derogatory power.
Both “Chinese” and “chink” seem to refer to the same people. However, why is “chink”
derogatory, while “Chinese” is not? Furthermore, slurs can be appropriated or reclaimed,
e.g., the term “queer” was a slur for homosexuals, but it has been “appropriated” by the
LGBTQ community as a symbol for taking pride in challenging heterosexual norms. This
feature gives rise to the question, “What is it for a slur to become less derogatory?” Slurs
have more puzzling features than these examples. An adequate theory of slurs, including
my force indicator theory, must explain the features of slurs and answer questions
corresponding to them. Therefore, I need to survey the features of slurs to be explained.
Here is an overview of the sections of the chapter. First, section 2.1 presents
methodological remarks on how to analyze the features of slurs and what it means to
explain these features. Then, each section examines one feature of slurs and analyzes it by
raising corresponding questions. Section 2.2 disambiguates the derogatory power of a slur,
such as “chink.” There are two questions to be asked about this feature. Why is “chink” a

13

“Chink”. Merriam-Webster Online. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chink (accessed June 8, 2019).
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derogatory word? In addition, why is someone’s saying that “Chang is a chink” derogatory?
Section 2.3 distinguishes the offensiveness of slurs (e.g., in virtue of what is “chink” an
offensive word?) from their derogatory power. In section 2.4, I will discuss the truthconditional contribution of slurs (e.g., why do “Chang is a chink” and “Chang is a Chinese”
share the same truth-condition?). In section 2.5, I will address the feature of independence
(e.g., why is it possible for “Chinese” to refer to the same people as “chink” without being
derogatory like the slur?). Section 2.6 focuses on the descriptive ineffability of slurs (e.g.,
why is it impossible to accurately paraphrase “chink”?), while section 2.7 discusses
perspective dependence (e.g., why does an utterance of slurs such as “Chang does business
with chinks” express the attitude of the speaker, not others?).
In section 2.8, I will discuss the historical variability of slurs (e.g., how can a slur like
“queer” become less derogatory over time?) Section 2.9 is about non-derogatory
utterances of slurs (e.g., if “chink” is a derogatory word, how can it be used in a nonderogatory way?). In section 2.10, I will point out that the so-called appropriation of slurs
is not a sui generis feature, but two features conflated together. Explaining “appropriation”
is nothing but explaining the historical variability and the non-derogatory utterances of
slurs. In section 2.11, I will introduce the non-displaceability of slurs (e.g., why does an
embedded slur remain derogatory, as in “If Chang is a chink, he celebrates Lunar New
Year”?). Section 2.12 addresses the Kaplanian inference puzzle (e.g., Why does the
inference from “the Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year” to “the chinks celebrate Lunar
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New Year” seem invalid?). In addition to these existing features in the literature, I will
introduce a new feature, self-defeating sentences, in section 2.13. Slurs seem to make
sentences like “praise the chink!” self-defeating. How do slurs make such sentences
inconsistent? These features and their corresponding questions may be difficult to keep
track of. For quick reference, section 2.14 summarizes all the questions introduced in each
section.

2.1 Methodological Remarks
This chapter introduces and clarifies features of slurs by analyzing them into a list of
distinct questions for theories of slurs. Every theorist of slurs has her own a list of features
to be explained. However, the selection of the features can be arbitrary and controversial.
Different questions might be conflated together under one single feature. For instance,
explaining the so-called “derogatory power” of slurs, as I will show in section 2.2, involves
answering two different questions. Sometimes theorists list a feature even though it
collapses into other features. What is called the “appropriation of slurs,” as I will argue in
section 2.10, is not a single feature; it conflates both historical variability and nonderogatory utterances of slurs. In short, the best way to analyze the features of slurs is to
organize them into a list of questions.
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For the questions regarding slurs, I will formulate each of them in its own paragraph
and label them as questions (Q1), (Q2), etc.14 Each label corresponds to a question that a
theory of slurs has to answer, e.g.,

(Q1) Type Derogatory Power: In virtue of what is a slur like “chink” a derogatory word?

The features and questions I identify, despite being different from one another, are not
totally independent of each other. Many of them are related to the two basic questions, i.e.,
(Q1) “In virtue of what is a slur like ‘chink’ a derogatory word?”, and (Q2) “In virtue of
what is an utterance like someone’s saying that ‘Chang is a chink’ derogatory?”. For
example, one’s answer to (Q1) partially determines how she answers other questions such
as (Q9) “what is it for a slur to become more derogatory or less derogatory over time?”. I
will illustrate this dependency between questions with boldface and regular fonts; question
(Q1) and (Q2) will be emphasized with boldface font, so as to show their status as the most
fundamental questions.
My formulations of the features of slurs may conflict with other theorists’
understandings. This is a result of the disagreement over slurs’ features between theorists.
When in conflict, my formulations reflect my own position of what those features are,
14

There is a need to label questions, theories, and arguments systematically. The literature on slurs is gigantic and

disorganized. More than ten features of slurs have been discussed, and each author has her own list of the features. A
handy way to keep track of them is to label the questions, theories, and arguments numerically.
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rather than the opposing understandings in the literature. I will defend my position later by
criticizing opposing views in chapter 5. Readers should notice that different theorists of
slurs often have conflicting intuitions about the same feature. Sometimes they cannot even
agree on what exactly the question is to be asked. Take the truth-conditional contribution
of slurs (§ 2.4) for instance. For most theories, explaining this feature amounts to asking:
why does the slur “chink” make the same truth-conditional contribution as its neutral
counterpart “Chinese”? However, some theorists would have completely opposite
intuitions (Hom and May 2013, 293); by their lights, the slur “chink” has a different
referent than “Chinese,” such that literally, no Chinese person is a chink. For them, the
right question to ask is: why do slurs make different truth-conditional contributions as their
neutral counterpart (see section 5.1). My formulation of truth-conditional contribution in
this chapter endorses the majority view, and I will criticize the opposite intuitions later in
chapter 5.
After explaining my way of analyzing the features of slurs, deeper questions will
remain: what is it to explain a feature such as the derogatory power of slurs?
Correspondingly, what are we doing when we answer a question about those features, e.g.,
(Q1) “why is a slur like ‘chink’ a derogatory word?” These questions are important because
the project of explaining the features of slurs could be misunderstood in certain ways. For
instance, one might think that to explain the derogatory power of slurs is to prove that slurs
are derogatory (e.g., with evidence such as the definition of “chink” in dictionaries), instead
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of explaining why they are derogatory. One might also misunderstand explaining the
derogatory power to be merely clarifying what this feature is (e.g., it is a linguistic
phenomenon, rather than an economic or logical phenomenon) without specifying its
source. This dissertation will address these side issues, but explaining slurs’ features
requires more.
Here is my answer to these questions: a feature of slurs is an interpretive effect of
slurs (that characterize them as a kind of linguistic expression), and to explain a feature is
to find the factor or the mechanism that gives rise to the effect.15 Take non-displaceability
(§ 2.11) for instance. One of the crucial effects of slurs, unlike general pejoratives such as
“asshole,” is to make the whole sentence derogatory when they are embedded within the
sentence. Therefore, to introduce a feature like non-displaceability is to clarify this
interpretive effect, e.g., what kind of sentences slurs affect, and whether other kinds of
expressions share this effect. These features are the phenomena to be explained by theories
of slurs. For a theory to explain a feature of slurs is to specify the factor or the mechanism
that gives rise to the interpretive effect (causally or constitutively). For instance, a theory
might trace the non-displaceability of a slur back to its derogatory conventional implicature,
which is also non-displaceable.

15

These characterizing effects do not have to be essential properties of slurs.
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2.2 Derogatory Power
Here is the outline of this complex section. First, I will clarify some terminology. Then I
will proceed to introduce the derogatory power of slurs by reformulating it into question
(Q1) and question (Q2). Reasons will be given for why we should separate these two
questions. Then I will clarify the nature of question (Q1) by rejecting two common
misreadings of it. Since derogatory power is often called “derogatory force” in the
literature, I will explain my terminological choice of “derogatory power” at the end of this
section.
Before analyzing the feature of derogatory power, a few clarifications of terminology
have to be made. Defining certain terms is crucial for accurately characterizing the feature
of derogatory power. However, readers could skip these clarifications and come back when
necessary.
I will mention “types” and “tokens” of slurs. Therefore, I need to clarify the
relationship between a “type” and a “token” of a slur, as well as the “type” and the “token”
of a sentence that contains slurs. A token of a slur is a particular instance of the word. The
tokens of a slur belong to or share the same type of slur. For example, when two speakers
utter the same sentence, “Chang is a chink,” there are two tokens of the type of “chink.”
The type-token distinction applies to sentences that contain slurs as well. In the case above,
there are two tokens of the same type of the sentence “Chang is a chink.”
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A term related to the type-token distinction is the term “utterance.” An “utterance” of
a sentence is the act of verbally producing a token of the sentence. To “utter” a sentence is
to make an utterance of the sentence. My usage of “utterance,” without any qualification,
stands for the production of a token of a sentence, rather than a word. For instance, when I
address “non-derogatory utterance” in section 2.9, I am talking about non-derogatory
utterances of sentences that contain slurs.
Now that I have clarified this terminology, it is time to introduce one of the essential
features of slurs, that is, their derogatory power (or expressive force) (Croom 2011, 345,
Jeshion 2013, 232, Richard 2008, 12, Hom 2008, 426, 2010, 164). Slurs are derogatory
words, and they are used to derogate people. Therefore, they are said to have “derogatory
power” (also called “derogatory force,” or “expressive force”). However, the term
“derogatory power” describes two related but distinct phenomena.
First, theories of slurs use “derogatory power” to describe certain phenomena of those
words themselves. Some theorists associate these words with derogation. Croom (2011,
345) describes slurs as words that “carry derogatory force whereas descriptives usually do
not.” Jeshion (2013, 232) takes slurs to be words with the “function to derogate or
dehumanize, by which I mean, that they function to signal that … they are inferior as
persons.” Other theorists describe this feature of slurs in terms of what those words express.
Slurs are said to be words that “forcefully convey hatred and contempt of their targets”
(Hom 2008, 426) and “express the negative, psychological attitudes of their speakers”
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(Hom 2010, 164). In addition, Richard (2008, 12) identify slurs as words that are
“conventional means to express strong negative attitudes towards members of a group.”
According to Hornsby (2001, 128), slurs “are commonly understood to convey hatred or
contempt.”
Second, “derogatory power” has been used to describe not slurs themselves, but
utterances or usages of slurs; using these words in these utterances can be derogatory and
insulting. For example, “calling someone a racial epithet is extremely pejorative,
controversial, and usually much more insulting than using ordinary derogatory terms like
‘stupid’ or ‘lazy’” (Hom 2008, 426), such that “to call some a n**ger is usually understood
as an act of derogation” (Croom 2011, 345). Richard (2008, 12) claims that “Given what
slurs are used to do, it is no surprise that their use often achieves extreme effects on their
targets—humiliation, subjugation, shame.”
It is clear now that two different but related questions are therefore conflated under
the label “derogatory power.” That is, explaining “derogatory power” involves answering
two related questions. I will introduce both questions and explain their difference.
First, theories of slurs answer a question about the feature of those words themselves,
i.e., why they are derogatory expressions in a language. Compare the slur “chink” with its
neutral counterpart “Chinese.” Seemingly, these are two co-extensional expressions refer
to the same group of people. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the words
themselves: “chink” is a derogatory word in English, whereas “Chinese” is not. For any
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given slur, a theory of slurs must explain why it is a derogatory word. I shall reformulate
this question as question (Q1), the question of the type derogatory power. This is the
question theorists address when they talk about why slurs, as a type of word, express
“hatred and contempt” or have the function to derogate.

(Q1) Type Derogatory Power: In virtue of what is a slur like “chink” a derogatory word?

Second, theories of slurs answer a related question, not about those words themselves,
but about utterances of slurs. Imagine a situation in which Chang’s nationality is
questioned. Two speakers give two different statements about Chang. The first one asserts
that (1) “Chang is a chink,” whereas the other speaker asserts that (2) “Chang is a Chinese.”

(1)

Chang is a chink

(2)

Chang is a Chinese

Now we can ask a question about these two utterances: why is utterance (1)
derogatory, whereas utterance (2) is not? Notice that this is a question about utterances (or
acts) of slurs, not about the words themselves. I shall label this “(Q2) the question of token
derogatory power.” This is the question at issue when theorists explain why calling
someone the N-word is derogatory and why using slurs can derogate or humiliate the target.
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(Q2) Token Derogatory Power: In virtue of what is the utterance of a slur (e.g., “Chang
is a chink”) a derogatory utterance?

Question (Q1) and question (Q2) are usually conflated together in the literature. Most
theories do not even differentiate between them.16 It seems to many that in answering one
of them, one would automatically answer the other. One might argue that uttering (1)
“Chang is a chink” is derogatory because it includes a derogatory word, “chink.” Once we
have an answer for (Q1) why “chink” is a derogatory word, we have the answer for (Q2)
as well.
However, there are two theoretical reasons to separate these two questions. First,
answering question (Q1) does not give us a free answer for (Q2). Take “chink” for instance.
No matter what sentence it is embedded into and what the speaker uses it to do, it is always
a derogatory word: a derogatory word against the Chinese. It remains a derogatory word
until a change happens in the vocabulary of English. By contrast, whether an utterance of
“chink” (e.g., saying that “Chang is a chink”) is derogatory depends on contextual factors
such as intentions, situations, etc. Not all utterances of “chink” are derogatory, and not all
16

Many theories run into problems because they try to answer (Q2) with their answer to (Q1). For example, Hom’s

theory (§ 5.1) answers both questions in terms of truth-conditional content. “Chink” is a derogatory word because it has
a derogatory truth-conditional content. Similarly, saying that “Chang is a chink” is a derogatory utterance because the
derogatory content is predicated of Chang. As I will argue in chapter 5, theories like this are vulnerable to my objections
because they conflate these two questions, and they do not always succeed at answering both.
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of them are derogatory against the Chinese. As I will show in 2.9, certain utterances of
slurs can be non-derogatory, even if they contain derogatory words (e.g., used by a Chinese
comedian or between Chinese friends). It is not the case that an utterance of “chink” is
derogatory simply because it contains “chink,” a derogatory word.
Second, these two questions might receive different kinds of answers. It is possible
that question (Q1) is explained by semantic properties, whereas (Q2) is explained in terms
of pragmatic mechanisms such as implicatures or presuppositions.17 It might be argued
that “chink” is a derogatory word because of its semantic content, but calling someone
“chink” is derogatory because of what the utterance conversationally implicates. It is
theoretically useful to keep these two questions apart since they might be answered
differently.
After differentiating question (Q1) from (Q2), I need to clarify question (Q1). This is
because question (Q1) could be misunderstood in two ways. Therefore, I will explain this
question by showing what it is not asking for.
First, question (Q1) is not asking for a conceptual analysis or a definition of the
English word “slur.” Asking question (Q1) could be misunderstood as asking the
seemingly trivial question of “Why are slurs derogatory words?”, just like asking “Why is
a bachelor an unmarried man?”. This appears to be trivial because “slurs” seem to be
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“Semantic” and “pragmatic” are very controversial terminologies. For my definitions, see section 2.10.
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“derogatory words” by definition. Therefore, the answer to (Q1) is nothing but the trivial
observation that the term “slur” simply has part of its definition “derogatory word.”
I will defend the non-triviality of (Q1) by clarifying what this question asks for. The
above reading of (Q1) misrepresents it to be a definitional or conceptual question about the
meaning of the English word “slur.” In fact, what question (Q1) asks, for each slur like
“chink” and “honky,” is why it is derogatory. Answering (Q1) does not consist in
investigating if the term “slurs” means “derogatory words,” but specifying the semantic,
pragmatic properties of words like “chink” and how those properties make those words
derogatory. Therefore, (Q1) is not comparable to asking, “Why is a bachelor an unmarried
man?”; it is analogous to asking, “In virtue of what is John, a bachelor, unmarried?”
Answering this question requires specifying the personal factors that explain his being
single, rather than the trivial response that “bachelor” means “unmarried males.” Similarly,
(Q1) should not be understood as a trivial question asking for the definition of the term
“slur.”
Second, question (Q1) is not asking a historical question. Question (Q1) is ambiguous
between two readings. Consider an analogy: the question “why is the water boiling?” is
also ambiguous between two readings. In the first reading, the question is asking for the
thermodynamic property in virtue of which the water is boiling, i.e., the water molecules
have enough kinetic energy to break away and become steam. In the second reading, the
question is a historical one, asking for how the water acquired the thermodynamic property
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in virtue of which the water is boiling. The appropriate answers would be like “It is boiling
because I put it on the stove 10 minutes ago.”
Analogously, (Q1) “In virtue of what is a slur like ‘chink’ a derogatory word?” could
be misread as asking the historical question, i.e., when and how did “chink” historically
acquire the property in virtue of which it is derogatory. Potential answers to the historical
question include etymological explanations like “‘Chink’ acquired a negative meaning in
English in the 20th century when racists used the word for ‘a narrow opening’ to describe
the eyes of Chinese immigrants.” Despite the importance of the historical question, (Q1)
is not asking the historical question of how a slur like “chink” comes to be derogatory.
Answering (Q1) involves specifying the property in virtue of which a slur is derogatory,
not how and when the slur came to acquire that property.
After clarifying question (Q1), I need to explain my choice of terminology, especially
why I choose to call this feature “derogatory power,” instead of other commonly used terms
such as “derogatory force.”
What I call the “derogatory power” of slurs is commonly called “derogatory force”
in the literature.18 However, I will avoid using the term “derogatory force” because it can
be misleading in two ways. 19 First, “derogatory force” would be misunderstood as an
18

Derogatory power is also labeled “offensiveness” by some theorists. For my distinction between derogatory power

and offensiveness, see section 2.3.
19

The term “force,” borrowed from the force-content distinction in speech act theory, needs to be clarified since it can

be easily confused with “derogatory power.” I will talk about the “force” of promising, asserting, derogating, etc. Unless
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illocutionary force, e.g., the force of a promise. However, derogatory power is meant to
describe a property of a word. It is not an illocutionary force, which is a property of a
speech act, rather than a linguistic expression. 20 If derogatory power were called
“derogatory force,” my theory would appear to be explaining an illocutionary force with
an illocutionary force. This theory would look like a nonstarter. Second, “derogatory force”
could be misunderstood as a property of types of sentences, such as “interrogative force.”
Sometimes types of sentences, instead of illocutionary acts, are said to have “interrogative
force” or “imperative force.” For instance, the interrogative sentence “Is Chang there?”
may be said to have an “interrogative force” provided by the grammatical mood. Contrary
to this usage, I shall reserve the term “force” for illocutionary acts.

2.3 Offensiveness
In addition to derogatory power, slurs have the feature of offensiveness; they are words that
cause offense. Therefore, using them or even mentioning them can cause audiences to take
offense. Taking offense is a mental state in which the subject feels offended by something.
To offend someone is to cause the mental state of feeling offended. People often protest

specified as “derogatory power,” “interrogative force,” etc., my usage of the term “force” stands for illocutionary force
of illocutionary acts. For the basics of illocutionary force, see section 3.1.
20

Linguistic expressions may have an use to provide illocutionary force. However, this does not mean they have

illocutionary force by themselves. For instance, the phrase “I promise” itself is not a promise, if it sits in the dictionaries
without ever being used by someone.
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against the public usages of slurs such as naming the football team “Redskins” because
they feel hurt and upset by them (Cox 2014).
The offensiveness of slurs is commonly confused with the derogatory power of slurs.
Almost all theorists conflate these two features together. Therefore, the relation between
offensiveness and derogatory power should be clarified. Some theorists formulate the
questions about slurs in terms of their “offensiveness,” rather than “derogatory power”
(Bolinger 2015, Anderson and Lepore 2013). Instead of asking (Q1) “why are slurs
derogatory words?”, they formulate the questions as “why are slurs offensive words?”,
“why is the utterance ‘Chang is a chink’ offensive?”, etc. They are using “derogatory power”
and “offensiveness” interchangeably.
Nevertheless, I will argue that offensiveness is different from derogatory power.
Therefore, these two should be not conflated with each other. This is because (although
slurs are both derogatory and offensive) it is possible for (the types of) words to be
offensive without being derogatory, and vice versa.
First, words can be offensive without being derogatory. For instance, addressing a
staunch communist with the title “sir” was offensive to him in China during the Cold War
era. This is because of the communist ideology that those titles are used by the bourgeoisie,
and socialist citizens should be addressed with the title “comrade.” Therefore, the word
“sir” was offensive in China in the sense of producing the psychological effect of feeling
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offended, even if it is an honorific title to show respect. A word can be offensive in this
sense without being derogatory.
Second, words can be derogatory without causing offense. A word can be derogatory,
even if no one feels offended by it. A good example is archaic derogatory words. The
ancient Greek word “κατάπυγον” is a pejorative for the passive participants in homosexual
relationships. It remains a derogatory word, even if no one feels hurt by it anymore
(because it is archaic).
In addition to (the types of) words, it is also possible for utterances to be offensive
without being derogatory, and vice versa. For example, unwittingly praising a thirdgeneration Chinese Canadian with “Your English is so good! Where are you from?” is not
derogatory. However, it is still offensive because the hearer can be offended by the
presupposition that he is not a true Canadian. Furthermore, criticizing the ancient
Carthaginians by saying “Carthaginians are terrible!” is derogatory, but it hardly offends
anyone nowadays.
Having distinguished offensiveness from derogatory power, we can now analyze the
former feature into corresponding questions. Just like the two questions about the
derogatory power, explaining the offensiveness of slurs requires answering the two related
questions, (Q3) and (Q4).

(Q3) Type Offensiveness: In virtue of what is a slur like “chink” an offensive word?
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(Q4) Token Offensiveness: In virtue of what is the utterance of a slur (e.g., “Chang is a
chink”) an offensive utterance?

Before ending this section, I need to address an objection against my formulation of
offensiveness as causing offense. It might be argued that offensiveness is not the same as
causing offense. In the ordinary use of “offensive,” we sometimes describe a word as
“offensive,” even if the audiences do not feel offended by it. Imagine a situation where I
call my friend “asshole,” and he is amused instead of feeling offended. It seems that
“asshole” remains an “offensive” word (in the sense that it can be used as an attack or an
offense against my friend), even if it does not cause the audience to feel offended.
My response is that the ordinary use of “offensive” is ambiguous. In the first sense,
this term has been used to describe offensiveness as causing offense. I endorse this sense
because this is the most common sense in ordinary language, as well as in the literature on
slurs. In addition, “offensive” does have a second sense in which offensiveness can be
equated with derogatory power; a word is “offensive” because it is a tool to derogate or
attack the target, no matter how the target feels. The objection above is based on this sense
of offensiveness as being derogatory. However, to say a word is “offensive” in this sense
is just another way to say it is a “derogatory” word. It is unnecessary to address the second
sense, since almost no one in the literature uses it and my discussions on the derogatory
power have already covered it.
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2.4 Truth-Conditional Contribution
The term “neutral counterparts” is essential for characterizing the truth-conditional
contribution of slurs. A neutral counterpart of a slur is a linguistic expression that seems to
share the same referent, descriptive content, or truth-conditional contribution as the slur,
without being a derogatory word. For instance, “Chinese” is the neutral counterpart of the
slur “chink,” because both seem to refer to the same people. Although some theorists agree
that “Chinese” is the neutral counterpart of “chink,” they deny that “chink” actually refers
to the same people as “Chinese” (Hom 2008). My definition of “neutral counterparts”
leaves the issue of their referents open to debate.
In addition, I need to clarify a related term: “truth-conditional content.” I will use
“truth-conditional content” interchangeably with “truth-conditional contribution,”
“referent,” and “descriptive content.” However, what do I exactly mean by “truthconditional content”? This term is ambiguous between 1) a content that determines the
truth-condition (or what is said) of a sentence or an utterance, and 2) a content that has a
truth-condition (i.e., it can be true or false), even if it does not determine the truth-condition
of a sentence or an utterance. Although the second sense is common, I use the term “truthconditional content” in the first sense; it does not mean any content that has a truth-
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condition. Suppose a speaker conventionally implicates that p in saying that q. 21 The
conventional implicature could be described as a “truth-conditional content” in the second
sense since it has a content which has the truth-condition that p. However, my usage does
not take the conventional implicature that p to be a “truth-conditional content.” The “truthconditional content” of his utterance should be q because the truth-condition of the
utterance is determined by what is said.
Given these definitions, we are ready to address the feature of truth-conditional
contribution of slurs, which raises further questions. For example, “Chinese” is the neutral
counterpart of “chink.” It appears that both words are co-referential; “chink,” after all, is a
derogatory word for the Chinese. However, does “chink” really have the same referent as
“Chinese”? Do they make the same contribution to the truth condition such that they are
interchangeable without altering the truth value? Let us label this question (Q5).

(Q5) Truth-Conditional Contribution: Does a slur (e.g., “chink”) make the same
contribution to the truth-conditional content as its neutral counterpart (e.g.,
“Chinese”)?

21

For a brief introduction to implicatures, see section 5.2.
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Here is another way to put the question. Compare again following sentence (1) with
(2), where “chink” is replaced with its neutral counterpart “Chinese.” Suppose Chang is
indeed Chinese. Thus (2) must be true, and (4) below must be false. How about the truth
value of (1)? Is it true or false? Maybe it has no truth value at all? The truth value of (1)
affects the truth value of (3), its negation, as well. If (1) is true, (3) must be false, and vice
versa. If (1) lacks truth value, (3) probably lacks truth value too.

(1)

Chang is a chink

(2)

Chang is a Chinese

(3)

Chang is not a chink

(4)

Chang is not a Chinese

Question (Q5) can be potentially answered in three ways. The first option is, “Yes,
they do make the same contribution as their neutral counterparts.” If Chang is Chinese,
sentence (3) should be false. I will adopt this position in my force indicator theory. The
other two options both answer “No” to question (Q5). The second option holds that “Slurs
make different contributions.” It follows that sentence (3) is true, even if Chang is Chinese.
Finally, the third option is that slurs deprive sentences of their truth values. Therefore,
sentence (3) is neither true nor false. For the details of my position and alternative views,
see section 4.1.
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2.5 Independence
Before introducing this feature, I need to define two terms. First, the term “derogatory
dimension” (or “derogatory aspect”) will be used to refer to whatever element of slurs
makes them derogatory. For instance, the slur “chink” has an extra derogatory dimension
that its neutral counterpart “Chinese” lacks. This vague term is deliberately introduced to
replace the so-called “derogatory content” or “derogatory message” of slurs. It is more
neutral in describing the features of slurs because it is inclusive of theories that refuse to
explain slurs in terms of propositional contents. For instance, the prohibitionist theory
would hold that “chink” expresses the same propositional content as “Chinese”; the only
difference is the extra-linguistic (non-linguistic) property of being prohibited by society
(see section 5.4). If the derogatory dimension of slurs were labeled “derogatory contents,”
the prohibitionist theory would not get off the ground in the first place.
Second, I need to clarify my usage of the term “content,” which is notoriously
ambiguous. Is a “content” always a proposition? Can a non-cognitive attitude such as
contempt be a content? The best way to avoid such ambiguity is to avoid using the term
“content.” When I use the term “content” in this dissertation, it will always be qualified as
“truth-conditional content,” “propositional content,” “non-propositional content,” etc. In
rare cases where I use “content” without qualifications, it includes both propositional and
non-propositional contents. For instance, I might describe the contempt for the Chinese as
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the “content” of a conventional implicature (see §5.2). This terminological choice is made
to ensure fairness for the non-propositional theories of slurs; I do not want the “contents”
of slurs to be propositional by definition.22 Nevertheless, I will do my best to avoid using
“content” in this unqualified sense.
We are ready to introduce the third feature of slurs, namely, their independence or
descriptive detachability (Whiting 2013, 364, Hornsby 2001, 129, Schlenker 2007, 238,
Hay 2013, 455). For any given slur, we can also find a neutral counterpart that shares the
same truth-conditional content without being a derogatory word. In other words, the
derogatory dimension of slurs seems independent or detachable from their truthconditional content. For instance, “Chinese” is the neutral word that seems to share the
referent of “chink” without sharing its derogatory dimension. “Black people” has the same
descriptive content as the N-word, but it is not a derogatory word.
This feature can be clarified by contrasting slurs with other kinds of words. Unlike
slurs, the derogatory dimensions of many words are not independent or detachable from
their truth-conditional contents. That is, they do not have neutral counterparts that share
the same referents without also being derogatory. Consider general pejoratives such as
“asshole,” “jerk,” “bitch.” What is the neutral counterpart of “asshole”? It is impossible to
find a word that refers to the same kind of people without being derogatory. One might be
22

Non-propositional theories of contents are rare, but they do exist. For instance, a pure expressivist semantics of moral

language might take the semantic content of “Stealing is wrong” to be an evaluative attitude against stealing, rather than
a proposition.
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tempted to give “mean, despicable person” as an answer. However, “mean, despicable
person” itself is pejorative. It is also unclear if “mean, despicable person” really has the
same referent as “asshole.”
Finally, we can summarize the question regarding this feature as follows:

(Q6) Independence: Why is the derogatory dimension of “chink” independent from its
truth-conditional content?

2.6 Descriptive Ineffability
Another interesting feature of slurs is their descriptive ineffability (Hom 2010, 166, Potts
2007, 176, Whiting 2013, 365, Schlenker 2007, 239). The derogatory dimension of slurs
cannot be satisfactorily paraphrased in purely descriptive, non-expressivist terms.23 When
a sentence or an utterance containing a slur is paraphrased in descriptive terms, the
derogatory dimension seems lost. For instance, paraphrasing (1) “Chang is a chink” as
“Chang is a Chinese and I have negative attitudes toward the Chinese” loses something in
translation.24 That is, the paraphrase ceases to be derogatory. It seems that the derogatory
dimension is not retained in describing someone’s attitudes about the Chinese. This
23

Expressivist terms are words that “express” non-cognitive attitudes such as contempt, disapproval, desires. Examples

include swear words, pejoratives, and moral terms. A non-expressivist term is a term that is not conventionally used to
express non-cognitive attitudes.
24

It is tempting to paraphrase “Chang is a chink” as something like “Chang is a Chinese and the Chinese are terrible.”

However, this would not be a purely descriptive paraphrase, since “terrible” is an evaluative term.
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suggests that the derogatory dimension of slurs differs from the descriptive content in some
way. But why is this the case? Let us label this question (Q7).

(Q7) Descriptive Ineffability: Why cannot the derogatory dimension of “chink” be
satisfactorily paraphrased in purely descriptive terms?

Notice that descriptive ineffability does not mean the impossibility of describing or
reporting someone’s using a slur. Descriptive ineffability is merely about paraphrasing a
certain element of slurs. Suppose a speaker derogates Chang by calling him “chink.” It is
indeed possible to describe what he has done, i.e., “He derogates Chang by calling him a
‘chink.’” Descriptive ineffability does not rule out this kind of description.
Finally, I have to defend descriptive ineffability from the objection that it is nothing
but the independence of slurs. Asking (Q7) why the derogatory dimension of a slur cannot
be paraphrased in descriptive terms seems to be the same as asking (Q6) why the
derogatory dimension is independent of its descriptive content. Therefore, there is no need
to list descriptive ineffability as a different feature than independence.
My response is that independence and descriptive ineffability are two distinct features
because of the theoretical possibility to have one of them without the other. In other words,
question (Q6) and (Q7) are logically independent of each other. First, it is possible for a
derogatory word to have independence without descriptive ineffability. Suppose the
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derogatory dimension of “chink” is the derogatory presupposition that the Chinese are
inferior. Such a presupposition is independent of the truth-conditional content but is not
ineffable. Second, it is also possible for a derogatory word to have the feature of descriptive
ineffability without independence. Slurs might be explained like thick evaluative terms
such as “cowardice.” “Cowardice” does not exhibit independence, because its derogatory
dimension depends on the descriptive content, such that there is no neutral counterpart for
“cowardice.” In addition, it might be argued that the derogatory dimension of slurs, like
thick terms, are non-cognitive attitudes such as disapprovals or displeasures. Since noncognitive attitudes have no propositional contents, they exhibit descriptive ineffability (e.g.,
consider paraphrasing what is expressed by “boo!”). To sum up, independence and
descriptive ineffability should be distinguished from one another. Question (Q6) and (Q7)
should not be conflated together.

2.7 Perspective Dependence
Before I introduce this feature, I need to clarify my use of the term “express.” The term
“express” is ambiguous between a speaker’s expressing something (e.g., what is expressed
in speaker’s meaning) and a word’s expressing something (e.g., what is expressed in the
semantic content). Some theories might take the derogatory dimension of a slur to be
expressed by the slur itself, whereas others might take it to be expressed by the speaker,
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not the word. However, I will leave the sense of “express” open to both senses, so as to
remain neutral between different theories.
Now I can introduce another feature of slurs, i.e., their perspective dependence or
agent-centeredness. That is, they are said to express the derogatory attitudes of the speaker
(Hom 2010, 169, Schlenker 2007, 239, Bolinger 2015, 1, Potts 2007, 166, Hay 2013). As
Potts (2007, 166) points out, “the perspective encoded in the expressive aspects of an
utterance is always the speaker’s.” Imagine a racist speaker commenting on Chang’s
ethnicity by uttering (1) “Chang is a chink.” This utterance expresses a negative attitude
against the Chinese. But whose attitude is this negative attitude? Whose “perspective” does
it reflect? The negative attitudes expressed by (1) seems to belong to the racist speaker, not
others. If this is the case, we can formulate the question about this feature as follows:

(Q8) Perspective Dependence: Why does an utterance of “chink” express the negative
attitude of the speaker, rather than others?

Slurs seem to be perspective dependent in more complicated cases. Consider an
example of belief reports. Compare utterance (5) with (6).

(5)

Bob believes that Chang is a chink.

(6)

Bob believes that Chang is a Chinese.
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If a speaker utters (6), he is merely reporting the belief of Bob. However, uttering (5)
expresses a negative attitude (of his own) toward the Chinese, in addition to reporting
Bob’s belief. The question is: whose racist attitude does (5) bring to light? A natural reading,
suggested by Hay (2013, 461), is that (5) expresses the attitudes of the speaker, not
necessarily Bob’s. After all, it is compatible with (5) that Bob has no negative attitudes
toward the Chinese; he merely believes that Chang is Chinese. If the negative attitudes
expressed are not Bob’s, they belong to the speaker.25

2.8 Historical Variability
Slurs are said to exhibit historical variability (Hom 2010, 166). That is, how derogatory a
slur is can change over time. On the one hand, slurs can become less derogatory or cease
to be derogatory words over time. For instance, the slur “queer” used to be a very
derogatory word against homosexuals. It has become less derogatory in English because it
has been “appropriated” or “reclaimed” by the LGBTQ community. On the other hand,
certain slurs become more derogatory over time. It has been observed that the derogatory
25

However, this intuition has been contested. Hom (2010, 169) has proposed exceptions in which slurs do not seem to

express the attitudes of the speakers. Reading “I am not prejudiced against the Chinese, but Bob believes that Chang is a
chink” in a certain way, it seems to report the negative attitude of Bob, rather than the speaker’s.
An adequate answer to question (Q8) should account for such a seeming exception to perspective dependence. It should
either explain why there is such an exception or deny it by explaining it away. I will defend the position that slurs always
express the negative attitudes of the speaker; For the details of my analysis, see 4.5.
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strength of “wetback” and “beaner” has recently increased because of social and political
changes in the U.S. (Hom 2010, 166).
Even neutral words can become derogatory and eventually become slurs over time.
An interesting example is the Chinese word “gongzhi,” which literally translates to “public
intellectuals.” This word was popularized in the early 2000s by the liberal Chinese media
to describe intellectuals who engage with public issues. These intellectuals gained
influence and prestige on the Chinese Internet by advocating for social progress and
political reforms. However, propaganda and crackdowns led to a change in the word.
Conservative media and Internet users started using “gongzhi” as a slur; they now verbally
abuse public intellectuals by labeling them “gongzhi.” Consequently, this word has
acquired a derogatory meaning, although it was neutral at the beginning.
The question about historical variability can be summarized as follows:

(Q9) Historical Variability: In virtue of what can a slur become more derogatory or less
derogatory over time?

2.9 Non-Derogatory Utterances of Slurs
Theories of slurs all have to face a puzzle: if slurs are derogatory words, how is it ever
possible to use them in a non-derogatory way? It has been suggested by many that, as a
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tool for derogation, slurs can be used in many ways other than derogation (Jeshion 2013,
233, Diaz-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton 2019).
Here is an example to illustrate the puzzle. Compare utterance (7) and (8) of the same
sentence. Imagine a situation in which a white supremacist is giving a speech about the
danger of incoming Chinese immigrants. He warns the audience by uttering (8) “Chinks
are coming!” In utterance (8), the speaker uses a derogatory word to say something
derogatory. By contrast, imagine another situation where radical Chinese activists gather
together to protest against racism. They want to show that they are not intimidated by racial
oppression by chanting (7) “Chinks are coming!”. The radical Chinese activists, in
utterance (7), deliberately abuse the derogatory word to protest racism. Although a
derogatory word is used, their utterances are not derogatory. Perhaps they are sending a
rebellious message that they are not afraid of the oppression imposed on them. However,
a puzzle remains to be solved: how is it even possible to use a derogatory word in a nonderogatory way? If “chink” is a derogatory word, why is (7) not as derogatory as (8)?

(7)

Chinks are coming! (Chanted by radical Chinese activists in a rally against racism)

(8)

Chinks are coming! (uttered by a white supremacist in a speech against Chinese
immigrant)
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Some readers might be confused by my example of non-derogatory utterance. How
can utterance (7) be non-derogatory given that it still seems problematic in certain ways?
Isn’t the so-called “non-derogatory utterance” simply relabeling appropriation of slurs?
Therefore, I need to make two clarifications. First, claiming that utterance (7) is nonderogatory is not to say that it is unproblematic. My analysis does not deny that such nonderogatory usages can be bad or harmful. Non-derogatory uses of slurs can still be
offensive (see § 2.3 and § 4.4). Their offensiveness may be harmful by causing emotional
turmoil for the victims of oppression. Utterance (7) may be problematic for reasons such
as offensiveness, but it is not problematic because of being derogatory. Even if utterance
(7) should be denounced, it should not be denounced for the same reason that utterance (8)
should be denounced. Second, my examples of non-derogatory uses of slurs are often
described as “appropriation of slurs.” However, the term “appropriation” is ambiguous
between two senses. Non-derogatory uses of slurs are cases of “appropriation” only in one
sense. I will elaborate on this in the following section.
Given these considerations, I shall introduce a question concerning the nonderogatory utterances of slurs:

(Q10) Non-derogatory Utterance: How can an utterance of a slur (e.g., “chinks are
coming”) be non-derogatory if the slur is a derogatory word?
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2.10 Appropriation of Slurs
Before introducing this feature, I have to define my usage of the term “meaning” and
“semantic.” I am not endorsing the view that “semantic” and “meaning” concern only the
truth-conditional content of an expression. Therefore, when I discuss the “semantic”
features or the “meaning” of slurs, I do not limit them to the truth-conditional, propositional
content of slurs. In contrast, my position on the semantic-pragmatic boundary can be called
“the type view” (Ezcurdia and Stainton 2013). By “semantics,” I mean the study of
meanings of the type of an expression, whereas pragmatics studies the utterances or tokens
of expressions in contexts. When I talk about the “meaning” of an expression, I mean what
is expressed by (or assigned to) the type of a linguistic expression. The type view would
include non-truth-conditional elements into meaning. For instance, the derogatory
dimension of the type of a slur could be a part of its meaning, even if it did not affect the
truth condition. Another example is “hello.” Its meaning includes the use of greeting people,
which is associated with the type of the word. Therefore, its meaning consists of something
non-truth-conditional. Since this dissertation is not about the semantics-pragmatics
boundary, I will leave this view to be defended in other papers. Clarifying my terminology
should be enough for defining the features of slurs.
A crucial phenomenon usually related to historical variability and non-derogatory
uses is the appropriation or reclamation of slurs (Hom 2008, 427, Jeshion 2013, 233).
However, the term “appropriation” or “reclamation” is ambiguous between two distinct
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senses. I shall draw a distinction between the semantic appropriation and pragmatic
appropriation of slurs.
The semantic appropriation of a slur happens when the victims of slurs manage to
take back the word by changing its meaning into something less derogatory. Consequently,
the word itself becomes less derogatory, regardless of how people use it. This is a semantic
change in the meaning of slurs over time: hence, “semantic appropriation” or “semantic
reclamation.” The typical example of this is the slur “queer.” Originally used to describe
homosexuals who were perceived to be strange and odd, this word became a slur for them
as early as the 19th century. In the 1980s, LGBTQ communities began to reclaim or
appropriate this slur. Homosexual people started to embrace this word as a distinct symbol
of their non-conformity to heterosexual norms. Consequently, the meaning of “queer”
started to shift toward a neutral meaning (even though its referent remained the same).
According to Oxford English Dictionary, “although originally chiefly derogatory, since the
late 1980s it has been used as a neutral or positive term, originally by some homosexuals.”26
The pragmatic appropriation of a slur is the phenomenon whereby the group targeted
by a slur merely uses it in a non-derogatory way, for purposes such as showing camaraderie
or pride. Unlike semantic appropriation, the pragmatically appropriated slur remains a
derogatory word; what becomes non-derogatory is a particular usage in a specific context.

26
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This would be analogous to a speaker’s deliberately calling a dog a “cat”; the term “cat”
still means cats, even if it is used to refer to a dog. This kind of appropriation is a pragmatic
phenomenon, rather than a semantic one. An example of pragmatic appropriation might be
the N-word; it is sometimes used in a non-derogatory way within the African-American
community as a sign of solidarity and the shared history of oppression (Jeshion 2013, 233).
As Randall Kennedy (2003) has observed, this slur has also been used for compliments,
showing affection, and even showing respect within the African American community. An
example from Kennedy (2003, 30) is “James Brown is a straight-up n**ger.” Despite these
non-derogatory usages, the N-word remains undoubtedly a derogatory word.
Despite the difference between semantic and pragmatic appropriation, these two are
still related in a way. That is, semantic appropriation can happen as a result of a pattern of
pragmatic appropriations. As the example of “queer” shows, a slur might cease to be a
derogatory word because the linguistic community has been using it in a non-derogatory
way regularly. This relation is not mysterious from the meta-semantic point of view. It is
merely a case of how changes in uses of a word result in the change in the meaning.
After disambiguating “appropriation” into two senses, it is clear that appropriation is
not an independent phenomenon; both semantic and pragmatic appropriation collapse into
other features of slurs ultimately. First, semantic appropriation is no more than an instance
of historical variability. In semantic appropriation, a slur has been “appropriated” such that
it becomes less derogatory. Therefore, an explanation of historical variability automatically
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explains how slurs can be semantically appropriated. Second, pragmatic appropriation is a
case of non-derogatory utterances of slurs. In pragmatic appropriation, a slur remains a
derogatory word. However, the utterance of that slur ceases to derogatory, because of a
certain pragmatic mechanism. This is the same puzzle as the one introduced in 2.9, which
concerns how the derogatory word “chink” could be used in non-derogatory utterances.
Because of this, the appropriation of slurs is not an independent phenomenon. I will
not raise question specifically for appropriation. Explaining this feature is simply to answer
question (Q9) and question (Q10).

2.11 Non-Displaceability
One of the most crucial features of slurs is their non-displaceability or scopelessness. Slurs
seem to make the whole sentences derogatory even when embedded within the scope of
connectives like negations and conditionals (Hom 2010, 168, Croom 2011, 345, Schlenker
2007, 238, Potts 2007, 166, Bolinger 2015). The feature of being derogatory seems to
“project through” the scope of connectives. For example, (1) “Chang is a chink” is no doubt
derogatory. Embedding it within the scope of a negation or a conditional makes the whole
sentence derogatory.27 This point is clear from the following examples:

27

An embedded slur makes a sentence a derogatory sentence. Whether the utterance of the sentence is derogatory

depends on other factors.
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(1)

Chang is a chink

(3)

Chang is not a chink

(9)

If Chang is a chink, he celebrates Lunar New Year.

Notice that not all expressivist words are non-displaceable. Compare the examples
above with the examples of general pejoratives below. Saying that (10) “Chang is an
asshole” is surely derogatory. However, embedding the general pejorative “asshole” within
the scope of connectives does not make the whole sentence derogatory, at least in the
following examples. Unlike (10), (11) seems to deny the negative attitudes about Chang.
Similarly, (12) does not express anything derogatory toward Chang; it is compatible with
“Chang is not an asshole!”

(10)

Chang is an asshole.

(11)

Chang is not an asshole.

(12)

If Chang is an asshole, he celebrates Lunar New Year.

Given the phenomenon illustrated above, we can summarize the question about nondisplaceability as follows:

54

(Q11) Non-Displaceability: Why does a sentence containing a slur (e.g., “chink”) remain
derogatory, even if the slur is embedded within the scope of connectives?

2.12 The Kaplanian Inference Puzzle
Slurs give rise to a Kaplanian inference puzzle or the deduction puzzle, in which slurs seem
to affect the course of inferences (Hom 2010, 167, Sennet and Copp 2015, 1087, Kaplan
unpublished). In his unpublished manuscripts, Kaplan proposes various sample inferences
in which expressives such as “damn” seem to affect the validity of inferences. This
motivates him to incorporate uses into semantics and embrace a broader notion of validity.
His examples have been extended to slurs. Slurs appear to affect the validity of inferences
in a similar way. These examples are labeled the “Kaplanian inference puzzle” instead of
“Kaplan’s inference puzzle” because they are not the original examples Kaplan used.
I shall illustrate this puzzle with my examples below. Compare inference (13) with
(14). Notice that the inferences are made from sentences to sentences, not from
propositions to propositions. A person who accepts the premise of inference (13) is not
committed to accepting its conclusion. For instance, a non-racist person might agree that
“The Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year,” but find the conclusion, “the chinks celebrate
Lunar New Year,” objectionable. Therefore, inference (13) seems “invalid” in some sense.
By contrast, someone who accepts the premise of inference (14) is committed to accepting
its conclusion. If he agrees that “the chinks celebrate Lunar New Year” for whatever reason,
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he should also agree that “the Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year.” Inference (14) seems
like a logically valid argument.

(13) The Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year.
Therefore, the chinks celebrate Lunar New Year.
(14) The chinks celebrate Lunar New Year.
Therefore, the Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year.

Here is a caveat on the notion of validity. It might be objected that what the two
examples illustrate is not validity or invalidity. This is because validity is nothing but the
preservation of truth, and despite its appearance, (13) is valid because the truth of the
premise guarantees the truth of the conclusion.
Here is my defense of the Kaplanian inference puzzle: notwithstanding the verbal
dispute over whether it should be described in terms of “validity,” this is a genuine feature
of slurs that is worth investigating. If it should not be labeled as “validity,” then we can
still study it under labels such as “schmadity.” Acknowledging this feature is not to deny
the validity of (13) in the sense of truth-preservation. Despite its “validity” in the traditional
sense, inference (13) is unacceptable or defective in a certain way.
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I shall reformulate the question over the Kaplanian inference puzzle as follows. This
formulation presents the feature in a neutral way that does not involve controversial terms
such as “validity.”

(Q12) Kaplanian inference puzzle: Why is someone not committed to accepting the
conclusion “The chinks celebrate Lunar New Year,” if he accepts the premise “The
Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year”?

2.13 Self-Defeating Sentences
Simply containing slurs can make certain sentences self-defeating. I shall call this “the
puzzle of self-defeating sentences.” Consider sentences (15) and (16) below, as well as
examples like “Glory to the chinks!”, and “I apologize for my discrimination against the
chinks.” Intuitively, something is wrong with them; these sentences seem to be selfdefeating or self-inconsistent in a certain way. Whatever the literal uses of these sentences
are, these uses cannot be fulfilled satisfactorily. This is not to say that they cannot be used
at all. Self-defeating sentences can be used, but not in a satisfactory, literal way. When
they are used, the hearers tend to resolve their inconsistency by hearing them as sarcastic
or non-literal. When a speaker utters “Praise the chinks,” he is likely to be interpreted to
be either sarcastic in praising or sarcastic in derogation. If there is a kind of inconsistency
in those self-defeating sentences, what is it?
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(15) Praise the chinks!
(16) I apologize for my discrimination against the chinks.

I shall label the question of this puzzle as follows:

(Q13) Self-defeating Sentences: Why does “chink” make the sentence “Praise the chinks!”
self-defeating?

One might deny this feature of slurs by rejecting the inconsistency in the so-called
“self-defeating sentences.” There can be two ways to reject it. I will defend this feature
from these two objections.
First, consider a counterexample, “Praise chinks for their wonderful food culture!”
It might be argued that there is no inconsistency in this “self-defeating sentence.” This is
because nothing is inconsistent for a racist speaker to derogate the Chinese overall but
praise their food culture in particular. Derogating a group is compatible with praising a
particular aspect of the group, and vice versa. I agree that this example does not exhibit
inconsistency. However, this cannot serve as a counterexample because the incompatibility
in my examples is between derogating the Chinese and praising the Chinese, not a
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particular aspect of them such as the food culture. It is still impossible to use sentence (15)
to both derogate the Chinese and praise them overall.
Second, it might be argued that sentence (15) “Praise the chinks!” itself exhibits no
inconsistency in certain contexts. Therefore, praising the Chinese and derogating the
Chinese can be compatible in (15). Imagine a Chinese-food-loving racist commenting on
Chinese restaurants with “We would not have these wonderful restaurants without their
amazing food! So, praise the Chinks!”28 However, I insist that (the type of) sentence (15)
itself remains inconsistent. Despite this, the token utterance of (15) in this context sounds
consistent because of pragmatic mechanisms such as pragmatic enrichment. The hearer
interprets it as derogating the Chinese overall while praising their food culture, narrowing
the content of the praise from the Chinese to their food culture. This could be analogous to
hearing the inconsistent sentence “Yesterday was rainy and sunny.” It may sound
consistent in certain contexts, because the hearer may interpret it as “Yesterday was rainy
for a while and sunny for a while,” narrowing the concept from “raining all day” to “raining
for a while.”

28

Thanks to Robert Statinton for the counterexample.
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2.14 Summary
In this chapter, I have introduced the main features of slurs. These features are analyzed
and reformulated into a list of questions for theories of slurs. It turns out that some features
involve more than one question and some features collapse into other features. It is
therefore helpful to list the questions introduced so far. Readers can come back to this
section for reference.

(Q1) Type Derogatory Power: In virtue of what is a slur like “chink” a derogatory word?
(Q2) Token Derogatory Power: In virtue of what is the utterance of a slur (e.g., “Chang is
a chink”) a derogatory utterance?
(Q3) Type Offensiveness: In virtue of what is a slur like “chink” an offensive word?
(Q4) Token Offensiveness: In virtue of what is the utterance of a slur (e.g., “Chang is a
chink”) an offensive utterance?
(Q5) Truth-Conditional Contribution: Does a slur (e.g., “chink”) make the same
contribution to the truth-conditional content as its neutral counterpart (e.g.,
“Chinese”)?
(Q6) Independence: Why is the derogatory dimension of “chink” independent from its
truth-conditional content?
(Q7) Descriptive Ineffability: Why cannot the derogatory dimension of “chink” be
satisfactorily paraphrased in purely descriptive terms?
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(Q8) Perspective Dependence: Why does an utterance of “chink” express the negative
attitude of the speaker, rather than others?
(Q9) Historical Variability: In virtue of what can a slur become more derogatory or less
derogatory over time?
(Q10)

Non-derogatory Utterance: How can an utterance of a slur (e.g., “chinks are
coming”) be non-derogatory if the slur is a derogatory word?

(Q11) Non-Displaceability: Why does a sentence containing a slur (e.g., “chink”) remain
derogatory, even if the slur is embedded within the scope of connectives?
(Q12) Kaplanian inference puzzle: Why is someone not committed to accepting the
conclusion “The chinks celebrate Lunar New Year,” if he accepts the premise “The
Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year”?
(Q13) Self-defeating Sentences: Why does “chink” make the sentence “Praise the chinks!”
self-defeating?

My illocutionary force indicator theory of slurs answers these questions from the
approach of speech act theory. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce the basic notions of
speech act theory in the following chapter.
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3 Preliminaries on Illocutionary Acts
The last chapter surveyed the features of slurs and corresponding questions about them.
The best approach to these questions, I believe, is to explain slurs from the perspective of
speech act theory. That is, slurs such as “chink” should be understood by their use to
perform illocutionary acts, specifically, to derogate people. They are comparable to
illocutionary force indicators like “I promise,” the paradigmatic use of which is to make
promises.
However, questions remain to be answered before developing an illocutionary force
indicator theory of slurs: What are illocutionary forces (e.g., promising, asserting,
derogating, etc.)? What do force indicators like “I promise” do? When I perform an
illocutionary act (e.g., promising to give you money), how is the illocutionary force
determined, especially by force indicators like “I promise”? It is, therefore, necessary for
this chapter to introduce the theoretical background of speech act theory and clarify the
theoretical framework of my illocutionary force indicator theory.
These questions will be answered in the following sections. Section 3.1 introduces the
basic notions of speech act theory such as illocutionary acts, their illocutionary force,
felicity conditions, etc. In section 3.2, I will introduce illocutionary force indicators and
propositional indicators. I will show their roles in determining the illocutionary force and
the propositional content of illocutionary acts. In section 3.3, I will address how
illocutionary force indicators help to determine the illocutionary force of utterances. My
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view is that force indicators provide the default interpretation in interpreting illocutionary
force. It can hence be labeled “the default interpretation view.”

3.1 Basics of Illocutionary Acts
“Speech acts” are the acts we perform with language. It is no surprise that language is used
to do lots of things, rather than merely describing things. We say “Hello!” to greet people
and say “Can I have a coffee?” to order drinks. We can also utter words to amuse people
(e.g., telling a joke) or just to pronounce certain words (e.g., trying to pronounce the word
“illocutionary”). Although these speech acts are all performed with language, they fall into
different categories.
Austin (1962, 94) distinguishes three kinds of speech acts, i.e., locutionary acts,
illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts. First, locutionary acts are acts of saying
something. Austin’s example is a speaker’s saying “Shoot her!”; He means “to photograph”
by “shoot” and Maria by “her.” Locutionary acts can be further divided into phonetic acts
(i.e., the act of producing certain noise), phatic acts (i.e., acts of uttering words and
sentences in a language), and rhetic acts (acts of meaning and referring by those words).
For instance, “He said ‘I shall be there’” reports a phatic act whereas “He meant that he
would be there” reports a rhetic act. Second, illocutionary acts are the acts of doing
something in saying something. Consider Austin’s example again. In saying “Shoot her,”
the speaker performs the illocutionary act of urging the hearer to photograph her. Further
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examples of illocutionary acts include ordering, warning, or undertaking, etc. Illocutionary
acts are taxonomized by their “illocutionary force.” For example, all illocutionary acts of
promising, despite their propositional contents, share the same illocutionary force of
promising. Third, perlocutionary acts are acts of doing something by saying something.
Saying something sometimes produces effects on the thoughts, feelings, actions of the
hearers (perlocutionary effects). The act of producing these effects by saying something
are called “perlocutionary acts.” Typical perlocutionary acts include convincing,
persuading, and deterring, etc. In Austin’s example of saying “Shoot her,” the
perlocutionary act is the act of persuading the hearer to photograph her.
Here is one question I have to address: what is the relation between utterances and
illocutionary acts? Suppose I promise to give you money by uttering (17) “I promise that I
will give you money.” Is the act of promising identical with the utterance? Or is the
illocutionary act something distinct from the utterance, e.g., an effect caused by the
utterance? As I have said in section 2.2, I take an utterance to be an act of producing a
token of a sentence or other linguistic expressions. Therefore, an utterance corresponds to
a “locutionary act” in Austin’s framework (except for practicing, performing, etc., where
the speaker does not mean what she says). As a locutionary act, an utterance of a sentence,
produced in the right circumstances, can be an illocutionary act. In other words, that
utterance is token-identical with an illocutionary act. For example, when I promise to give
you money by uttering (17) “I promise that I will give you money” under the right context,

64

there is one single act under different descriptions. The same act can be both described as
an utterance of a sentence (e.g., Chang says “I promise that I will give you money”) or
described as an illocutionary act of promising (e.g., Chang promises to give you money).
This answer should be enough for clarifying the relation between utterances and
illocutionary acts. I will leave it undefended since this dissertation is not about philosophy
of action.

(17) I promise that I will give you money.

Having introduced illocutionary acts, we can further distinguish two components of
them. A distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content is often drawn
within the structure of illocutionary acts (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 1). The distinction
between force and content can be shown by the variation of illocutionary acts. For instance,
promising that I will give you money has the same propositional content as predicting that
I will give you money, but they differ in illocutionary forces. Similarly, illocutionary acts
can share illocutionary force but not propositional contents. Promising that I will give you
money has the same force as promising that John will come. The difference between the
two lies in the propositional content.
A few things should be noticed about the “propositional content” of illocutionary acts.
First, this term, used in speech act theory, should not be confused with “semantic contents”
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(or the “truth-conditional content”) of sentences or utterances. The term “propositional
content” is used to describe a property of an illocutionary act, rather than a property of a
sentence or an utterance. For example, the proposition that I will give you money can be
the “propositional content” of my act promising to give you money, but not the “semantic
content” of (17) “I promise that I will give you money.” Second, the “propositional
contents” of illocutionary acts, despite their name, do not have to be fully propositional
(Searle 1969, 30). For instance, welcoming someone by saying “welcome!” does not
contain a proposition as its content. After all, it is the people, not propositions, that are
welcomed.
The next step, after distinguishing between force and content, is to give an analysis of
the illocutionary force of derogation. Searle and Vanderveken (1985) analyze illocutionary
force by describing its seven elements, i.e., illocutionary point, degree of strength of the
illocutionary point, mode of achievement, propositional content condition, preparatory
condition, sincerity condition, and degree of strength of sincerity condition.
I will explain the seven elements of illocutionary force in turn. First, an illocutionary
point characterizes the purpose essential to a type of illocutionary act. For instance, the
illocutionary point of making a promise to do something is to commit the speaker to do it.
Second, the strength of illocutionary point differentiates types of illocutionary acts that
share the same point with different strength. For instance, requesting someone to do
something is weaker than insisting that he does it, even though both share the same point
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of committing someone to do something. Third, mode of achievement specifies the ways
the illocutionary point has to be achieved. A good example of this is testifying. Unlike
making an assertion, one can testify only if the mode of achievement is satisfied, i.e., he
has the position of a witness. Fourth, propositional content condition determines the kind
of propositional content an illocutionary act can have. A promise has a proposition as its
content. However, its propositional content condition requires the proposition to be about
acts in the future, not acts in the past. Fifth, preparatory conditions are the conditions
necessary for the successful and non-defective performance of illocutionary acts. For
instance, a preparatory condition of promising requires the promised act to be in the interest
of the hearer. Therefore, promising a hearer to do something bad for him would be a
successful but defective illocutionary act. Sixth, the sincerity condition distinguishes
sincere illocutionary act from insincere ones. Sincere illocutionary acts often require the
speaker to have corresponding psychological states. The sincerity condition of a promise
is that the speaker must intend to uphold it. Finally, degree of strength of sincerity
conditions differentiates the strength of psychological states expressed by illocutionary acts.
For instance, sincerely imploring requires a stronger desire than sincerely requesting.
The successful and non-defective performance of illocutionary acts requires the
satisfaction of certain conditions (Austin 1962, Bach and Harnish 1979, 55, Searle and
Vanderveken 1985, 12). These conditions are commonly labeled “felicity conditions.”
Failed or defective illocutionary acts are called infelicitous acts. Illocutionary acts can be
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infelicitous in two ways (Austin 1962, 16). First, they can be a case of misfire, in which
the speaker attempts but fails at performing the illocutionary acts. For instance, actually
excommunicating someone from the church by saying “I hereby excommunicate you”
requires the speaker to hold a certain office in the Catholic church, e.g., the pope. Therefore,
a non-Catholic person’s saying “I hereby excommunicate you” would be a case of misfire,
i.e., a failed attempt of excommunication. Let us call the conditions for successful
illocutionary acts without misfire “success conditions.” The success condition of
excommunication, for example, is that the speaker holds a certain office in the Catholic
church. Second, infelicitous illocutionary acts can be an instance of abuse, where the
illocutionary act is successfully performed but is still defective. Suppose I succeed at
promising that I will give you money, but I intend to break the promise. This is a successful
but insincere promise. Although the success condition is met, the illocutionary act is still
defective and unhappy. Let us call the conditions for the non-defective performance nondefectiveness conditions. In the case of promise, non-defectiveness conditions require the
speaker’s intention to keep the promise.

3.2 Illocutionary Force Indicators and Propositional Indicators
Searle (1969, 30) draws a distinction between illocutionary force indicators (or
“illocutionary indicating devices”) and propositional indicators. These two kinds of
syntactical elements contribute to the illocutionary act in different ways. Illocutionary force
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indicators (or illocutionary force indicating devices) explicitly show the illocutionary force
of an utterance, in other words, how the propositional content of an utterance should be
taken (Searle 1969, 30, Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 2). Propositional indicators, on the
other hand, contribute to the propositional content of an utterance. Consider again (17) “[I
promise [that I will give you money]].”29 The propositional indicator “[that I will give you
money]” provides the propositional content of this utterance, whereas the force indicator
“[I promise]” shows that this should be taken as a promise, not as a confession.
The term “propositional indicator” does not mean that the propositional content of an
illocutionary act is always propositional. A propositional indicator can contribute a nonpropositional content to the illocutionary act. For instance, what the propositional indicator
“John” in “I hereby denounce John” contributes is merely a person, not a proposition. This
is because the content of denouncing John is simply a person, rather than a proposition. It
would be weird to denounce an abstract object like a proposition.
There is a large variety of force indicators (Austin 1962, 73, Searle 1969, 30). The
most common ones are the explicit performative formulas such as “I promise,” “I
apologize,” and “I urge.” Austin takes these to be the most successful force indicators but
not the only indicators. He introduces additional force indicators. First, moods are also
force indicators. The imperative mood indicates the force of a command. For example,

29

Brackets are added to show the structure of the sentence.
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“shoot her!” can have the illocutionary force of an order or command. Second, intonation
encodes illocutionary force. Depending on the intonation contour of (the type of) this
sentence, “It is going to charge” can encode the illocutionary force of a warning, question
or a protest. Third, adding adverbial phrases like “probably” can modify the illocutionary
force of indicators like “I shall.” Fourth, connecting particles such as “still,” “therefore,”
“although” can provide the illocutionary force of insisting, concluding, conceding, etc.
Fifth, Austin (1962, 76) even includes non-linguistic illocutionary force indicators, i.e.,
“accompanies of the utterance.” These include gesture and actions like winks, shrugging,
and frowns. Finally, context or “circumstance of the utterance” can indicate illocutionary
force. For instance, the health of the speaker may affect the illocutionary force of “I shall
die someday.”

3.3 How Force Indicators Determine Illocutionary Force
An obvious problem for speech act theory is to explain the relationship between force
indicators and illocutionary force. What role do force indicators play in determining the
illocutionary force of utterances? When I am making a promise, how does the illocutionary
force of promising come from force indicators like “I promise”?
Answering this question is not easy. Consider a naïve answer: if X is a force indicator
for the illocutionary act F, every utterance that contains X has the illocutionary force F. For
instance, the imperative mood is a force indicator of ordering. Consequently, an utterance
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of an imperative sentence has the illocutionary force of ordering; uttering “shoot her!” is
the illocutionary act of ordering someone to photograph someone. However, this answer
does not stand up to scrutiny. As Alston (2000, 174) points out, imperative mood is
insufficient to determine the exact illocutionary force of an utterance; uttering “shoot her!”
could be ordering, imploring, urging, or advising that someone is to be photographed (or
no illocutionary act at all). There seems to be a gap between the force indicators and the
illocutionary force of utterances; the latter is underdetermined by the former. I shall label
this “the gap problem,” and formulate it as follows:

The gap problem: What role does an illocutionary force indicator play in determining the
illocutionary force of an utterance containing the indicator?

Austin’s description of the role of force indicators is rather vague (Austin 1962, 69).
His view is that the job of explicit force indicators is to make the illocutionary force explicit.
For instance, “I promise” makes the illocutionary force of promise explicit in utterance (17)
“I promise that I will give you money.” Nonetheless, one might wonder what is to make
the force explicit. Austin emphasizes that to “make explicit” is not to describe or state what
one is doing. He draws an analogy to conventional acts such as bowing before someone. It
is unclear if this bowing should be taken as an act of paying obedience, or just observing
flowers on the ground. However, further acts like raising hats or saying “Salaam” make it
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explicit how the bowing should be taken. Notice that raising hats or saying “Salaam” does
not describe what the act is. By analogy, the indicator “I promise” does not describe the act
of promising; it shows that the utterance should be taken as a promise. Unfortunately,
Austin left “making explicit” largely unexplained, except that it is not describing or stating
the act.
My answer to the gap problem is that force indicators provide the default for
interpreting illocutionary force. I shall label this view “the default interpretation view” of
force indicators. Upon understanding the utterance of a sentence, the hearer starts
interpreting its illocutionary force and eventually understands what illocutionary act it is.
The mere appearance of a force indicator provides the initial (but defeasible) interpretation
of the illocutionary force, without taking other factors into considerations. For example,
utterances of the same sentence “Shoot her!” all contain a force indicator, i.e., the
imperative mood. The force indicator guides the hearer to the initial hypothesis that the
utterance is an illocutionary act of telling the hearer to photograph Maria. If there are no
further contextual factors to defeat this interpretation, the utterance is understood to have
the illocutionary force of telling.
Nonetheless, the default interpretation alone does not determine the end result;
utterances often end up as having illocutionary forces that deviate from the default
interpretation provided by the indicators. For instance, the default interpretation of “Shoot
her!” as telling the hearer to photograph her may be defeated by further contextual factors.
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The hearer may infer that it is an act of ordering because the speaker is invoking his
authority in saying so. Similarly, the hearer may interpret the utterance as imploring him
to photograph her, because only the hearer has the right to decide. The hearer may decide
that the utterance does not have an illocutionary force of directives (e.g., telling, urging,
ordering, imploring) at all, on the ground that the speaker is not speaking literally (e.g., the
speaker is joking or performing). Although force indicators do not determine illocutionary
force by themselves, at least they provide the default interpretation in the process.
Here is a caveat on my terminology “default interpretation.” I am using this term in
an epistemic sense. The “default interpretation” could mean a nomic notion or an epistemic
notion. In the nomic sense, the “default interpretation” of an utterance is the interpretation
we are psychologically disposed to reach upon hearing the utterance. It is described and
governed by psychological laws, hence a “nomic” notion. However, in the epistemic sense,
the default interpretation is the one the hearer should accept, until countervailing evidence
appears. It is a normative notion, rather than merely a descriptive one. I believe that
interpreting illocutionary force is an epistemic process of inferring the illocutionary force
from the limited evidence. When I claim that force indicators provide the default
interpretation, I mean they serve as primary evidence to form the initial hypothesis in
inferring about the illocutionary force. Again, I shall leave this view undefended, since I
am not proposing a particular speech act theory.
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The default interpretation view is nothing new in the literature. It has been suggested
by many philosophers. Alston (2000, 186) calls the default interpretation of illocutionary
force the matching illocutionary act type. Alston holds that for each sentence, there is
always a type of illocutionary act that is made completely explicit by the meaning of the
sentence. In other words, if the speaker utters a sentence directly and literally, the hearer
can know the type of illocutionary act the speaker is performing, just by knowing the
meaning of the sentence. This type is the matching illocutionary act type of the sentence.
Technically, the matching illocutionary act type is provided by the sentence, rather than
illocutionary force indicators. Nonetheless, Alston would agree that force indicators
determine the illocutionary force of the matching illocutionary act since the force indicators
are components of sentences. Another example of the default interpretation view comes
from Stainton (1999, 76). He uses examples of force indicators like the interrogative
mood.30 What is the role of the interrogative mood of “Is it raining?” in determining the
illocutionary force of utterances of it? Stainton argues that the illocutionary force of the
utterance is simply determined by the interrogative mood ceteris paribus. That is, the
utterances (or tokens) of “Is it raining?” have the illocutionary force of asking by default,
if there are no defeating factors. Despite the details, both Stainton and Alston can be taken
as proponents of the default interpretation view.

30

The interrogative mood can also be called “the interrogative force” of a sentence. I shall avoid this term because it can

be easily confused with illocutionary force.
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3.4 Summary
To illustrate the background of the force indicator theory, I have introduced the basic
notions of speech act theory in this chapter. Illocutionary acts are the acts of doing
something in saying something (§ 3.1). An illocutionary act has two components: an
illocutionary force and a propositional content. Successful performance of illocutionary
acts requires the satisfaction of their felicity conditions. Illocutionary force indicators are
the words that determine illocutionary force to illocutionary acts, while propositional
indicators can provide propositional contents to them (§ 3.2). Illocutionary force indicators
determine the illocutionary force by providing the default interpretation (§ 3.3). These
basic notions of speech act theory will enable me to develop the force indicator theory in
detail.
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4 The Illocutionary Force Indicator Theory of Slurs
The force indicator theory of slurs stems from this idea: the key to understanding slurs is
not so much what messages they communicate, but what they are used to do in addition.
Slurs do not merely describe or represent their targets in certain ways; they are used to
insult, derogate, or abuse the targets. This is in line with the spirit of speech act theory. To
capture the meaning of words like “hello” and “goodbye,” the best way is to study their
corresponding speech acts, e.g., greeting and bidding farewell. By analogy, slurs are best
explained in terms of the illocutionary acts they are used to perform.
The goal of this chapter is to develop the details of the illocutionary force indicator
theory of slurs. Slurs are analogous to illocutionary force indicators like “I promise,” the
job of which is to perform the illocutionary act of promising. Similarly, the force indicator
theory takes slurs to be illocutionary force indicators of derogation. For instance, the use
of the slur “chink” is to perform the illocutionary act of derogating the Chinese.
Furthermore, derogation is a family of declarative illocutionary acts, which includes acts
such as insulting, belittling, disparaging, demeaning, etc. The illocutionary point of these
acts is to enforce a norm which assigns an inferior status to the target. For instance, to
derogate the Chinese is to enforce a racist norm in which the Chinese are deprived of the
right to be respected, the freedom from discrimination, etc.31 In addition to being force

31

For the details of enforcing norms and normative status, see section 4.1.
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indicators, slurs are also propositional indicators. They contribute to propositions, and their
contributions are identical with their neutral counterparts. For instance, asserting “Chang
is a chink” has the same truth-condition as asserting “Chang is a Chinese.” These details
will be specified in the following section.
This chapter will proceed as follows: I will develop the force indicator theory of slurs
in section 4.1; they are illocutionary force indicators of derogation. For example, the slur
“chink” makes the illocutionary force of derogation explicit in the utterance “Chang is a
chink.” In addition, slurs are also propositional indicators that make the same truthconditional contribution as their neutral counterparts, e.g., “Chang is a chink” is true iff
“Chang is Chinese” is true. However, this force indicator theory requires an explication of
the nature of derogation. In section 4.1, I will analyze the illocutionary acts of derogation
in terms of the seven components of its illocutionary force. These acts enforce a norm
which assigns an inferior normative status to the target. After clarifying what kind of force
indicator slurs are (§4.1) and what illocutionary act derogation is (§4.1), further questions
arise. How do slurs as force indicators determine the illocutionary force of derogation? In
section 4.3, I will show that slurs are neither necessary nor sufficient for derogation.
However, slurs as force indicators provide the default illocutionary force of derogation.
That is, utterances of slurs are interpreted as derogation unless defeating factors occur. Do
slurs play other roles in addition to being illocutionary force indicators? In section 4.4, I
will address a perlocutionary effect of slurs, i.e., their offensiveness. I will distinguish the
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perlocutionary effects of slurs from their illocutionary force. Finally, is the force indicator
theory a good theory for explaining the features of slurs introduced in chapter 2? In section
4.5, I will apply my theory to answer questions about the features of slurs. Take descriptive
ineffability for instance. (Q7) Why cannot the derogatory dimension of “chink” be
satisfactorily paraphrased in descriptive terms? For the force indicator theory, this is
because the derogatory dimension is an illocutionary force, which cannot be paraphrased
into propositional contents. These answers should illustrate the explanatory power of the
force indicator theory.

4.1 Slurs are Illocutionary Force Indicators of Derogation
An illocutionary approach to slurs has already been suggested by several theorists, even
though it has never been explicitly developed (Hornsby 2001, 140, Richard 2008, 12,
Anderson and Lepore 2013, 352). According to Hornsby (2001, 130), slurs are useless in
the sense that non-bigots cannot accept anything done by using slurs. To explain slurs’
uselessness, “there is nowhere else to turn than to the kinds of speech act made by those
who use them—speech acts of illocutionary kinds, as we have seen, such as vilifying,
snubbing, expressing derision, and so on” (Hornsby 2001, 140). Moreover, Richard (2008,
12) holds that “What makes a word a slur is that it is used to do certain things, that it has
(in Austinian jargon) a certain illocutionary potential.” Anderson and Lepore (2013, 352)
have mentioned a “performative view” of slurs, which “suggest a slur’s function is a part
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of its meaning; that is, that slurs are performatives whose utterances constitute a pernicious
action.” My force indicator theory is inspired by these early explorations.
Another precursor of the force indicator theory is “the register view” of slurs, which
I endorsed in an earlier article (Diaz-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton 2019). 32 As a
sociolinguistic concept, “register” refers to a way of speaking in particular situations. For
instance, “tummy” is the word for stomach when people talk to children; therefore, it
belongs to the “childish” register. Likewise, slurs are words used to talk in a derogatory
way; they belong to the “derogatory” register. What differentiates “chink” from “Chinese”
is its use for the derogatory register, not any unique descriptive or expressivist content. The
force indicator theory inherits this use-theoretic approach to slurs, with a different
understanding of the use of slurs. Their use is to derogate people, in addition to speaking
in a derogatory way.
Given this background of speech act theories, I am ready to formulate the
illocutionary force indicator theory of slurs. The illocutionary force indicator theory takes
slurs to play two roles; slurs are both illocutionary force indicators as well as propositional
indicators. I shall define the force indicator theory as the conjunction of the following two
theses:

32

For a detailed comparison between my force indicator theory and the register theory, see section 6.6.
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(T1) The Illocutionary Force Indicator Theory of Slurs: 1) Slurs are illocutionary force
indicators of the illocutionary acts of derogation; 2) they are also propositional
indicators that make the same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral
counterparts.

The first thesis says that slurs are illocutionary force indicators of the illocutionary
acts of derogation. Whenever a slur is used in the right circumstances, it makes the
illocutionary force of derogation explicit in an utterance. That is, the illocutionary force of
the utterance is interpreted as derogation by default unless there are defeating factors.33 In
certain contexts, this utterance counts as an illocutionary act of derogation. Consider the
example of sentence (1). If a racist utters (1) in a literal way, he is derogating the Chinese
people (in addition to his assertion that Chang is Chinese).

(1)

Chang is a chink

(2)

Chang is a Chinese

(3)

Chang is not a chink

(4)

Chang is not a Chinese

33

For how force indicators help to determine illocutionary force, see section 3.3 and section 4.3.
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The first thesis answers the two essential questions about the derogatory power of
slurs. Question (Q1) asks in virtue of what a slur, such as “chink,” is a derogatory word.
The force indicator theory’s answer to (Q1) is simple; slurs are derogatory words because
they are illocutionary force indicators of derogation, i.e., the conventional devices to
derogate people. 34 The derogatory power of slurs arises from their status as force
indicators. For example, “chink” is a derogatory word because the use of this word is to
derogate the Chinese, whereas the word “Chinese” lacks such a built-in, linguistically
encoded use. In addition, the force indicator theory has no problem in answering question
(Q2), i.e., why is an utterance of slurs, such as “Chang is a chink,” derogatory? Utterances
of slurs are derogatory when they are illocutionary acts of derogation, that is, have the
illocutionary force of derogation. For the purpose of introducing the force indicator theory,
I will only answer question (Q1) and (Q2) for now. Other questions about slurs will be
answered in section 4.5.
In addition to the first thesis, the second thesis holds that slurs are also propositional
indicators. That is, they contribute to the propositional content of utterances. In particular,
slurs make the same contribution to the proposition as their neutral counterparts. A neutral
counterpart of a slur shares the referent of it without being a derogatory word, e.g.,

34

As I have shown in section 2.2, this is not supposed to be an answer to the questions 1) “what is the definition of the

term ‘slur’?” and 2) “how did a slur historically become a force indicator?” These two questions are the common
misreading of question (Q1).
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“Chinese” is the neutral counterpart of “chink.”35 For instance, sentence (1) “Chang is a
chink” expresses the same proposition as sentence (2), “Chang is a Chinese,” because
“chink” make the same truth-conditional contribution as “Chinese.” Sentence (1) and (2)
share the same truth condition. If Chang were Italian, both (1) and (2) would be false.
The second thesis answers (Q5) the question of truth conditional-contribution (i.e.,
do slurs make the same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral counterparts?). Its
answer is “Yes. Slurs do make the same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral
counterparts.” This is one of the many potential answers to question (Q5). I will defend
this thesis in section 6.4.
Nevertheless, it is useful to contrast the second thesis with alternative answers to (Q5).
Theorists of slurs have different theoretically informed intuitions about the truthconditional contribution. There are three different views.
First, some theorists, including me, think that slurs make the same truth-conditional
contribution as their neutral counterparts (Hom 2010, 169). That is, “chink” has exactly the
same referent as “Chinese.” Sentence (1) and (2) have the same truth condition; both are
true if and only if Chang is Chinese. Sentence (1) is true, despite being derogatory.
Consequently, (3) is false. My force indicator theory of slurs endorses this position.

35

Only co-reference (and being non-derogatory) is needed to be a neutral counterpart of “chink.” We can still take

“Chinese” to be a neutral counterpart of “chink,” even if it has a different sense or other descriptive content.
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Second, other theorists believe that slurs make different contributions; it is false to
predicate them of their supposed targets (Hom and May 2013, 293). No Chinese person is
a chink. Despite Chang’s being Chinese, (1) “Chang is a chink” is literally false.
Correspondingly, (3) “Chang is not a chink” is true, rather than false or void of truth value.
The intuition seems to be that slurs cannot be true of their targets because they misrepresent
them in an objectionable way. We would find sentence (1) unacceptable. It is unacceptable
because it is false. This intuition is supported by further explanations, which will be
presented in detail in 5.1.
Third, some theorists agree that slurs make different truth-conditional contributions,
but they think sentences containing slurs are neither true nor false. That is, unlike the true
sentence (2), sentence (1) has no truth value at all. Similarly, (3) is neither true nor false.
A proponent of this view is Richard (2008, 13). Richard’s intuition is supported by the
claim that to agree that (1) “Chang is a chink” is true is to agree with the racist thought
expressed by (1). Since we do not agree with those racist thoughts, we cannot take (1) to
be true. In addition, sentence (1) is not false. If it were false, its negation, (3) “Chang is not
a chink,” would be true. However, its negation is equally unacceptable, because it expresses
a racist thought too. For Richard’s explanation that supports this intuition, see 5.5.
After introducing the force indicator theory and its two theses, a few quick
clarifications have to be made before I proceed. First, the claim that slurs are both force
indicators and propositional indicators should not be understood as proposing that slurs
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contain two syntactical components, a force indicator and a propositional indicator. For
instance, the expression “damn Chinese” syntactically contains the force indicator “damn”
and the propositional indicator “Chinese.” My force indicator theory does not claim that
slurs have two syntactical components like “damn Chinese.” A slur such as “chink” is a
minimal syntactical unit by itself. Second, the force indicator theory does not entail the
ambiguity of slurs. The theory might be misunderstood as taking slurs to be ambiguous
between a force indicator and a propositional indicator, e.g., “chink” either indicates the
force of derogation or contributes its referent to the proposition. On the contrary, I believe
that a slur is simultaneously a force indicator and a propositional indicator. Third, I agree
that slurs can also be used in non-sentential speech acts. A potential objection against my
theory is that it ignores non-sentential speech acts. This is because my examples so far are
all about uttering sentences with slurs. However, it is indeed possible to utter a single slur
instead of a whole sentence. Suppose a speaker points at a Chinese person and utters
“Chinks!”. I would take this to be a non-sentential speech act of both assertion and
derogation. This would be analogous to making a non-sentential assertion by pointing at a
Chinese person and uttering “Chinese!”.
Despite these quick clarifications, I still need to address some common worries about
the force indicator theory. These common worries often arise from certain confusions of
the force indicator theory. Therefore, addressing them here helps clarify the claims of the
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indicator theory. However, certain substantive objections require more than clarifications.
Therefore, they will be addressed later in chapter 6.
First, it might be argued that the force indicator theory’s explanation of the
“derogatory power” of slurs is trivial. This is because the saying that slurs indicate the
“illocutionary force of derogation” merely redescribes the feature of “derogatory power,”
rather than explaining it. However, this objection is based on a terminological confusion.
As I have shown in section 2.2, the term “derogatory power” of slurs should not be
conflated with “illocutionary force of derogation.” Technically, “derogatory power” refers
to a property of the types of slurs and sentences that contain them; it is not an illocutionary
force. The type of word is said to have “derogatory power” simply when it is a derogatory
word. By “the illocutionary force of derogation,” I mean a property of particular utterances
or illocutionary acts; it can be sometimes made explicit by slurs in utterances. But this
illocutionary force itself is not a property of the types of slurs. Slurs do not have
illocutionary forces because they are not illocutionary acts.
Second, one might worry about my claim that slurs are force indicators to derogate
the target group, rather than individuals. Takes (1) “Chang is a chink” for instance. My
theory holds that uttering (1) in the right circumstance is an act of derogating the Chinese.
However, is not this utterance also derogating Chang, the subject of (1)? This seems to be
the very point of calling Chang a “chink.” How can slurs be force indicators to derogate
the target groups, if they are already used to derogate individuals?
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I believe that slurs derogate individuals via their group membership. Here is an
analogy; a promise to come quickly is also a promise to come. Likewise, an act of
derogating the Chinese is also an act of derogating Chang, who is a Chinese person. As I
will show in section 4.1, derogation is an illocutionary act of enforcing a norm that assigns
an inferior status to the target. Therefore, enforcing a norm in which the Chinese are
assigned an inferior role is also enforcing a norm in which Chang is treated as inferior. This
is why calling Chang a “chink” derogates him via derogating the Chinese.
Third, the force indicator theory might face the objection that slurs cannot provide the
illocutionary force of derogation when the utterances already have other illocutionary
forces. For instance, uttering (1) “Chang is a chink” is already an illocutionary act of
assertion. How can this utterance have the illocutionary force of derogation when it already
has the force of assertion? How can an assertion also be an act of derogation?
It is common for an utterance to be multiple illocutionary acts and have multiple
illocutionary forces. Suppose a flight attendant utters “I am sorry that the flight is delayed.”
This utterance could be both an apology and an assertion. Searle and Vanderveken (1985,
3) provide similar examples such as “I will go to his house, but will he be there?”. Such an
utterance would be both an assertion and asking a question. It is useful to borrow the
framework developed by Searle and Vanderveken (1985). These utterances with multiple
illocutionary forces are taken to be performing complex illocutionary acts. These complex
acts have logical forms like “(F1(P1) & F2(P2)),” where “F(P)” stands for an illocutionary
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act with the force F and the propositional content P. The conjunction between two
illocutionary acts is “success functional” in the sense that the success of the complex
illocutionary act is a function of the success of the two constituent acts. For instance,
uttering “I am sorry that the flight is delayed” performs a complex illocutionary act, the
success of which requires the success of an apology and the success of an assertion.
Slurs are usually uttered to perform complex illocutionary acts. That is, uttering
sentences with slurs usually performs multiple illocutionary acts in addition to derogation.
For instance, an utterance of (1) “Chang is a chink” might be both an act of derogating the
Chinese and an assertion that Chang is a Chinese. Similarly, uttering (18) “Is Chang a
chink?” could simultaneously perform the act of asking a question as well as derogating
the Chinese. It would be implausible to claim that uttering (18) does nothing but derogating
the Chinese; it obviously asks a question.
Fourth, one might argue that general pejoratives like “asshole” are also force
indicators of derogation, but they are not slurs. For instance, saying that (10) “Chang is an
asshole” is an act of derogation just like saying (1) “Chang is a chink.” Nevertheless,
“asshole” is not a slur because it derogates only an individual, instead of derogating the
whole target group. It would be bizarre to say all other “assholes” beside Chang are hurt
by “Chang is an asshole.” This seems to be a counterexample to my claim that slurs are
force indicators of derogation.
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This objection rests on a misunderstanding, i.e., it takes my theory to hold that slurs
are the only force indicators of derogation. On the contrary, I agree that there are force
indicators of derogation other than slurs. General pejoratives (e.g., “asshole”), moral terms
(e.g., “wrong”), and thick concepts (e.g., “cruel”) can all be used to derogate someone.
Nevertheless, they differ from slurs in many aspects. For example, general pejoratives do
not derogate via group memberships, and moral terms often apply to someone’s acts rather
than the person. Since this is a dissertation on slurs, I will not delve into how other kinds
of words function as force indicators of derogation.

4.2 The Illocutionary Acts of Derogation
My force indicator theory of slurs, which takes slurs to be force indicators of derogation,
requires a corresponding account of derogation. What is to derogate someone? If it is an
illocutionary act, which kind is it? Is derogation a single illocutionary act or a family of
them? These questions have to be answered by an analysis of derogation.
I believe that derogation is a kind of declarative illocutionary act; its point is to enforce
a norm which assigns an inferior normative status on the target.36 Declarative illocutionary
acts are the acts of changing the world by saying something, that is, the speaker brings

36

It is tempting to think of derogation as an expressivist illocutionary act to express negative attitudes. I believe

expressing the negative attitudes is a part of the sincerity condition, not the illocutionary point of derogation. This is
analogous with the relation between assertion and expressing a belief. Expressing a belief is necessary for a sincere
assertion, but an assertion is not merely an expression of a belief. For more discussion, see section 6.5.
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about certain states of affairs by the successful performance of the speech act (Searle and
Vanderveken 1985, 37). As a declarative act, derogation is analogous to illocutionary acts
such as approving, naming, resigning, and blessing. Moreover, I need to specify the aspect
of the world changed by derogation. I believe the point of derogating someone is to lower
her normative status. By “normative status,” I mean a position defined by its rights or lack
of rights, as well as its value assigned by a norm (e.g., being a knight, a priest, a prisoner).
A normative status is inferior to other statuses when it is deprived of rights or deemed to
be worse. Racism is a discriminatory norm that assigns people superior and inferior
normative statuses by their race. Consider a society with a racist hierarchy, where racism
deprives Chinese minorities of the rights to be respected, eligibility to certain career
opportunities, freedom from discrimination, etc. To derogate the Chinese by calling them
“chink” is to enforce a racist norm which assigns an inferior normative status on them, e.g.,
denying their right to respect, licensing discrimination against them, etc.
A good example of the declarative nature of derogation comes from Tirrell’s analysis
of the role of slurs in the Rwandan genocide (Tirrell 2012). Tutsi people were labeled with
slurs such as “inzoka” (snake). Snakes occupy a special normative status in Rwandan
society. That is, snakes should be killed by smashing their heads and cutting them up, and
being trusted to cut off their heads is an honor for Rwandan boys. Therefore, calling
someone an “inzoka” is not merely an expression of contempt. When the propaganda
derogates Tutsis by calling them “inzoka,” they are given the normative status of snakes in
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Rwandan culture. This is why “inzoka” is action-engendering; it licenses atrocious actions
to treat Tutsis as snakes, such as “dismemberment of the person’s limbs, and death by
exsanguination” (Tirrell 2012, 200).
After introducing derogation as a declarative illocutionary act, I will analyze its
illocutionary force in more detail. I shall adopt the framework of Searle and Vanderveken
(1985, 46) to illustrate the seven components of the illocutionary force of derogation.37
First, the illocutionary point of derogation, as I just showed, is a declarative point. To
derogate is to enforce a norm which assigns an inferior normative status on the target.
Second, derogation encompasses a range of strength of illocutionary points. It is
possible to derogate a group strongly or weakly. Strong derogation enforces a norm with
an even lower normative status than weak derogation. For example, derogating someone
with the N-word is stronger than derogating someone by calling someone “honky.” This is
because the racist social hierarchy denies more rights and freedoms of black people than
whites.
Third, derogation does not have a special mode of achievement. Unlike testifying or
commanding, there is no restriction on how the illocutionary point is achieved. Derogation
does not require the speaker to be in a special position. When it comes to slurs, anyone in
any position can use them for derogation. Slurs not only can be used by the dominant group
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For the details of Searle and Vanderveken’s analysis of illocutionary force, see section 3.1.
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to derogate the oppressed group; they can also be used by the oppressed group to derogate
the dominant group or even themselves. For example, it is possible for a black foreman,
both a participant and a victim of racism, to enforce a norm which assigns the low
normative status on other black slaves by calling them the N-word.
Fourth, derogation has a special content condition. Unlike promises or assertions, the
content of derogation is not a proposition. It takes persons or groups of people as its content.
For instance, derogating the Chinese takes the Chinese as its content. It is also possible to
derogate Chang, a particular person.38 However, one cannot derogate abstract entities like
a set of possible worlds, since this violates the content condition. This is because norms
such as racism and sexism assign normative statuses only to people, not to abstract objects
like sets and possible worlds.39
Fifth, derogation has a preparatory condition, i.e., the speaker must intend to enforce
a norm which assigns the lower normative status on the target. For example, it is impossible
for a speaker to derogate the Chinese unless he wants to endorse the norm that denies them
rights and freedoms enjoyed by the equal members of the society.
Sixth, the sincerity condition of derogation requires that the speaker has negative
evaluative attitudes (e.g., hatred or contempt) toward the target. Derogation can be
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It is possible to simultaneously derogate a group and an individual, e.g., saying that “Chang is a chink” derogates

Chang through his group membership.
39

Nevertheless, if a society had a discriminatory norm against certain abstract entities (say, “setism”), it would be

possible to derogate objects like sets and functions. It would also be possible to have slurs for sets and functions.
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insincere when the speaker does not hate or despise the people he derogates. However,
insincerity does not affect the success (in the technical sense of speech act theory) of
derogation; an insincere derogation is still an act of derogation. Imagine someone who is
kidnapped and forced to derogate the Chinese. Although the speaker does not have negative
attitudes toward the Chinese (sincerity condition), he intends to enforce a norm which
assigns an inferior normative status to them (preparatory condition), in order to satisfy the
kidnapper. In this case, derogation can be successful without being sincere.
Finally, derogation encompasses a range of degrees of strength of sincerity conditions.
Different kinds of derogation may require different strength in the negative evaluative
attitudes expressed.
After introducing my account of derogation, I have to address some worries by further
clarifying it.
First, one might worry about the relation between derogation and other kinds of
illocutionary acts. What is the difference between derogating, disparaging, and discrediting
someone? Are they the same kind of illocutionary act?
This brings out one interesting point about derogation. That is, derogation
encompasses a family of overlapping (i.e., sharing many things in common) illocutionary
acts, such as denigrating, disparaging, belittling, humiliating, insulting, and discrediting.
These illocutionary acts all belong to the family of derogation because they mostly share
the seven components of derogation as specified above. For instance, denigrating,
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disparaging, discrediting the Chinese are all declarative acts to enforce a norm which
assigns inferior statuses to them. They all require that the speaker must intend to enforce
that norm.
The second worry is that derogation needs not to be social or political. I have been
focusing on derogation with racial slurs. However, it seems possible to derogate other
people in terms of their taste or intelligence. What happens when I derogate someone by
calling them “a moron”?
Here is my response. Despite sharing many components of illocutionary force, these
overlapping members of derogation vary by the kinds of norms they enforce in their
illocutionary points. Derogating one’s aesthetic status by calling one a “philistine” is
different from derogating someone’s epistemic standing by calling him a “moron.” Acts of
derogation can enforce different kinds of norms such as moral, aesthetic, epistemic norms,
etc. For instance, discrediting someone has a more specific illocutionary point than other
acts of derogation; the inferior status enforced by discrediting is about the trustworthiness
or the reputation of the target. This is why all acts of discrediting the Chinese are acts of
derogating them, but the reverse is not true.
Since acts of derogation are taxonomized by different kinds of norms, slurs also fall
into different kinds by the norms. Different kinds of slurs are force indicators to enforce
different kinds of norms. There are non-racial slurs, such as sexist slurs (e.g., “bitch”
enforces sexist norms), and homophobic slurs (e.g., “faggot” enforces homophobic norms).
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Just like the examples above, there are also non-social-and-political slurs, such as aesthetic
slurs and epistemic slurs.
Thirdly, one of the worries is that my view remains unclear about how some slurs can
be more oppressive than others. Comparing to calling black people the N-word, calling
white people “honky” seems more harmless and less oppressive. However, it follows from
my view that both are acts of derogation, i.e., enforcing norms that discriminate against
black people and white people respectively. Why is using “honky” less oppressive than the
N-word?
I will address this worry by clarifying the relation between the acts of derogation and
the norms they enforce. Norms can be more or less instantiated (or realized) in a world.
For example, the norm of racism is instantiated in a racist society, whereas a society with
full racial equality violates such a norm. How oppressive and harmful an act of derogation
is depends on the kind of norm it enforces. Derogating black people with slurs is very
oppressive because there are actual institutions and cultures that perpetuate racism against
them in real life. By contrast, derogating white people by calling them “honky” is far less
oppressive because a racist norm against white people is hardly instantiated in the real
world.
Finally, my claim that a single act of derogation can change the normative status of a
group seems too strong to some readers. Suppose Chinese minorities have achieved equal
status in society by years of struggle and activism. My view appears to entail that a racist
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speaker can change their social status with just a few slurs and thereby reverse the result of
the political progress of many years. This seems hardly plausible.
My response is that derogation usually enforces a norm in a local and circumstantial
way. When a racist speaker derogates the Chinese before his audiences, the norm is usually
enforced between the speaker and the audiences, without affecting the whole society.40
For instance, the audiences have acquired personal approval from the speaker to
discriminate against the Chinese, even if the society at large is still against discrimination.41
Moreover, derogation can fail at enforcing a norm when the audiences refuse to cooperate
with the norm. For example, (even successfully) derogating the Chinese before a group of
Chinese political activists may not enforce a racist norm because the activists will always
undermine the norm.

4.3 How Slurs Determine Illocutionary Force
After introducing the illocutionary act of derogation, the relation between the force
indicator and the illocutionary acts of derogation remains to be clarified. If slurs are force
indicators of derogation, are slurs necessary for utterances to have the illocutionary force
of derogation? Are they sufficient for utterances to have the force of derogation?
40

Nevertheless, it is possible that, on rare occasions, a speaker has enough power in a society such that he can change

the status of a group in society by derogating them. Imagine that a powerful president or a religious leader has the support
of all the members of society. If he openly derogates the Chinese with slurs in a public speech and everyone cooperates,
he may able to change the social status with a few slurs.
41

If enough members of society keep enforcing a racist norm, the norm will eventually be realized in the entire society.
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Although slurs are force indicators of derogation, they are not necessary for
derogation for two reasons. First, many illocutionary acts can be performed without
relevant force indicators; the force could be provided by context. For instance, one can
make promises without saying “I promise” in certain contexts. Similarly, derogation can
be done without slurs, e.g., through indirect speech acts such as asserting that “I would not
befriend the Chinese” or warning that “The Chinese are taking our jobs!”. Although slurs
are unnecessary for derogation, they are still the conventional linguistic tools to facilitate
derogation; they make derogation more easy and explicit.
Second, slurs are not necessary for derogation because they are not the only force
indicators of derogation. As I have explained in section 4.1, there are other illocutionary
force indicators of derogation. For instance, many negative evaluative terms such as
“damn,” “boo,” and the F-word can make the force of derogation explicit. Instead of using
“chink,” one can also derogate the Chinese by saying “Damn the Chinese!” Unlike slurs,
the illocutionary force of these evaluative terms is not tied with a particular group. The use
of “chink” is to derogate the Chinese, whereas “damn” can be used to derogate anyone.
Not only are slurs unnecessary for derogation, but they are also insufficient for
derogation. A slur has the use to make the illocutionary force of derogation explicit in an
utterance. Nevertheless, the utterance of a slur does not always count as an illocutionary
act of derogation. This is because illocutionary acts can misfire when their success
conditions (including preparatory conditions) are not met. In particular, the success
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condition of derogation requires satisfying the preparatory condition that the speaker must
want to enforce a norm which assigns an inferior normative status on the target. Suppose
an innocent child (or an English learner), who is ignorant of the meaning of “chink,” uses
it unintentionally, even though he does not intend to express contempt of the Chinese.42
His utterance of “chink” fails to be an act of derogation, because the success condition is
not met. This is not to say the usage of the slur is not offensive or unproblematic; the child
may be punished, but not on the grounds of derogating the Chinese people. I will revisit
unsuccessful or infelicitous derogation in my analysis of non-derogatory uses of slurs in
4.5.
The force indicator theory of slurs gives rise to deeper issues about illocutionary force
indicators. If slurs are neither necessary nor sufficient for derogation, what do they do in
determining the illocutionary force of derogation? What does it mean to say slurs make the
illocutionary force of derogation explicit? The discussion on illocutionary force indicators
in section 3.3 is helpful here.
What slurs do as force indicators in determining the illocutionary force is to provide
the default interpretation of illocutionary force. This is simply an application of the default
interpretation view introduced in section 3.3. That is, utterances of slurs are interpreted as
having the illocutionary force of derogation by default unless there are defeating factors.

42

For an alternative analysis of the same phenomenon, see Diaz-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton (2019).
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The “default interpretation” is an epistemic notion about what the hearer should infer from
the given evidence. Take an utterance of (1) “Chang is a chink” for instance. Upon hearing
this utterance, the hearer, merely by recognizing the force indicator “chink,” can arrive at
the default interpretation that this utterance has the force of derogation. Suppose there are
no defeating factors to this interpretation, i.e., the speaker is not speaking metaphorically
or sarcastically, and the felicity conditions are met. The hearer can conclude that utterance
(1) is at least an act of derogating the Chinese.
Two things need to be clarified here. First, although utterance (1) is interpreted by
default as an illocutionary act of derogation, it is not merely a single act of derogation. As
I have explained in 4.1, it may be a complex illocutionary act with multiple illocutionary
forces. For instance, the hearer may interpret utterance (1) as both asserting that Chang is
a Chinese and derogating the Chinese. Similarly, utterance (1) could be complex
illocutionary acts such as asserting & derogating, suggesting & derogating, claiming &
derogating, etc.
Second, the illocutionary force of derogation can be further narrowed down into its
subcategories. As I have shown in section 4.1, derogation is a family of overlapping
illocutionary acts such as denigrating, disparaging, belittling, insulting and discrediting.43
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Some might deny that acts like insulting are illocutionary on the ground that one cannot insult a person with “I hereby

insult you” (the hereby test). However, the hereby test may not be a good guide for illocutionary acts. This is because
insulting may pass the hereby test in other languages, as I will show in section 6.1 with Austin’s example of “I insult you”
in German.
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Upon hearing (1) “Chang is a chink,” a hearer initially reaches the default interpretation
that (1) has the illocutionary force of derogation. However, she may infer from her
background knowledge (e.g., the speaker despises the Chinese for being unreliable) that (1)
is not merely derogating the Chinese, but discrediting their reliability specifically.
Consequently, the hearer narrows her interpretation of illocutionary force from derogating
to discrediting.

4.4 Offensiveness as Perlocutionary Effects of Slurs
Despite my explanation of derogatory power in terms of illocutionary force, I believe the
offensiveness of slurs is perlocutionary, rather than illocutionary. That is, taking offense is
a perlocutionary effect of slurs, i.e., an effect of words on the thoughts and feels of the
hearer. Offending someone with a slur is a perlocutionary act, intentional or not, to produce
those effects.44 A slur like “chink” often causes audiences to feel offended for various
reasons. Imagine Chang hears someone’s utterance of (1) “Chang is a chink.” He might
feel offended because of his political view against using hate speech, his feeling of being
disrespected, his personal traumatic experience of being called “chink,” etc. No matter how
the offense is caused, it is a perlocutionary effect of the slur. Likewise, the speaker can
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utter (1) “Chang is a chink” to offend Chang because of the perlocutionary effects “chink”
produces.
This perlocutionary view of offensiveness explains how derogatory power and
offensiveness can come apart. That is, utterances of slurs can be derogatory without being
offensive, and vice versa.
First, consider the possibility of derogatory power without offensiveness. Imagine a
group of racist speakers keeps calling the Chinese “chinks” among themselves. Suppose
no other people hear them using the slur. The racist speakers use the slur to derogate the
Chinese, but no one among them feels offended by the usage of “chink.” After all, they are
not the target of the slur, and they feel no remorse about using it. This is possible because
their utterances of “chink” are successful acts of derogating the Chinese,” without
producing the perlocutionary effects of taking offense.
Second, it is also possible to have offensiveness without derogatory power. Consider
again the example of an innocent child.45 He does not understand the meaning and the
history of the slur “chink,” but he finds it funny because the adults are offended by it. The
child calls other kids on the playground “chinks” as a prank, even if he does not hate or
despise the Chinese. Despite using a derogatory word, his utterances are non-derogatory
since he does not want to derogate the Chinese. That is, his utterance is a locutionary act
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of using a derogatory word, without being an illocutionary act of derogation. Nevertheless,
what he says is not totally harmless; it remains offensive. The child uses a slur in order to
offend other kids on the playground, i.e., a perlocutionary act to cause offense. Again, the
possibility of this case can be accommodated by my distinction between perlocutionary
effects and illocutionary force of slurs.
One crucial difference between offensiveness and derogatory power is their
dependence on intentions. Whether an utterance of slurs is derogatory depends on the
intention of the speaker, whereas it can be offensive regardless of the intention. As I have
shown in section 4.1, the preparatory condition must be met for an utterance to be an act
of derogation, i.e., the speaker must intend to enforce a norm that assigns an inferior status
on the target. This is why intentions can make certain utterances of slurs non-derogatory,
e.g., calling close Chinese friends “chinks” to show intimacy. While derogatory power is
speaker-centered, offensiveness is hearer-centered; the intention of the speaker plays no
role in the offensiveness. No matter what the speaker intends, his utterance is offensive so
long as the hearer feels offended. Recall the example of the radical Chinese activists
chanting (7) “Chinks are coming!”. Other Chinese hearers may still find their utterance
offensive, even if they intend to challenge racism rather than to enforce it.
This difference of the dependence on intentions matters for regulating the harms of
slurs. To over-simply the matter, there are two opposing views on the harm of slurs. First,
it is believed that slurs are always harmful no matter what the speaker intends. This is why
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we should purge these words altogether from our vocabulary. Second, others argue that
slurs are harmful only when the speaker intends to harm. It follows that usages of slurs can
always be excused by the non-malign intentions of the speaker.
I believe both views capture only half of the whole picture. Slurs produce two kinds
of harms; derogation harms the target normatively by enforcing discriminatory norms,
while offense harms the target psychologically by producing pain and suffering.
Derogation depends on the intention, whereas offense does not. The first view is true to the
extent that slurs can always cause offense regardless of the intention. The second view is
true in the sense that using slurs can be non-derogatory when the intention is not to malign.
My distinction between offensiveness and derogatory power illustrates the complexity of
the harms of slurs and how to regulate them.

4.5 Explaining the Features of Slurs
After introducing the force indicator theory, we can apply it to explain the features of slurs.
Unlike other theories of slurs, the force indicator theory has no problem in explaining them.
Derogatory Power: The force indicator theory has to answer two questions associated
with the derogatory power of slurs (Croom 2011, 345, Jeshion 2013, 232, Richard 2008,
12, Hom 2008, 426, 2010, 164). I have used the force indicator theory to answer these
questions in section 4.1. However, it is useful to repeat them here. Consider question (Q1):
In virtue of what is a slur such as “chink” a derogatory word? According to the force
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indicator theory, slurs are derogatory words because they are illocutionary force indicators
of derogation.46 How about question (Q2)? In virtue of what is an utterance of slurs, e.g.,
“Chang is a chink,” derogatory? It follows from the force indicator theory that an utterance
of slurs is derogatory when it is an illocutionary act of derogation. The force indicator
theory has no problem with answering (Q1) and (Q2).
Offensiveness: The force indicator theory also has to answer questions about slurs’
offensiveness. Question (Q3) asks: “Why is a word such as ‘chink’ an offensive word?”
Similarly, question (Q4) asks: “Why is an utterance of slurs such as “Chang is a chink” an
offensive utterance?” My answer is that slurs and utterances of them are offensive because
of their perlocutionary effects, i.e., they tend to cause the hearers to feel offended. Hearers
take offense from slurs for a variety of reasons such as conflicting political views, feeling
disrespect, or personal experiences of racism, etc.
Truth-conditional Contribution: The force indicator theory has to explain the truthconditional contribution of slurs by answering (Q5): Does a slur (e.g., “chink”) make the
same truth-conditional contribution as its neutral counterpart (e.g., “Chinese”)? The force
indicator theory explains this by allowing slurs to be propositional indicators that make the
same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral counterparts. For instance, “chink”
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made the same contribution as “Chinese” to the truth-condition, such that (1) “Chang is a
chink” shares the same truth-condition as (2) “Chang is a Chinese.”
Independence: The force indicator theory has no problem in explaining the
independence of slurs (Whiting 2013, 364, Hornsby 2001, 129). To explain this question,
it has to answer question (Q6): Why is the derogatory dimension of a slur, (e.g., “chink”)
independent from its descriptive content? That is, how is it possible for “Chinese” to share
the same descriptive content as “chink,” without the former being a derogatory word? The
force indicator theory answers this by separating the role of force indicator and the role of
propositional indicator; it is possible to have one role without the other. Since slurs are
both force indicators and propositional indicators, they can have neutral counterparts that
share the same role as propositional indicators without being force indicators.
Descriptive Ineffability: The force indicator theory is capable of explaining the
descriptive ineffability of slurs. That is, it answers the question (Q7): why cannot the
derogatory dimension of a slur like “chink” be satisfactorily paraphrased in purely
descriptive terms (Hom 2010, 166, Potts 2007, 176, Whiting 2013, 365, Schlenker 2007,
239)? For instance, paraphrasing (1) “Chang is a chink” as “Chang is a Chinese and I have
negative attitudes toward the Chinese” does not capture the derogatory dimension of
“chink.” Something is lost.
For the force indicator theory, this is a consequence of the distinction between force
and content. Illocutionary force and propositional contents are not mutually translatable.
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Consequently, no illocutionary force indicator can be paraphrased into a (pure)
propositional indicator. Consider the illocutionary act of greeting someone by saying
“hello!”. It is unsatisfactory to paraphrase “hello!” with “I am greeting you”; asserting that
“I am greeting you,” after all, may not be a greeting. This is because of the impossibility
to translate the illocutionary force of greeting into the proposition that I am greeting you.
Similarly, one cannot paraphrase the illocutionary force of “Chang is a chink” with “Chang
is a Chinese, and I have negative attitudes toward the Chinese.”
One might suggest that “hello!” could have a descriptive paraphrase, i.e., “I hereby
greet you.” I agree that “I hereby greet you” accurately paraphrases the illocutionary force
of “hello.” However, “I hereby greet you” is no longer purely descriptive; this performative
sentence also contains force indicators. As for slurs like “chink,” “I hereby derogate the
Chinese” does not even paraphrase the illocutionary force of “chink.” This is because “I
hereby derogate” does not have a performative use in English. For more discussions on the
performative verbs of derogation, see section 6.1.
Perspective Independence: The force indicator theory can answer the questions about
the perspective dependence or agent-centeredness of slurs. Slurs are said to always indicate
the derogatory attitudes of the speaker (Hom 2010, 169, Schlenker 2007, 239, Bolinger
2015, 1). As Potts (2007, 166) claims, “the perspective encoded in the expressive aspects
of an utterance is always the speaker’s.” According to the force indicator theory, this is
simply because derogation expresses negative evaluative attitudes as its sincerity condition
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(just like an assertion expresses a belief. See § 4.1). The negative evaluative attitude is
always an attitude of the speaker¸ not others; the sincerity of derogation depends only on
the attitudes of the speaker. This is analogous to the fact that an assertion expresses no
one’s belief but the speaker’s belief.
It might be argued that certain force indicators are not perspective dependent. For
instance, uttering sentences like “John promised Bob to give him five dollars” reports the
promising-attitude of John, not the attitude of the speaker. However, this does not
constitute a counterexample to my claim. This is because the verb “promised,” unlike the
performative formula “I promise,” does not function as a force indicator in this example.
Historical Variability: The force indicator theory explains the feature of historical
variability of slurs. Recall the question (Q9): how can a slur become more derogatory or
less derogatory over time? Answering this question takes two steps.
Step one is to answer this question: what is it for a slur to be more or less derogatory?
According to the force indicator theory, for a slur to be more or less derogatory is for it to
be a force indicator of stronger or weaker illocutionary force of derogation (than it was).
As I have illustrated earlier, the illocutionary force of derogation can be strong or weak,
because it can vary in the strength of illocutionary points.
Step two involves explaining what it is for a slur to be a force indicator of stronger
illocutionary force over time. I believe this is a meta-semantic question concerning the
change of force indicators. There is nothing mysterious about a word’s becoming a force
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indicator of stronger or weaker illocutionary force. It is also possible for a word to acquire
the role of force indicators or lose it completely. The role of force indicators changes
because of changes in the regularity of usages in a linguistic community. For instance, the
phrase “I was wondering if…” was originally a pure propositional indicator describing
one’s interest, without providing illocutionary force. It has been regularly used by English
speakers as a polite way of requesting someone to do something. Consequently, it has
become an illocutionary force indicator for requesting.
Taking the two steps together, we have an answer to question (Q9): slurs become more
or less derogatory when their roles as force indicators change, and such changes are the
result of how slurs are used in a linguistic community. Consider the example of “queer” in
section 2.10 again. This slur became less derogatory because the LGBTQ community
started to use it in a non-derogatory way, to show their non-conformity to heterosexual
norms. This change in the use resulted in the change of force indicator; “queer” became a
force indicator of weaker illocutionary force or ceased to be a force indicator of derogation
at all.
Non-Derogatory Utterances: After historical variability, the force indicator theory has
to explain the non-derogatory utterances of slurs. These are simply cases of misfire of
illocutionary acts. Uses of slurs are derogatory utterances when they are illocutionary acts
of derogation. However, the Chinese activists’ utterance 5) fails to be an act of derogation,
despite using the derogatory word “chink.” As I have shown in 2.2, having the illocutionary
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force of derogation is insufficient for an utterance to be an act of derogation. Derogating
the Chinese requires satisfying the preparatory condition that the speaker must intend to
enforce a norm which assigns an inferior status on the Chinese. Otherwise, the utterance
would misfire. Unlike the white supremacist, the Chinese activists do not actually want to
enforce racism against the Chinese. Consequently, their utterance 5) fails to be an
illocutionary act of derogation against the Chinese, and hence fails to be derogatory.
Appropriation: The appropriation of slurs, as I have argued in section 2.10, collapses
into historical variability and non-derogatory utterances of slurs. Since appropriation is
not an independent feature, the force indicator theory has already explained appropriation
by explaining historical variability and non-derogatory utterances.
Non-Displaceability: Another crucial feature of slurs is non-displaceability. Slurs are
derogatory even when embedded within the scope of connectives like negations and
conditionals (Hom 2010, 168, Croom 2011, 345, Schlenker 2007, 238, Potts 2007, 166,
Bolinger 2015). The feature of being derogatory seems to “project through” the scope of
connectives. According to the force indicator theory, certain force indicators, including
slurs, provide illocutionary force when they are embedded in connectives.47 For example,
“chink” provides the illocutionary force of derogation to the utterance (9) “If Chang is a
chink, he celebrates Lunar New Year,” even if it is embedded in the antecedent. Since non-
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displaceability could be used as an objection, I will address this feature in greater detail in
section 6.2.
Kaplanian Inference Puzzle: Slurs give rise to a Kaplanian inference puzzle (Hom
2010, 167, Sennet and Copp 2015, 1087, Kaplan unpublished). A person who accepts the
premise of inference (13) is not committed to accepting its conclusion.48 Inference (13)
seems “invalid,” whereas inference (14) seems “valid” (in a sense other than validity as
truth-preservation). What kind of “invalidity” is it?

(13) The Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year.
Therefore, the chinks celebrate Lunar New Year.
(14) The chinks celebrate Lunar New Year.
Therefore, the Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year.

This kind of “invalidity” can be explained by an illocutionary approach; it is not a
logical relation between propositional contents, but a logical relation between illocutionary
forces. Borrowing the framework from Searle and Vanderveken (1985), there is a lack of
illocutionary entailment between the premises and the conclusion of (13). Inference (13)
seems invalid because its conclusion contains the force indicator of derogation which its
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premise lacks. Its invalidity is analogous to the problematic inference from “I apologize
for P” to “I apologize for P, and I promise that Q.” The validity of inference (14) is
explained by the illocutionary entailment in a similar way.
Self-Defeating Sentences: The illocutionary force indicator theory helps to explain
what I call “the puzzle of self-defeating sentences,” i.e., how slurs make certain sentences
self-defeating.49 Consider the following sentences. Intuitively, something is wrong with
them; these sentences seem to be self-defeating or self-inconsistent. Whatever the literal
uses of these sentences are, these uses cannot be fulfilled satisfactorily. What kind of
inconsistency is involved here?

(15) Praise the chinks!
(16) I apologize for my discrimination against the chinks.

This phenomenon of inconsistency is not a consequence of inconsistent propositional
contents. These sentences are not inconsistent in the same way as asserting that P&~P. In
particular, sentence (15) does not even express full propositions, not to mention
inconsistent propositional contents. For example, an utterance of sentence (15) “Praise the
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is read as derogating the Chinese but praising an aspect of them, e.g., the Chinese food culture. For my responses, see
section 2.13.
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chinks!” has the Chinese as its content, rather than a proposition. In fact, it does not even
have a truth condition. This is why sentence (15) cannot be a case of logical falsity like
P&~P. Therefore, any inconsistency in it cannot lie within its propositional content.50
If self-defeating sentences cannot be explained by inconsistent propositional contents,
this points toward the force indicator theory. That is, the inconsistency lies not in
propositional contents, but in illocutionary force. I shall adopt Searle and Vanderveken’s
(1985, 261) analysis of “illocutionary incompatibility” to explain this. Two illocutionary
acts are incompatible when it is impossible to perform both successfully. Take (15) “Praise
chinks” for instance. It is self-defeating because it contains illocutionary force indicators
for both praise and derogation. However, praising and derogating the same group are two
incompatible illocutionary acts. To praise a group is to assign a superior status in a certain
norm. Unlike praising, derogation aims at achieving the illocutionary point of imposing an
inferior normative status on someone. Because of the impossibility of assigning both an
inferior and a superior normative status to a given group, derogation and praising are two
incompatible illocutionary acts. This is why sentence (15) appears self-defeating; its two
illocutionary force indicators indicate forces of incompatible illocutionary acts. A similar
analysis can be given of other cases of self-defeating sentences.
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4.6 Summary
This chapter has introduced the force indicator theory of slurs in detail. In section (§ 4.1),
I have defined the force indicator theory as the conjunction of two theses: 1) Slurs are
illocutionary force indicators of the illocutionary acts of derogation; 2) They are also
propositional indicators that make the same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral
counterparts. This theory requires an analysis of the illocutionary act of derogation. In
section 4.1, I have analyzed derogation as a declarative illocutionary act of enforcing a
norm that assigns an inferior normative status to the target. Moreover, I have shown that
slurs are force indicators in the sense that utterances of slurs are interpreted as illocutionary
acts of derogation by default (§ 4.3). In addition to slurs’ role as force indicators, I have
also illustrated their perlocutionary effects, i.e., offensiveness (§ 4.4). Finally, I have
applied the force indicator theory to answer questions about the features of slurs (§ 4.5).

112

5 Alternative Theories of Slurs and Objections
Many theories of slurs have been proposed to explain the features of slurs. 51 This chapter
surveys and critiques major alternatives to my theory. I will introduce each theory by
briefly summarizing it and providing its answers to the questions introduced in chapter 2.
Theories of slurs are listed and labeled as theory (T1), (T2) and so on. For instance, I
shall define the main thesis of the truth-conditional content theory as follows:

(T2) Truth-conditional content theory: Slurs have derogatory truth-conditional contents,
i.e., complex normative properties of the form “ought to be discriminated against in
certain ways because of having certain stereotypical properties because of belonging
to a certain group.”

The existing theories, I believe, ultimately fail for different reasons. Nonetheless,
appreciating those theories and their weaknesses helps to strengthen my illocutionary force
indicator theory of slurs. Therefore, I will evaluate each theory by raising arguments
against them. I will label these arguments numerically as arguments (A1), (A2), etc.52 For
example:
51

As mentioned in section 1.2, the term “slur” is ambiguous. Following the literature, I shall use “slurs” in a narrower

sense. This paper focuses on “slurs” as derogatory expressions such as ethnic epithets, not “slurs” as derogatory speech,
e.g., what is described by “John’s comments slurred me.”
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(A1) Argument from Non-Assertions: If the truth-conditional content theory is true, then
non-assertion utterances of slurs cannot be derogatory. However, utterances like “Is
Chang a chink?” can still be derogatory.

My survey includes the most common theories but not all existing theories of slurs.
First, the literature on slurs is large, and a comprehensive survey is difficult. In addition,
only certain theories need to be selected because rejecting them supports my force indicator
theory in some way. These theories often endorse an opposing position to mine on a feature
or a question about slurs. I will discuss cases which highlight the strengths of my own view.
Therefore, including them is helpful for paving the way for developing the force indicator
theory. For instance, the truth-conditional content theory (T2) holds that “chink” has a
different referent than “Chinese,” whereas my force indicator theory takes them to be coreferential. Therefore, the truth-conditional content theory is introduced and criticized,
because this helps to establish my view.
Here is the outline of this chapter. In each section, a theory will be introduced, and
my arguments will be raised against it. In section 5.1, I will introduce Hom’s truthconditional content theory (T2), the view that slurs have derogatory truth-conditional
content. Section 5.2 discusses (T3) the conventional implicature theory, which takes slurs
to carry derogatory conventional implicatures. In section 5.3, I will present (T4)
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inferentialism about slurs, which explains slurs in terms of inferential rules to derogatory
statements. (T5) Prohibitionism of slurs offers an account of slurs from the prohibition of
the usage of slurs (§ 5.4). (T6) Mark Richard’s theory provides a unique theory of slurs,
according to which utterances that contain slurs have no truth values (§ 5.5). Hornsby offers
(T7) an account of slurs which draws an analogy between slurs and derogatory gestures (§
5.6). Finally, I will summarize the theories introduced in this chapter in section 5.7, where
readers can find a list of definitions of those theories for quick reference.

5.1 Hom's Truth-Conditional Content Theory
Hom’s truth-conditional content theory (or “combinatorial externalism” as he calls it)
explains slurs’ derogatory power in terms of truth-conditional contents (Hom 2008). 53
Recall that question (Q1) asks why a given slur such as “chink” is a derogatory word. The
truth-conditional content theory has a simple answer: words are derogatory when they have
derogatory truth-conditional contents (which represent their targets as having negative
properties), and slurs are derogatory words because they have derogatory truth-conditional
contents. The truth-conditional contents of slurs are complex normative properties like
“ought to be subject to such-and-such discriminatory practices for having such-and-such
stereotypical properties all because of belonging to such-and-such groups.” (Hom 2010,
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394) For instance, “chink” does not refer to the same group of people as “Chinese,” the
truth-conditional content of which is simply the property of being Chinese. For Hom (Hom
2012, 394), “chink” means “ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards,
and ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to managerial positions,…, because
of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, …, all because of being
Chinese.” In general, the truth-conditional contents of slurs are properties with the
following form: “ought be subject to p*1 + … +p*n because of being d*1 +… + d*n all
because of being NPC*,” “where p*1, …, p*n are deontic prescriptions derived from the
set of racist practices, d*1, …, d*n are the negative properties derived from the racist
ideology, and NPC* is the semantic value of the appropriate nonpejorative correlate of the
epithet” (Hom 2008, 431).
Let us reformulate the main thesis of this theory as follows:

(T2) Truth-conditional content theory: Slurs have derogatory truth-conditional contents,
i.e., complex normative properties of the form “ought to be discriminated against in
certain ways because of having certain stereotypical properties because of belonging
to a certain group.”

The truth-conditional content theory also must answer (Q2), i.e., why is an utterance
like “Chang is a chink” derogatory. Hom extends his answer for (Q1) to answer (Q2). Slurs
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are derogatory words because they express derogatory truth-conditional contents.
Consequently, utterances of slurs are derogatory if and only if the truth-conditional content
of slurs are predicated of someone (Hom 2012, 397, Hom 2008, 432). Asserting that
“Chang is a chink” is derogatory because it asserts that Chang ought to be discriminated
against in certain ways… because he is Chinese. As Hom (2008, 432) puts it, “derogation
is the actual application, or predication, of derogatory content. This speech act of applying
the epithet to an individual is to predicate the derogatory truth-conditional content of
someone, and thus literally to say something deeply negative, and threatening, towards that
person.”
The truth-conditional content theory would deny that (Q5) (i.e., Do slurs make the
same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral counterparts?) is the right question to
be asked. It asks a different question: why does a slur like “chink” make a different truthconditional contribution as its seemingly neutral counterpart “Chinese,” despite its
appearance of co-reference? This is because the truth-conditional content theory endorses
the opposite intuition about the truth-conditional contribution of slurs. Slurs seem to make
different contributions because unlike their neutral counterparts, slurs seem to be false of
their targets (Hom and May 2013, 293). Despite Chang’s being Chinese, (1) “Chang is a
chink” is literally false, according to the truth-conditional content theory (it insists on the
truth of (3) “Chang is not a chink”). The intuition seems to be that slurs like “chink” cannot
be true of their targets because they misrepresent them in an objectionable way. We would
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find utterance (1) unacceptable. Accepting the truth of (1) appears to be accepting the point
of view of racism. The best explanation of the unacceptability of (1) is simply that it is
false.
If the truth-conditional content theory holds that, contrary to (Q5), we should explain
the different truth-conditional contribution of slurs, what is its answer? Why does “chink”
make a different truth-conditional contribution as “Chinese”? The truth-conditional content
theory has a unique answer. Because of their derogatory truth-conditional contents, slurs
make different contributions to the truth conditions than their neutral counterparts do.
Therefore, switching a slur with its neutral counterpart in a sentence changes its truth
condition. It follows from the truth-conditional content theory that (1) “Chang is a chink”
is true if and only if Chang ought to be discriminated against in such-and-such ways…
because of being Chinese. In contrast, (2) “Chang is a Chinese” is true if and only if Chang
is a Chinese. Consequently, (1) “Chang is a chink” is false and (3) “Chang is not a chink”
is true, even if Chang is Chinese. This is because no one is a chink, who should be
discriminated against because of being Chinese (Hom and May 2013). The truthconditional content theory insists that (1) “Chang is a chink” must be false by appealing to
the intuition that it is unacceptable. To accept the truth of (1) seems to be agreeing with the
racist speaker in derogating the Chinese.
A consequence of the truth-conditional content theory’s answer to (Q5) is the null
extensionality of slurs, i.e., the claim that slurs have empty extensions or they refer to
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nothing (Hom and May 2013, 294). This is because of the moral fact that no one should be
discriminated against for stereotypical properties because of their identity. If no one should
be discriminated against because of being Chinese, “chink” has a null extension. In other
words, no one is a “chink.” The so-called “chinks,” just like unicorns and Santa Claus, do
not exist. It follows that “there are no chinks in China” is literally true. It also entails that
“chinks should be excluded from advancement to managerial positions” is an a priori and
necessary truth. Sennet and Copp (2015, 1096) have argued against this consequence of
the truth-conditional theory.
The truth-conditional content theory offers answers to other questions. For the sake
of brevity, I will only introduce its answer to (Q6) here. Although Hom does not explicitly
address (Q6), the question of independence, his theory would have a unique answer to it.
According to Hom’s theory, the derogatory dimension of a slur is a part of its truthconditional content, a complex normative property. Although the derogatory dimension
cannot be detached from the truth-conditional content altogether, it can be detached from
a certain descriptive content within the whole truth-conditional content. For example, the
neutral counterpart “Chinese” shares a part of the complex normative property of being a
“chink,” i.e., the property of being Chinese. However, “Chinese” lacks the derogatory
dimension within the complex normative property, i.e., “ought to be discriminated against
in certain ways…”
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I have introduced the (T2) the truth-conditional content theory and how it answers
questions about slurs. Now we can compare it with my (T1) force indicator theory. There
are two major differences. First, these two theories disagree over (Q5) the truth-conditional
contribution of slurs. The force indicator theory takes “chink” to have the same truthconditional content as “Chinese,” whereas the truth-conditional content theory does not.
Consequently, the force indicator theory takes (1) “Chang is a chink” to be true, while the
truth-conditional content theory takes (1) to be false. Second, the force indicator theory has
a different understanding of the source of derogatory power ((Q1) and (Q2)). The force
indicator theory ultimately traces the derogatory power back to the illocutionary force,
rather than truth-conditional content. By contrast, the truth-conditional content theory takes
derogatory power to arise from the truth-conditional contents or applying these contents to
people.
These two major differences give rise to objections against the truth-conditional
content theory. I will raise three objections of mine and explain how truth-conditional
content theory runs into problems because it adopts these different positions.
First, the truth-conditional content theory fails to offer a satisfactory answer to
question (Q2), i.e., why utterances of slurs are derogatory. In particular, it has difficulties
in explaining why non-assertion utterances of slurs can be derogatory. Asking questions
and issuing commands with slurs can be as derogatory as assertions. Consider the following
example utterances of slurs:
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(18) Is Chang a chink?
(19) Bring me a chink, Chang!

Despite their apparent derogatory power, Hom’s truth-conditional content theory
cannot allow these two utterances to be derogatory. This is because utterances of slurs,
according to Hom, are derogatory only if their derogatory contents are predicated of
someone, e.g., claiming that certain people ought to be discriminated against. However,
the speakers are not claiming that some people are chinks in the question and the command.
Applying their account, the speaker is merely questioning if Chang is Chinese and hence
should be discriminated against for being Chinese. Since the speaker is not asserting that
Chang should be discriminated against for being Chinese, (18) is not derogatory for Hom.
Similarly, the truth-conditional content theory takes (19) to be non-derogatory because the
speaker is not predicating the derogatory content to anyone. This argument can be
summarized as follows:

(A1) Argument from Non-Assertions: If the truth-conditional content theory is true, then
non-assertion utterances of slurs cannot be derogatory. However, utterances like “Is
Chang a chink?” can still be derogatory.
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Notice how (T1) the force indicator theory is immune to objection (A1). My theory
takes utterances of slurs to be derogatory when they have the illocutionary force of
derogation; it does not appeal to predicating derogatory contents in answering (Q2).
Consequently, (T1) allows non-assertions like (18), (19) to be derogatory. Non-assertions
of slurs can have multiple illocutionary forces including the force of derogation, as
described by Searle and Vandervaken (1985). Ultimately, the truth-conditional content
theory is vulnerable to (A1), because it insists that utterances of slurs are derogatory only
when they attribute derogatory contents to the target.
Second, the truth-conditional content theory also faces a great problem in answering
question (Q10), i.e., how certain utterances of slurs can be non-derogatory. Consider again
the examples given in section 2.9. Two utterances of the same sentence are uttered in
different contexts by different speakers. Utterance (8) is very derogatory, whereas (7) is
not derogatory. If “chink” is a derogatory word, why is (7) not as derogatory as (8)? Why
cannot the Chinese activist be accused of making nasty claims about the Chinese just like
the white supremacist?

(7)

Chinks are coming! (Chanted by radical Chinese activists in a rally against racism)

(8)

Chinks are coming! (uttered by a white supremacist in a speech against Chinese
immigrant)
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Although utterance (7) is not a derogatory utterance, the truth-conditional content
theory entails that utterance (7) and utterance (8) should be derogatory exactly in the same
way. For Hom, to derogate someone with a slur is to predicate the truth-conditional content
of the slur of him. In both utterances, the speakers assert that there are chinks, i.e., people
who ought to be discriminated against in such-and-such ways…because of being Chinese.
Therefore, both utterances should be derogatory exactly in the same way. The Chinese
activists are derogating the Chinese just like the white supremacists are. Again, this is very
counterintuitive. Hom’s theory should allow slurs to be used in non-derogatory utterances.
To summarize:

(A2) Argument from Non-Derogatory Utterances: If the truth-conditional content theory
is true, then there cannot be non-derogatory utterances in which slurs are predicated
of someone. However, such utterances can be non-derogatory in certain contexts.

Again, objection (A2) does not apply to (T1) the force indicator theory. This is
because (T1) allows variations in how derogatory utterances are, even if the truthconditional contents remain unchanged. Utterance (7) lacks the illocutionary force of
derogation, even if (7) has the same truth-conditional content as (8). The lesson is that
truth-conditional contents do not have enough context-sensitivity as illocutionary forces do
to explain non-derogatory utterances of slurs like (7).
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The third objection against the truth-conditional content theory concerns truthconditional contributions. The truth-conditional content theory takes slurs to make different
truth-conditional contributions than their neutral counterparts do. Consider examples (1) (4) below. This theory would take (1) to be false and (3) to be true. This is because “chink,”
unlike “Chinese,” means “ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards…,
because of being slanty-eyed, and devious…, all because of being Chinese” (2012, 394).
According to this theory, sentence (1) is false and (3) is true, because no one is a chink; no
one should be discriminated against for being Chinese.

(1)

Chang is a chink

(2)

Chang is a Chinese

(3)

Chang is not a chink

(4)

Chang is not a Chinese

I will argue against this analysis of the truth values of (1) and (3), using cases where
truth values have significant normative consequences. Contrary to the truth-conditional
content theory, I insist that (1) must be capable of being true, and (3) must be able to be
false. Suppose testimonies on Chang’s ethnicity are requested in a trial. A foul-mouthed
racist, who calls the Chinese “chink” by habit, decides to lie about the fact that Chang is
Chinese. He asserts that (3) “Chang is not a chink” to the judge. Could he escape the
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accusation of perjury with the excuse that (3) is in fact trivially true, as Hom shows? No.
This should be clearly treated as perjury because his assertion of (3) is a lie, in particular,
a false statement about Chang’s ethnicity. On the other hand, if the racist decided to reveal
Chang’s ethnicity by asserting (1), this would be a derogatory but true statement. It would
be implausible for the court to rule that (1) is a false testimony on the grounds that no one
is a chink. Let us label this argument (A3):

(A3) Argument from Truth-conditional Contribution: The truth-conditional content
theory entails that “Chang is not a chink” must be true. However, this sentence can
be false as is shown by the fact that asserting it in a court would be perjury as a
testimony about Chang’s ethnicity.

Objection (A3) does not challenge (T1) the force indicator theory, because (T1) takes
slurs to make the same truth-conditional contents as their neutral counterparts. It follows
from my theory that (3) “Chang is a not a chink” is false and asserting so counts as perjury.
The force indicator theory acknowledges the intuition that non-bigots find “Chang is a not
a chink” unacceptable, but denies that this makes it true.54 The truth-conditional content
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For detailed analysis of cases like this, see section 6.4.
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theory gives rise to problems like this because of its different view on the truth-conditional
contents of slurs.

5.2 The Conventional Implicature Theory
The conventional implicature theory is based on the notion of conventional implicature
introduced by Grice (1989, 25). Conventional implicature is a kind of implicature in
contrast with what is said. Unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures
are determined by choice of words (or the built-in, conventional meanings of words), rather
than mere cooperative principles.55 For instance, “but” carries a conventional implicature
of contrast that “and” lacks. What is said by “Chang is rich but kind” is exactly the same
as “Chang is rich and kind”; both are true if and only if Chang is rich and Chang is kind.
However, “Chang is rich but kind” conventionally implicates the contrast between being
rich and being kind, whereas “Chang is rich and kind” does not.
Conventional implicatures exhibit special features, according to Grice (1989). The
first feature is their non-cancellability. Conventional implicatures cannot be canceled by
opting out of the cooperative principle either explicitly or by context. This is because
conventional implicatures are carried not by the cooperative principle but the choice of
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Generally speaking, the principle is the rule that “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the

stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice
1989, 275).
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words (or the conventional meanings of the words). Here is an example Grice would use:
one cannot cancel what is conventionally implicated by “Chang is rich but kind” by adding
“Don’t get me wrong- I don’t mean that rich people are not kind.”
The second feature of conventional implicatures is their detachability, i.e., it is
possible to say the same thing without giving rise to the implicature. For instance, what is
said by “Chang is rich but kind” can be expressed by “Chang is rich and kind” without the
conventional implicature.
The third feature of conventional implicatures is said to be their non-displaceability
(2005). In other words, conventional implicatures project through the scope of sentential
connectives and propositional attitude verbs. For instance, the conventional implicature of
“Chang is rich but kind” projects through the scope of “believe” in “Bob believes that
Chang is rich but kind.”
The conventional implicature theory explains the features of slurs in terms of
conventional implicatures (Whiting 2013, 364, Williamson 2009, 149, Sennet and Copp
2017, 248).56 What distinguishes slurs from their neutral counterparts is their derogatory
conventional implicatures. The difference between “chink” and “Chinese” is analogous to
the difference between “but” and “and.” Conventional implicature theory’s answer to
question (Q1) is simple: slurs are derogatory words because they carry derogatory
56

Theorists like Bolinger (2015) and Nunberg (2018) explain the features of slurs in terms of conversational implicatures

rather than conventional implicatures. These conversational implicatures arise from the speaker’s choice to use a slur
instead of a neutral word. See Appendix 2 for the details of this conversational implicature view.
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conventional implicatures. Question (Q2) is also answered in the same way; utterances of
slurs are derogatory because they conventionally implicate derogatory contents. For
instance, what is said by “Chang is a chink” and “Chang is a Chinese” are the same. Both
utterances have the same truth conditions (or what is said) but differ in conventional
implicatures. Uttering “Chang is a chink” conventionally implicates a derogatory content
such as negative attitudes toward the Chinese. Let us summarize the theory as follows:

(T3) Conventional Implicature Theory: Slurs carry derogatory conventional implicatures
such as negative attitudes toward the target.

There are two variants of the conventional implicature theory. They disagree over
whether the conventional implicature of slurs is propositional or not. Some take the
conventional implicature carried by slurs to be propositional (Williamson 2009, Sennet and
Copp 2017), while others take the implicature to be non-propositional (Whiting 2013).57
For Williamson (2009, 149), the derogatory conventional implicature is something
propositional; e.g., “Lessing was a Boche” conventionally implicates that Germans are
cruel in addition to saying that Lessing was a German. Similarly, Sennet and Copp (2017,
256) take a slur like “papist” to carry the conventional implicature that the speaker “has the
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The term “propositional” can be misleading. Notice that “propositional” conventional implicatures are not what is

said; they do not affect the truth-condition of the utterance.
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relevant bigoted attitude, such as contempt for Catholics or the like.” In contrast, Whiting
(2013, 365) holds that the conventional implicature of a slur is a non-cognitive attitude
such as contempt, scorn, and derision. Such non-propositional conventional implicatures
are the reasons why slurs have (Q7) descriptive ineffability; non-cognitive attitudes simply
cannot be paraphrased. Whiting’s notion of conventional implicature deviates from the
Gricean orthodoxy, which takes conventional implicature to be propositional by definition.
For the sake of argument, I shall grant the possibility of conventionally implicating noncognitive attitudes.
Conventional implicatures are also invoked to explain other features of slurs. Consider
question (Q5). What contribution to the truth-condition does the slur “chink” make? The
conventional implicature theory, unlike the truth-conditional content theory, holds that
slurs make exactly the same contribution to what is said as their neutral counterparts.
Replacing a slur with a neutral counterpart does not affect what is said. For instance, the
truth-conditional contribution of “chink” is the same as “Chinese.” It follows that (1)
“Chang is a chink” is true if and only if (2) “Chang is a Chinese” is true. Furthermore, the
conventional implicature theory answers (Q6) —the question of independence— by
appealing to the detachability of conventional implicatures; the derogatory dimension of
slurs is independent because it is possible to say the same thing without the derogatory
conventional implicature of slurs. Answering the question (Q11) of non-displaceability is
also easy; the derogatory power of slurs projects through the scope of connectives simply
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because conventional implicatures always project through like this (Williamson 2009,
151).58
The most significant difference between the force indicator theory and the
conventional implicature theory is their answer to question to (Q2). For the force indicator
theory, utterances of slurs are derogatory when they have the illocutionary force of
derogation. Illocutionary force is more context-sensitive than conventional implicatures; it
is determined by many factors such as semantic meanings, speaker meaning, intonation,
grammatical moods, etc. By comparison, the conventional implicature theory takes
utterances to be derogatory when they carry derogatory conventional implicatures.
Conventional implicature is less context-sensitive than illocutionary force; it is mostly
determined by choice of words.59 As the following objections show, this difference leads
to problems for the conventional implicature theory.
I will raise two objections against the conventional implicature theory. The first
argument is borrowed from argument (A2) against the truth-conditional content theory.
That is, the conventional implicature theory faces a similar problem in explaining the
possibility of non-derogatory utterances of slurs (Q10).
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Even propositional conventional implicature can project through the scope of connectives. For example, “Chang is

rich but kind” implicates the proposition that rich people are unlikely to be kind. A complex sentence that contains this
atomic sentence (e.g., If Chang is rich but kind, he will donate money to charities) implicates the same proposition.
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There may be rare cases in which conventional implicature is defeated by contextual factors. This is why I claim it is

“mostly” determined by choice of words.
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(A4) Argument from Non-Derogatory Utterances: If the conventional implicature theory
is true, an utterance of a slur is always derogatory. However, some utterances of
slurs can be non-derogatory.

The conventional implicature theory is challenged by (A4) because conventional
implicatures are determined by choice of words. Consider the example of utterance (8) and
utterance (9) again. Although “chink” is a derogatory word, “chinks are coming!” chanted
by Chinese activists to protest racism is not a derogatory utterance. Nevertheless, it follows
from the conventional implicature theory that utterance (7) is as derogatory as utterance
(8). This because in both utterances, the speaker conventionally implicates his negative
attitude toward the Chinese by using the word “chink.” When “chink” has been chosen
over “Chinese,” the utterance carries the same derogatory conventional implicature against
the Chinese. Remember that conventional implicatures are non-cancellable. If the
conventional implicature theory was true, it would be very difficult to find contexts in
which “Chinks are coming” could be non-derogatory. As section 2.9 has shown, this
consequence is very counterintuitive.

(7)

Chinks are coming! (Chanted by radical Chinese activists in a rally against racism)

(8)

Chinks are coming! (uttered by a white supremacist in a speech against Chinese
immigrant)
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A response to argument (A4) might be that conventional implicatures, though not
cancellable, could still be defeated in certain cases like sarcasm.60 This could allow the
possibility of non-derogatory utterances for the conventional implicature theory. Imagine
a situation where the rich people from the 1% are unhappy with the conventionally
implicated contrast between being rich and being kind. They gather in a rally and chant
“Rich BUT kind! Rich BUT kind!”. It might be argued that their utterances do not carry
the conventional implicature that there is a contrast between being rich and being kind.
Therefore, the conventional implicature theory could explain utterance (7) just like this
case. However, my reply is that the conventional implicature, i.e., the contrast between
being rich and being poor, is not defeated by their sarcastic uses in this case. The speakers
conventionally implicate the contrast and then conversationally implicate their rejection of
this contrast. If this conventional implicature was absent (e.g., chanting “Rich and kind!”
instead), the protestors could not express the sarcastic rejection of the contrast.61
The second argument against the conventional implicature theory rests on the
observation that the slur for one group can be used to derogate another group. Let us label
this argument (A5)
60

Thanks for David Bourget for raising this response.
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Notice that my reply to this response does not apply to my force indicator theory. Just like the conventionally

implicated contrast, slurs’ role as illocutionary force indicators cannot be canceled or defeated by sarcasm; what is
defeated is the act of derogation. Even in sarcastic uses of slurs, slurs are still derogatory words, i.e., illocutionary force
indicators of derogation.
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(A5) Argument from Indirect Derogation: If the conventional implicature theory is true,
it is impossible to derogate a group with a slur for another group. However, it is
possible to derogate Koreans with a slur for the Chinese.

It is possible to derogate a group with a slur for another group. Consider the following
example utterance (20). The word “chink” is a slur against the Chinese. However, utterance
(20) below is derogatory for Koreans, even if “chink” is not a derogatory word for being
Korean. Perhaps the speaker is implying the Korean neighbors are despicable like “chinks.”
Because this utterance is derogatory against them, the Korean neighbors have a legitimate
reason to feel hurt and to protest it. The speaker cannot excuse himself by pointing out that
it has nothing to do with Koreans because he uttered a slur against the Chinese.

(20) “Chinks are moving into our neighborhood.” (A white supremacist comments on his
new Korean neighbors, even though he knows that they are Korean)

The conventional implicature theory cannot accommodate the intuition that a slur can
be uttered to derogate a group other than its referent. When it comes to utterance (20), the
conventional implicature theory cannot allow an utterance of “chink” to be derogatory
against Koreans. This is because utterances of “chink” conventionally implicate derogatory
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contents toward the Chinese, not the Koreans. For example, Williamson (2009) would hold
that “chink” conventionally implicates that the Chinese are devious, whereas Whiting
(2013) would take the conventional implicature to be the contempt of the Chinese. Either
way, the conventional implicature has nothing to do with Koreans.62 Therefore utterance
(20) can be derogatory only against the Chinese, not Koreans. Again, this result of the
conventional implicature theory is implausible.
Why does the conventional implicature theory face problems like (A4) and (A5)? This
is because conventional implicature is determined by choice of linguistic expressions,
rather than pragmatic factors such as cooperative principles (Grice 1989, 25). Therefore,
contextual factors play more limited roles in determining if an utterance is derogatory and
whom it is derogatory against. Whenever the speaker chooses to use the word “chink,” his
utterance carries the same derogatory conventional implicature against the Chinese. By
contrast, the illocutionary force indicator theory can avoid problems like (A4) and (A5).
This is because illocutionary force is more flexible than conventional implicatures.63 In
particular, utterances of slurs can lose the illocutionary force of derogation when the
felicity conditions are not met. Moreover, an utterance can derogate the Korean indirectly
62

By contrasts, a proposition that involves Koreans could be derogatory against them, even if it is false. For example,

expressing the proposition that Koreans are American imperialists is indeed derogatory against Koreans, who are not
American imperialists. Unfortunately, conventional implicature theorists think that the conventional implicatures of
“chink” involves no group other than the Chinese.
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The role of illocutionary force indicator can be as conventional as conventional implicatures. For example, when an

utterance of a slur is infelicitous, it does not have the illocutionary force of derogation. However, that slur remains a force
indicator of derogation. Their role of force indicators is conventionally encoded in the types of slurs.
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via directly derogating the Chinese, just like indirect speech acts such as “Can you pass me
the salt?”.

5.3 Inferentialism about Slurs
Inferentialism about slurs is based on inferential role semantics. Instead of explaining
meanings in terms of reference and truth-conditions, inferential role semantics takes
inference relations between sentences to be fundamental for meaning. As Dummett (1973,
453) puts it, “learning to use a statement…involves…learning two things: the conditions
under which one is justified in making the statement; and…the consequences of accepting
it. Here ‘consequences’ must be taken to include … the inferential powers of the
statement...” In particular, the meaning of a term is determined by its inferential rules which
license appropriate inferences between sentences. That is, to understand the meaning of
“bachelor,” one has to understand that the inferential rules allow inferences from “Chang
is a bachelor” to “Chang is unmarried,” “Chang is male,” etc.
According to inferentialism about slurs, the inferential rules of slurs allow inferences
to derogatory statements. The example from Dummett (1973, 454) is the slur “Boche” for
Germans. The inferential rules of slurs permit inferring from someone’s being a “Boche”
to that “he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans.” Williamson (2009,
139) reformulates Dummett's view on the meaning of “Boche” with the following
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inferential rules. These two rules allow the inference from “x is a German” to “x is a Boche,”
and the inference from “x is a Boche” to “x is cruel” respectively.

Boche-Introduction:

Boche-Elimination:

x is a German

x is a Boche

x is a Boche

x is cruel

Inferentialism can answer the essential questions about slurs. Consider question (Q2):
Why is an utterance like “Chang is a chink” derogatory? This sentence or utterance is
derogatory because derogatory statements can be inferred from it.64 “Chang is a chink” is
derogatory because we can infer that “Chang is devious,” “Chang is rude,” etc., from it.
This leads to an answer to question (Q1): why is a slur like “chink” a derogatory word.
“Chink” is a derogatory word, because its meaning consists of the inferential rules that
license inferences to derogatory statements, e.g., from “Chang is a chink” to “Chang is
devious,” etc. For example:

Chink-Introduction:

Chink-Elimination:

x is a Chinese

x is a chink

x is a chink

x is devious

64

This explanation of derogatory sentences is not necessarily circular. There might be a holistic account of derogatory

sentences.
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Inferentialism about slurs could be modified to answer question (Q12) about
Kaplanian Inference Puzzle. Inference (14) from “The chinks celebrate Lunar New Year”
to “Therefore, the Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year” seems “valid” because the
inferential role of “chink” contains a chink elimination rule that licenses such an inference.
Likewise, inference (13) from “The Chinese celebrate Lunar New Year” to “Therefore, the
chinks celebrate Lunar New Year” seems “invalid” because the inferential role of “chink”
does not include a chink-introduction rule that allows it. Notice that this claim about
inference (13) may be inconsistent with the chink-introduction rule from “x is a Chinese”
to “x is a chink” introduced above. Inferentialism can in principle explain the Kaplanian
Inference Puzzle, but it needs to be modified to resolve inconsistencies like this.
It is helpful to summarize inferentialism about slurs as the following thesis:

(T4) Inferentialism about Slurs: The meaning of a slur consists of inferential rules that
permit inferences to derogatory sentences about the target.

Inferentialism about slurs differs from the force indicator theory because it gives
statements or declarative sentences the central role in explaining slurs. Unlike other kinds
of sentences, statements are governed by inferential relations between them. Slurs are
derogatory when they license inferences between certain statements. By comparison, the
force indicator theory does not give statements such a central role; slurs have the same use
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to derogate in all kinds of sentences. This emphasis on statements and the relation between
statements makes inferentialism vulnerable to my objections.
I will argue that inferentialism also fails to explain how non-declarative sentences can
be derogatory. This is similar to (A1) argument from non-assertions against the truthconditional content theory; slurs can make non-declarative sentences like imperatives or
interrogatives derogatory. Consider sentences (18) and (19) again. Both should be as
derogatory as the declarative sentence (1) “Chang is a chink.”

(18) Is Chang a chink?
(19) Bring me a chink, Chang!

Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that there are any inferential rules from (18) and (19)
to derogatory statements. Inferential relation is surely an essential semantic relation
between declarative sentences. Nonetheless, it is unclear what can be inferred from
interrogatives and imperatives. Is it possible to infer from the question “Is Chang a chink?”
a derogatory statement like “Chang is devious”? The answer is no because no inference
can be drawn from a question to a statement. A statement may answer a question, but
cannot be inferred from it. I shall reformulate the argument as (A6):
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(A6) The Argument from Non-Declarative Sentences: It follows from inferentialism that
non-declarative sentences like “Is Chang a chink?” are not derogatory because no
derogatory statements can be inferred from them. However, non-declarative
sentences with slurs can be derogatory.

A possible response to argument (A6) is to expand the notion of “inference” to include
semantic relations from imperatives to imperatives, and from interrogatives to
interrogatives. For instance, one might be able to infer from “Get me a bachelor!” to “Get
me a male person!”. This is because issuing the command in some sense entails the further
command; if the speaker has asked for a bachelor, he must have asked for a male person.
Therefore, the possible response to (A6) would endorse inferences from (18) “Is Chang a
chink?” to interrogatives with derogatory terms like “Is Chang devious?”, “Is Chang rude?”,
etc. Similarly, the meaning of “chink” would allow inferences from (19) “Bring me a chink,
Chang!” to “Get me a devious person, Chang!”, etc.
This response, unfortunately, would not save inferentialism about slurs. For the sake
of argument, I shall grant the possibility that inferential rules allow inference from nondeclarative sentences with slurs to other non-declarative sentences with derogatory terms.
Nonetheless, this response is insufficient to explain (Q1) why slurs are derogatory. This is
because those non-declarative sentences with derogatory terms are not derogatory
sentences themselves. Unlike “Chang is devious,” “Is Chang devious?” is not derogatory
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at all. Similarly, “Get me a devious person, Chang!” is also non-derogatory. Even if they
can be inferred from (18) or (19), they do not explain why non-declarative sentences like
(18) or (19) are derogatory.
Another response to argument (A6) is to limit the scope of inferentialism to
propositions (rather than providing a semantics for non-declarative sentences).65 It might
be argued that inferential rules constitute only the proposition, not the grammatical moods.
For example, sentence (1) “Chang is a chink” has an indicative mood, whereas (18) “Is
Chang a chink?” has an interrogative mood. Nonetheless, both (1) and (18) share the same
derogatory proposition that Chang is a chink. This proposition, according to the limited
inferentialism, can be defined in terms of inferential rules from it to other derogatory
propositions (e.g., that Chang is devious, that Chang is rude, etc.). This response holds a
sentence like (18) is derogatory when it expresses a derogatory proposition, regardless of
its grammatical mood. Consequently, this limited inferentialism seems to have no problem
of explaining why non-declarative sentences like (18) can be derogatory.
My reply to this response rejects its assumption that sentences are derogatory when
they express derogatory propositions. Consider the following two sentences:

(10) Chang is an asshole.

65

Thanks for Robert Stainton for this response.
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(21) Is Chang an asshole?

Sentence (10) and (21) share the same derogatory proposition, i.e., that Chang is an
asshole. It follows from the assumption that (10) is derogatory iff (21) is derogatory.
However, although (10) is derogatory, question (21) is not. Even a person with the utmost
respect for Chang has no problem with asking question (21). This suggests that expressing
a derogatory proposition is insufficient for a sentence to be derogatory. After all, a
derogatory proposition is not necessarily endorsed by a sentence; a proposition could be
denied, questioned, or mocked. Therefore, grammatical moods (and other illocutionary
force indicators) help to determine if a sentence is derogatory. I do not have a theory for
how “asshole” and “chink” interact differently with the interrogative mood. But this
example should suffice for defending argument (A6) from the response.
Why is inferentialism about slurs susceptible to objections like (A6)? I believe the
source is its overemphasis on the role of statements or declarative sentences. Making
inferences between statements is one of the many things slurs can be used to do. It is a
mistake to think of it as the most essential function of slurs. The force indicator theory does
not face the same problem because it allows non-statements of slurs to have the
illocutionary force of derogation. For instance, utterance (18) “Is Chang a chink?” can have
both the illocutionary force of asking a question and the force of derogating the Chinese.
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5.4 The Prohibition Theory
The prohibitionist theory of slurs is unique in the sense that it explains the derogatory
power or offensiveness of slurs in terms of a non-linguistic property, i.e., prohibitions
(Anderson and Lepore 2013).66 Slurs are prohibited words. They are not allowed to be
used on many occasions. This fact provides an answer to question (Q1); slurs are
derogatory words because they are prohibited. Question (Q3) can be given a similar answer;
slurs cause offense because using or mentioning them violates the prohibition on them.
Anderson and Lepore do not specify exactly which kind of prohibition is required for slurs.
Nonetheless, they suggest that a word can be made a slur once it is prohibited by relevant
groups, which often are the target groups of slurs. For instance, if the Chinese community
denounces and protests against the word “chink,” such a prohibition should make “chink”
a slur. The core thesis of the prohibitionist theory can be formulated as follows:

(T5) The Prohibition Theory: Slurs are derogatory or offensive words because they are
prohibited words.

Appealing to prohibition is useful in explaining many features of slurs. Take nondisplaceability (Q11) for instance. The derogatory power or offensiveness of slurs project

66

By a “non-linguistic” property, I mean a property that is not studied by the core areas of theoretical linguistics and

philosophy of language, such as semantics, syntax, pragmatics, and phonology.
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through the scope of connectives. This is because no matter how slurs are embedded, they
are always prohibited (Anderson and Lepore 2013, 354). For example, the occurrence of
the slur in (3) “Chang is not a chink” is as prohibited as (1) “Chang is a chink.” Therefore,
embedded slurs remain offensive or derogatory.
The most significant difference between the force indicator theory and the prohibition
theory is the kind of explanation they give. While the prohibition theory appeals to nonlinguistic explanations, the force indicator theory explains the derogatory power or
offensiveness of slurs with linguistic explanations. Social prohibition, as a non-linguistic
explanation, is too crude to explain the subtleties of offensiveness and derogatory power.
Before I raise objections against the prohibition theory, here is a caveat on the
terminology. Unlike my distinction between derogatory power and offensiveness, the
prohibition theory conflates the two features together; Anderson and Lepore use the term
“offensiveness” interchangeably with “derogatory power.” Therefore, the prohibition
theory can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be interpreted as explaining derogatory
power with prohibition (i.e., answering question (Q1) and (Q2)). Second, it can also be
read as explaining offensiveness with prohibition (i.e., answering (Q3) and (Q4)).
Because of the two possible readings, my objections against the prohibition theory
have to address both readings. Therefore, I will first argue against the prohibition theory as
an explanation of derogatory power. Then I will raise objections against this theory as an
explanation of offensiveness.
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First, let us examine the prohibition theory as an explanation of offensiveness. I will
argue that the prohibition is insufficient for explaining why using slurs causes offense.
Imagine a situation where a close Chinese friend calls Chang “chink” as a sign of intimacy.
Chang feels amused instead of taking offense. After all, Chang understands that the friend
is merely playing with the taboo or prohibition, rather than insulting him. In this case, a
prohibition is violated, but no offense is caused. Causing offense must involve more than
violating a prohibition (e.g., perceived hostility). The prohibition theory is vulnerable to
this objection because the offensiveness of slurs involves the psychological reactions of
the audience, which a violation of a prohibition does not take into account. I shall formulate
this argument as follows.

(A7) The Argument from Non-offensive Utterances: Prohibition is insufficient for
explaining offensiveness because an utterance of slurs can violate a prohibition
without causing offense.

Second, after arguing against the prohibition theory as an explanation of offensiveness,
let us test the theory as an explanation of derogatory power.
One of the common objections against the prohibition theory is that it reverses the
order of explanation; it seems that slurs’ being derogatory explains their prohibitions, not
the other way around (Anderson and Lepore 2013, 354). For instance, if we ask “why is
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‘chink’ a prohibited word?”, the right answer should be that “chink” is a derogatory word
against the Chinese. Therefore, explaining the derogatory power of “chink” in terms of the
prohibition against it would be putting the cart before the horse. Anderson and Lepore’s
response is to deny that derogatory power is sufficient for explaining prohibition. One of
their examples is that pronouncing the tetragrammaton (i.e., YHWH) is prohibited in the
Jewish communities. It is prohibited not because it is derogatory, but because it is a divine
name.
I will argue against Anderson and Lepore’s response by showing that prohibition is
also insufficient for derogatory power. The kind of examples Anderson and Lepore invoke
not only undermines explaining prohibition in terms of derogatory power, but also their
explanation of derogatory power in terms of prohibition. Many words are prohibited, but
they are not derogatory words. Therefore, prohibition is not enough for explaining
derogatory power. A good example is the naming taboo in Imperial China. Addressing the
Kangxi Emperor by his personal name “Xuanye” (or even using the characters in this name)
is strictly prohibited and punishable by the death penalty. However, the prohibition on
“Xuanye” does not make this name a derogatory word, not to mention a slur, for the
Emperor. The same can be said for the tetragrammaton. Allow me to reformulate my
argument as follows:
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(A8) The Argument from Prohibited Non-derogatory Words: Prohibition is insufficient
for explaining derogatory power because there are prohibited words that are not
derogatory words.

It has also been argued that the prohibitionist theory is insufficient for explaining the
particular way in which slurs are derogatory. That is, prohibition is insufficient for
differentiating between the derogatory power of slurs and general pejoratives (Anderson
and Lepore 2013, 355). For instance, the word “chink” is derogatory in a way different
from “asshole”, even though they are both prohibited words. Prohibition alone is
insufficient for explaining the difference. Anderson and Lepore respond to this accusation
by denying such a difference; there is no evidence to prove that both words are derogatory
in different ways. They insist that there is no difference in the reaction among hearers. Even
if we were more offended by slurs, that would be because they are more prohibited.
I will argue that Anderson and Lepore's reply still fails because there is one difference
they cannot deny and cannot explain. The derogatory power of slurs, unlike other
pejoratives, is directed against all members of the target group, rather than an individual.
In particular, “chink” is not just a derogatory word; it is a derogatory word against all
members of a group. The job of this word is to derogate or insult all the Chinese. This is a
feature that general pejoratives lack; they are not derogatory words against all members of
a group. The word “asshole” does not target all mean, contemptible persons; its use is to
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insult particular individuals. For instance, all Chinese would have a reason to feel offended
by the sentence “Chang is a Chink,” the literal usage of which hurts all Chinese in addition
to Chang. By contrast, one would not say that all “assholes” or a national organization of
“assholes” have reason to feel hurt and protest the utterance (10) “Chang is an asshole.”
The word “asshole” is not a derogatory word against all members of its referent, say, all
mean and contemptible people. After all, the literal usage of (10) “Chang is an asshole”
targets no one but Chang. I shall formulate this argument as follows:

(A9) The Argument from Directness of Derogatory Power: Both slurs and general
pejoratives are prohibited words. However, slurs are derogatory words against all
members of the target group, whereas general pejoratives are not. Therefore,
prohibition is insufficient for explaining why slurs are derogatory words.

Anderson and Lepore might provide prohibitionist explanations for how words can be
derogatory against certain groups of people. There can be two approaches, and I will reject
both of them. First, they might hold that a derogatory word is derogatory against a group
because it refers to that group. However, this explanation would not distinguish between
slurs and general pejoratives. This is because general pejoratives are not derogatory against
their referent; “asshole” is not a word to insult all mean and despicable people. Second,
they might hold that derogatory words are derogatory against people who prohibit them.
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“Chink” is a derogatory word against the Chinese, because it is prohibited by the Chinese
community. However, this alternative explanation would not work because a slur is often
prohibited by people who are not the target of it. Many groups of activists prohibit and
denounce the word “chink,” even though they are not Chinese. Nonetheless, this does not
make “Chink” a derogatory word against non-Chinese groups.
We should take a step back and reflect on why the prohibition theory is vulnerable to
objections like (A9). Unlike illocutionary acts, prohibition is too crude to differentiate slurs
from general pejoratives; it does not tell us the target of the offensive and derogatory word.
By contrast, the illocutionary force indicator theory would have no problem in explaining
the difference. The illocutionary act of derogation can have different targets as its content.
“Chang is an asshole” is derogatory against Chang, because it derogates Chang, rather than
all “assholes.” By contrast, “Chang is a chink” is derogatory against the Chinese because
it derogates all the Chinese, not just Chang.

5.5 Mark Richard’s Theory
Mark Richard (2008) invokes slurs, in addition to vagueness, taste predicates, etc., as
examples of the limitation of defining meaning in terms of truth-conditions. Let me focus
on his view on slurs. His theory has a simple answer for (Q1): slurs are derogatory words
because they are “conventional means to express strong negative attitudes towards
members of a group, attitudes in some sense grounded in nothing more than membership
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in the group” (Richard 2008, 12). As for why utterances of slurs are derogatory (Q2),
Richard takes these utterances to express distinctive derogatory thoughts. For instance, (1)
“Chang is a chink” expresses the slurring thought that Chang is a chink, whereas (2)
“Chang is a Chinese” expresses a different thought, i.e., the thought that Chang is a Chinese.
To think that someone is a chink requires having contempt for Chinese people because of
their ethnic identity, and contempt is a part of the thought.
When it comes to the truth-conditional contribution of slurs (Q5), Richard’s theory
has a unique answer. Richard (2008, 7) believes that utterances containing slurs lack truth
values. That is, (1) “Chang is a chink” is neither true nor false. This is because they express
a special kind of thought that is incapable of truth. Compare the slurring thought that Chang
is a chink with the thought that Chang is a Chinese. The former thought cannot be true,
even though the latter thought is true. It cannot be true because it misrepresents the target
of the slurs. Again, the thought that Chang is chink has the contempt of the Chinese as a
part it. Simply having such contempt is a misrepresentation of Chinese people, because the
contempt represents the Chinese as worthy of contempt. Since they are not contemptible
for their Chinese identity, the thought misrepresents them. Because the thoughts expressed
by utterances containing slurs misrepresent the target of slurs, they have no truth values.
Richard (2008, 24) offers further arguments for his claim that utterances of slurs have
no truth values. First, he argues that utterances of slurs cannot be true. This argument is
based on his theory of truth; to say a thought is true is to endorse it as representing the

149

world correctly. But slurring thoughts misrepresent the world; we do not think a racist
thought represents the world correctly. So slurring thoughts are not true. To say they are
true is to accept the way racists represent their target. Second, utterances of slurs are not
false either. Although they express slurring thoughts that misrepresent the target,
misrepresentation does not make them false. This is because to say those thoughts are false
is to say their negations are true. For instance, to say that (1) “Chang is a chink” is false is
to say that (3) “Chang is not a chink” is true. Nonetheless, we do not accept the truth of
those negations. To say (3) “Chang is not a chink” is true amounts to saying that the racist
speaker represents the world right. (3) is also not true because it expresses a slurring
thought that misrepresents the Chinese.
I will reformulate the central thesis of Richard’s theory as follows:

(T6) Mark Richard’s Theory of Slurs: Utterances of slurs express slurring thoughts that
misrepresent the targets as worthy of contempt, and they lack truth values because
of the misrepresentation.

Contrary to Richard’s theory, my theory does not appeal to slurring thoughts. I believe
the derogatory power of slurs arises from utterances and speech acts, not from mental states.
This is because to derogate a group is a matter of enforcing a discriminatory norm, rather
than expressing one’s thoughts. However, I do not have an objection against Richard’s
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theory from this difference. Therefore, I need to introduce another difference that gives rise
to a problem for him.
The most significant disagreement between my force indicator theory and Richard’s
theory is the truth-conditional contribution of slurs. The force indicator theory does not
take utterances of slurs to be void of truth value. Although it agrees that (1) “Chang is a
chink” is unacceptable and cannot be endorsed by non-bigots, such unacceptability does
not affect its truth value. For example, it takes (1) “Chang is a chink” to be true, even if it
is objectionable. After all, slurs’ role as force indicators does not affect their role as
propositional indicators. By contrast, Richard’s theory takes such unacceptability to be the
exact reason why utterances of slurs lack truth values. As my objection will show, denying
the truth values of utterances of slurs leads to unwanted consequences for Richard’s theory.
I will raise an argument similar to argument (A3) against the truth-conditional content
theory:

(A10) The Argument from Lying: if an utterance has no truth value, it is impossible to lie
with it. However, one can lie with an utterance that contains a slur. Therefore,
Richard’s theory is mistaken in claiming that utterances of slurs have no truth values.

This argument is based on the possibility of lying with slurs. One of the necessary
conditions for a lie is the capability of having truth values. For instance, utterances like
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“thank you!”, “what is that?”, and “please go that way” cannot be lies because they cannot
be true or false. In telling a lie, the speaker is committed to the truth value of the statement.
This is why the speaker can be accused of lying when the statement turns out to be false.
A lie misrepresents the world in a certain way that makes it false. If the misrepresentation
in an utterance of slur deprives it of truth value, then it cannot be a lie.
Nonetheless, it is surely possible to lie with slurs. Consider again the example of a
foul-mouthed racist, who calls the Chinese “chinks” by habit. He is demanded by the court
to testify on Chang’s ethnicity. He knows that Chang is Chinese, but he decides to hide this
fact. Therefore, he utters a sentence with a slur: (3) “Chang is not a chink.” It is intuitive
that he has lied with (3). Despite being derogatory, what he says is a lie. He could not
escape the accusation of being a liar with the excuse that what he says lacks truth value.
Similar cases can easily be made. Given the possibility of lies with slurs, Richard’s theory
(T6) is wrong in claiming utterances of slurs have no truth value.
Why is Richard’s theory susceptible to objections like argument (A10)? The objection
arises from Richard’s assumption that expressing negative attitudes deprives utterances of
truth values because of misrepresentation. A theory of slurs can avoid this objection by
abandoning this assumption. For example, the force indicator theory would not face
problems like (A10). This is because utterance (3) “Chang is not a chink” is both an
illocutionary act of derogation and an act of assertion. “Chink” contributes to the truth-
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condition of the assertion, which is capable of being a lie. Being an act of derogation does
not prevent the utterance from being an assertion.

5.6 Hornsby’s Gesture Theory
Hornsby’s gesture theory is motivated by an interesting feature of slurs, that is, their
uselessness. What does uselessness mean? According to Hornsby (2001, 130), “In the case
of derogatory words … One cannot endorse anything that is done using these words. And
this is what I mean by useless—absolutely useless, as it were.” Although slurs have a use
for bigots, they are useless for non-bigots because they would not use this word to do
anything; they could always use the neutral counterpart. In addition, slurs are absolutely
useless, in the sense that non-bigots cannot accept anything that is done by using slurs.
Hornsby’s positive account is rather vague. She explains usages of slur with an
analogy to gestures, although she does not offer a concrete theory. That is, uttering a slur
is like uttering its neutral counterpart while making a gesture. The derogatory dimension
of the meaning of slur is said to be expressed by this gesture. For instance, someone’s
uttering (1) “Chang is a chink” is like uttering (2) “Chang is a Chinese” while pointing the
middle finger. The derogatory attitude toward the Chinese is expressed by something
analogous to the middle finger. Hornsby should not be read as claiming that utterances of
slurs involve actual gestures. This would be obviously false; people can make derogatory
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utterances of slurs even if they are incapable of making gestures. What she offers is merely
an analogy to gestures.

(T7) Hornsby’s Gesture Theory: An utterance of a slur is analogous to an utterance with
its neutral counterpart while making a gesture.

Because Hornsby does not have a concrete theory beside an analogy, it is difficult to
raise objections against it. I will therefore not argue against it. To the contrary, I believe
that her gesture theory ultimately collapses into an illocutionary force indicator theory like
mine. Therefore, I agree with her approach. According to Austin (1962, 76), gesture is one
of the many kinds of illocutionary force indicators. Austin calls gestures such as winks,
shrugging, frowns, “accompanies of the utterance.” What gestures do is to make the
illocutionary force of slurs explicit, i.e., show how the content of the utterances should be
taken. In fact, Hornsby herself suggests slurs should be explained in terms of illocutionary
acts. When it comes to explaining the uselessness of slurs in particular, Hornsby (2001,
140) claims that “there is nowhere else to turn than to the kinds of speech act made by
those who use them—speech acts of illocutionary kinds, as we have seen, such as vilifying,
snubbing, expressing derision, and so on. And when sentences containing them are seen as
suited for doing such things as these, one has a ready explanation of their uselessness.”
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Therefore, Hornsby’s gesture theory is a helpful approximation of illocutionary force
indicator theories.

5.7 Summary
In this chapter, I have summarized and criticized the major theories of slurs. It is helpful to
list these theories again here.

(T2) Truth-conditional content theory: Slurs have derogatory truth-conditional contents,
i.e., complex normative properties of the form “ought to be discriminated against in
certain ways because of having certain stereotypical properties because of belonging
to a certain group
(T3) Conventional Implicature Theory: Slurs carry derogatory conventional implicatures
such as negative attitudes toward the target.
(T4) Inferentialism about Slurs: The meaning of a slur consists of inferential rules that
permit inferences to derogatory sentences about the target.
(T5) The Prohibition Theory: Slurs are derogatory or offensive words because they are
prohibited words.
(T6) Mark Richard’s Theory of Slurs: Utterances of slurs express slurring thoughts that
misrepresent the targets as worthy of contempt, and they lack truth values because
of the misrepresentation.
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(T7) Hornsby’s Gesture Theory: An utterance of a slur is analogous to an utterance with
its neutral counterpart while making a gesture.

These alternative theories of slurs are subject to various objections because they often
adopt an opposing position to mine on many issues. I have illustrated the differences
between my theory and these theories, and I have raised objections against them based on
these differences. These challenges help to highlight the advantages of my force indicator
theory over the alternatives. However, criticizing other theories of slurs is not enough; I
have to defend my theory from objections as well. This is the task of the following chapter.
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6 Defending the Illocutionary Force Indicator Theory
Many objections can be raised against different aspects of the force indicator theory. Its
first thesis is that slurs are illocutionary force indicators of derogation. One might challenge
this thesis by questioning the nature of derogation. Is it really an illocutionary act? If
derogation is not an illocutionary act, there can be no force indicators for them. One might
also challenge the first thesis by excluding slurs from force indicators. Do slurs behave in
the same way as force indicators? If slurs are very different from force indicators, we have
a reason to reject the force indicator theory. The second thesis of the force indicator theory
takes slurs to make the same truth-conditional contributions as their neutral counterparts.
However, are there exceptions where they make different contributions? If there are, the
second thesis has to be rejected. This is not a comprehensive list of all objections. However,
a proponent of the force indicator theory must respond to them.
In this chapter, I will defend the force indicator theory from these potential objections.
In section 6.1, I will respond to the objection that derogation is not an illocutionary act
because one cannot derogate by saying “I hereby derogate…”. In section 6.2, I will address
the objection that slurs behave differently than force indicators when embedded. Section
6.3 will focus on as objection stating that the force indicator theory leads to systematic
ambiguity. In section 6.4, I will discuss the objection that slurs make different truthconditional contributions than their neutral counterparts. Lastly, it might be argued that my
theory collapses into expressivism or a register theory of slurs. In the final two sections, I
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will illustrate the advantages of the force indicator theory by comparing it with
expressivism (§ 6.5) and the register theory (§ 6.6) respectively.

6.1 Objection 1: Derogation is Not Illocutionary
The first objection against the force indicator theory denies that derogation is an
illocutionary act. If so, slurs cannot be the illocutionary force indicators of derogation.
Every illocutionary act seems to have a corresponding performative verb. For instance, the
illocutionary act of promising has the corresponding performative verb “promise.” Thus,
one can make a promise by uttering “I hereby promise that…”. If derogation is an
illocutionary act, how come there is no performative verb for it? If no one can derogate the
Chinese by saying “I hereby derogate the Chinese,” derogation does not seem like an
illocutionary act. Since derogation is not an illocutionary act, slurs cannot be force
indicators of derogation.
However, this objection rests on the unjustified assumption that every illocutionary
act corresponds to a performative verb. My response is simply to reject this assumption.
Many speech act theorists deny that every illocutionary act corresponds to one
performative verb (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 179, Sadock 2004, 56). In particular,
some illocutionary acts do not have corresponding performative verbs. For instance,
boasting is an illocutionary act, but it is impossible to boast by saying that “I boast that I
own a car.” Similarly, verbs such as “threaten,” “insinuate,” and “hint” do not have
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performative uses like “promise,” even if they correspond to illocutionary acts. If so, the
fact that English has no performative verb for derogation poses no threat to the force
indicator theory.
Moreover, the lack of a performative verb for derogation in English might not be
shared by other languages. For example, insulting is a member of the family of
illocutionary acts of derogation (see section 4.1). Surely one cannot insult a person by
saying “I hereby insult you” in English. But this does not necessarily apply to other
languages. Austin (1962, 30) points out that “in the heyday of student duelling in Germany
it was the custom for members of one club to march past members of a rival club, … and
then for each to say to his chosen opponent … ‘Beleidigung’, which means ‘I insult you’.”
This example suggests the possibility that insulting and derogation may have
corresponding performative verbs in other languages.
Even if acts like boasting and insulting do not have performative verbs, some readers
may still be unconvinced that derogation is an illocutionary act. It might be argued that my
examples, such as boasting and insulting, should all be expelled from the realm of
illocutionary acts. Therefore, their lack of performative verbs does not defend derogation
from this objection. I agree that boasting and derogating may not be like prototypical
illocutionary acts such as assertion and promising. Nonetheless, there are theoretical
reasons to at least treat derogating along the same lines as other illocutionary acts. That is,
derogation shares important commonalities with other illocutionary acts. For instance,
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derogation can be performed in saying something, just like other illocutionary acts.
Moreover, its force can be conventionally encoded in the types of linguistic expressions,
and derogation can be made infelicitous by the context.
Because of these commonalities, my illocutionary force indicator theory remains
intact for the most part, even if a narrow conception of illocutionary act excludes
derogation. Let us call derogation a “schmillocutionary act” instead, if it is not illocutionary.
As “schmillocutionary force indicators,” slurs still provide a default interpretation of
derogation to utterances, just like illocutionary force indicators. Derogation, even if not
illocutionary, can achieve a “schmillocutionary point” to enforce a certain norm. The
features of slurs can be explained by appealing to the mechanisms of illocutionary acts
without calling them “illocutionary.” Consequently, the dispute over derogation’s status as
illocutionary act becomes trivial for my theory.

6.2 Objection 2: Embedded Slurs are Not Like Force Indicators
Another objection against the force indicator theory arises from the feature of the nondisplaceability of slurs. The familiar force indicators do not indicate illocutionary forces
when embedded within the scope of connectives. For example, uttering the sentence “If I
promise that I will not come, the conference will have fewer participants” does not have
the illocutionary force of a promise. By comparison, slurs remain derogatory even when
they are embedded within the scope of connectives. This is the feature of non-
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displaceability of slurs introduced in section 2.11. Consider the following conditional
sentence (22). Even if “chink” is embedded within the antecedent, the whole sentence is
still derogatory. Therefore, slurs cannot be force indicators because they behave differently
when embedded.

(22)

If chinks celebrate Lunar New Year, they eat dumplings.

My response to this objection challenges its assumption that embedded force
indicators generally indicate no illocutionary force. It has been argued that certain
parentheticals are illocutionary force indicators, and they can be embedded without losing
illocutionary force (Green 2000, 447). Consider the parenthetical “as I suppose” within the
conditional “If snow is white, as I suppose, then grass is green.” This parenthetical indicates
the illocutionary force of supposing that snow is white, which should be differentiated from
asserting that grass is green if snow is white.67 Furthermore, this example of embedded
parenthetical should not be confused with the conditional “If I suppose that snow is white,
then grass is green.” My response does not claim that this conditional has the force of
supposition. Although the embedded expression “I suppose” indicates no illocutionary
force of supposition, it is not a parenthetical expression.
67

I take supposition to be an illocutionary act, the point of which is to present a proposition for consideration without

committing to its truth. A speaker supposing that p, unlike someone who asserts that p, cannot be blamed, even if p turns
out to be false.
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I believe that slurs behave like those parentheticals; they also keep their illocutionary
force when embedded. Therefore, sentence (22) is analogous to “If the Chinese, damn those
people, celebrate Lunar New Year, they eat dumplings.” The embedded parenthetical
“damn those people” indicates the force of derogation like slurs, whereas “the Chinese”
provides propositional content. This is not to say that slurs are disguised parentheticals. I
believe a slur like “chink” is syntactically different from “Chinese, damn those people.”
Different kinds of illocutionary force indicators behave differently when embedded. Both
slurs and certain parentheticals belong to the kind of indicators that retain their
illocutionary force when they are embedded. Other indicators of this kind include
honorifics like “sir” and swear words like “damn.”

6.3 Objection 3: Force Indicator Theory Entails Ambiguity
Anderson and Lepore (2013, 353) raise the ambiguity objection against the force indicator
theory. It seems to follow from the force indicator theory, or any performative theory, that
slurs must be systematically ambiguous. They give an example in which a racist drives by
a group of African Americans and yells out (23), and one person in the group tries to clarify
the confusion with (24):

(23)

You n**gers and spics don’t belong here!

(24)

I think you three must be the n**gers, and the rest of us are the spics.
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(25)

I think you three must be the “n**gers,” and the rest of us are the “spics.”

Anderson and Lepore argue that the slurs in (24) are non-performative or lack
illocutionary force, although their meanings remain the same as those in (23). If the
performative aspect or the illocutionary force of slurs were parts of the meanings, those
slurs would have different meanings in (23) and (24). However, their meanings do not seem
to change at all.
I will defuse this objection by denying that the slurs retain the same meanings in (23)
and (24). Their meanings have changed because those slurs in (24) are used in mixed
quotations, which should not be regarded as indications for ambiguity. My reply consists
of two steps.
First, I believe that slurs in (24) are actually used in mixed quotations and (24) should
be analyzed as (25).68 In mixed quotations, slurs are used to report the derogatory usages
of other speakers, instead of being used by the speaker for derogation. This is why slurs
seem to lose their performative or illocutionary aspects in (24). (24) is a disguised case of
mixed quotation, because the speaker is reporting his thought about the racist’s usage of
the slurs; he thinks that some of the group were labeled with the N-word and the rest were
called “spics” by the racist. In addition, the alternative reading must be rejected; it cannot

68

Thanks to Robert Stainton for his helpful comments on mixed quotations
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be the case that the speaker of (24) uses “spics” in the same meaning as the racist in (23).
Unlike the mistaken racist, the speaker knows that they are all African Americans. Why
would he claim that he thinks that the rest of them are the Hispanics?
Second, cases of mixed quotations should not be used as evidence for ambiguity,
because even unambiguous words change their meanings in mixed quotations. I assume
the word “chef” is unambiguous. Suppose a person, who is not a chef, is nicknamed “chef.”
Compare (26) with (27). Mixed quotation changes the meaning of “chef” in (27). (26) states
that the hearer must be the cook, whereas (27) merely claims that the hearer is called “chef.”
However, this case of mixed quotation does not establish the ambiguity of “chef.”
Otherwise, every word could be proven ambiguous like this.

(26) You must be the chef.
(27) You must be the “chef.”

6.4 Objection 4: Slurs Make Different Truth-conditional Contributions
An objection could be raised against my claim that slurs make the same truth-conditional
contributions as their neutral counterparts. Let us call this “the truth condition objection.”
As section 4.1 shows, I believe “chink” contributes the same to the proposition as
“Chinese”; both words refer to the Chinese people. Suppose Chang is a Chinese person. It
follows from my theory that (1) “Chang is a chink” and (2) “Chang is a Chinese” are both
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true. Correspondingly, (3) “Chang is not a chink” and (4) “Chang is not a Chinese” are
both false. Against my position, it might be objected that slurs make a different truthconditional contribution than their neutral counterparts. For example, someone might hold
that the sentence (1) “Chang is a chink” is actually false, while (3) “Chang is not a chink”
is true. It seems that we have reached an impasse of conflicting intuitions of truth values.
This objection needs better examples to support the intuitions behind it.
Unlike controversial cases like (1) and (3), this objection is better supported by the
so-called “NDNA” (non-derogatory, non-appropriated) cases, where slurs seem to make
different truth-conditional contributions (Hom 2008, 429, 2010, 169, Hom and May 2013,
303). I have adopted the following examples of NDNA uses with minor changes. Consider
the following examples. Sentence (28) and (31) are called “NDNA” uses because they are
not derogatory even though they contain slurs. Slurs also seem to affect the truth conditions
of NDNA uses. Compare the truth conditions of (28) and (29). Replacing “chink” with
“Chinese” seems to change their truth values. (28) appears to be true, whereas (29) seems
false. That is, treating the Chinese as “chinks” is an immoral act of racism, whereas treating
them as “Chinese” commits no wrong. Similarly, the truth conditions of (31) and (32) seem
different. (31) appears to be true, whereas (32) is logically false. If these intuitions of
NDNA uses are validated, the force indicator theory is false about the truth-conditional
contribution of slurs.
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(28) Institutions that treat the Chinese as chinks are morally depraved.
(29) Institutions that treat the Chinese as Chinese are morally depraved.
(30) Institutions that treat the Chinese as “chinks” are morally depraved.
(31) I am Chinese, but I am not a chink.
(32) I am Chinese, but I am not a Chinese.
(33) I am Chinese, but I am not a “chink.”

Despite their similarities, the truth condition objection is different from the ambiguity
objection in the last section. The proponents of the truth condition objection do not take
slurs to be ambiguous between a derogatory meaning and neutral meaning. For example,
“chink” has one single meaning, which is always different from “Chinese.
However, the truth condition objection rests on the same intuitions as the ambiguity
objection, i.e., both invoke cases of disguised mixed quotations. The slur “chink” seems to
make a different truth-conditional contribution than “Chinese” in (28) and (31), because
“chink” is actually used in mixed quotations. First, (28) is actually a disguised form of (30).
This is why replacing “chink” with “Chinese” changes the truth condition; there is a
difference between treating someone as “chinks” and treating them as “Chinese.” Similarly,
(31) should be read as (33). What the speaker denies is not his being Chinese, but his being
called “chink.” Refusing to be called as “chink” is a different thing than refusing to be
called “Chinese.” This is why replacing “chink” in (31) seems to change the truth value.
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My response to the truth condition objection is similar to the response to the ambiguity
objection since both objections rest on the same intuition. The truth condition objection
fails because mixed quotations are not evidence for different truth-conditional
contributions. I will not delve into the semantics of mixed quotations. But one thing is clear:
mixed quotations are analogous to opaque contexts. An expression in mixed quotation
cannot be replaced with a co-referential expression without altering the truth values.
Consider the example of “Kraft Dinner,” the Canadian brand of the same product
“Kraft Mac & Cheese” in the U.S. I take the truth-conditional contribution of “Kraft Dinner”
to be same as “Kraft Mac & Cheese.” Like NDNA uses, I can use mixed quotations to
create similar cases where “Kraft Dinner” seems to make a different contribution to the
truth condition than “Kraft Mac & Cheese.” Imagine a “Kraft Dinner” nationalist who
refuses to call the same food “Kraft Mac & Cheese.” It makes sense for him to assert (34)
and (35). Despite the same truth-conditional contribution, “Kraft Dinner” in mixed
quotations is not substitutable with “Kraft Mac & Cheese.” To sum up, cases of mixed
quotations should not be used as evidence for different truth-conditional contributions.

(34) This is “Kraft Dinner,” not “Kraft Mac & Cheese”!
(35) Those who treat “Kraft Dinner” as “Kraft Mac & Cheese” are un-Canadian.
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6.5 Objection 5: Collapsing into an Expressivist Theory
It might be argued that the force indicator theory ultimately collapses into an expressivist
theory of slurs, which takes a slur to have at least two semantic contents, a truth-conditional
content and an expressivist content (Jeshion 2013). Why is the slur “chink” both used to
refer to the Chinese and to derogate the Chinese? My theory takes slurs to be both a
propositional indicator and a force indicator of derogation. However, derogation involves
expressing negative evaluative attitudes toward someone (How can I derogate the Chinese
without expressing contempt or disdain for them?). Therefore, expressivism appears to
offer a more elegant explanation, i.e., that “chink” expresses two contents, its referent (i.e.,
the Chinese), and its expressivist content (i.e., contempt toward the Chinese). To derogate
the Chinese is to express this expressivist content about them. Such an expressivist theory
seems equivalent to the force indicator theory, but without the unnecessary postulates of
speech acts.
Before responding to this objection, there is a caveat on my term “express.” As I have
explained in § 1.1 and § 2.7, “express” is ambiguous between a speaker’s expressing
something (e.g., speaker meaning) and a word’s expressing something (e.g., semantic
content). My usage of “express” includes both senses, so as to accommodate different
versions of expressivism.
I have two responses to this objection. First, the force indicator theory is not
equivalent to an expressivist theory, in terms of how negative attitudes are expressed. My
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force indicator theory agrees with expressivism that utterances of slurs involve expressing
negative evaluative attitudes. In derogatory speeches, using slurs often expresses contempt,
disdain, or disrespect. Although both theories agree that utterances of slurs express
negative evaluative attitudes, there is a difference: the force indicator theory insists that the
speaker, not the slur, expresses attitudes, whereas the expressivist theory takes the slur to
express attitudes. I believe the negative attitudes are expressed via the sincerity condition
of derogation, not expressed as a part of the semantic content. When a speaker sincerely
derogates the Chinese, he also expresses negative attitudes such as contempt of the Chinese.
Otherwise, his utterance would be an insincere act of derogation. By contrast, expressivism
takes an utterance of “chink” to express negative attitudes in the same way as the truthconditional content is expressed; both arise from the semantic contents of the slur.
Consequently, even an insincere utterance of “chink” expresses the contempt of the
Chinese.
To understand the relation between derogation and expressing negative attitudes,
consider an analogy of assertion. In asserting that “Chang is Chinese,” a speaker often
expresses her belief that Chang is Chinese. This is because the sincerity condition of
assertion requires a corresponding belief; asserting that “Chang is Chinese” without
believing so is insincere. However, this does not mean that assertion is merely an
expression of belief. It also does not entail that the semantic content of “Chang is Chinese”
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is a belief. After all, it is the speech act of assertion, not the meaning of the sentence, that
requires the belief.
Second, the force indicator theory disagrees with expressivism with regard to the
normative consequences of utterances of slurs. When slurs are used, the declarative
illocutionary acts of derogation are not reducible to expressing attitudes. For instance,
derogating the Chinese brings normative consequences by imposing an inferior normative
status, which is deprived of the right to be respected, freedom from discrimination, etc. By
contrast, merely expressing an attitude often does not explicitly generate these normative
consequences. For example, it is unclear if expressing one’s contempt by frowning at the
Chinese licenses other people’s discriminatory actions against the Chinese.
Third, the force indicator theory provides more explanation than an expressivist
theory. Since expressivism takes slurs to express negative attitudes as a part of their
semantic content, it does not explain how slurs interact with contexts. Take non-derogatory
uses of slurs for instance. Expressivism might explain them as merely non-literal uses of
words (Jeshion 2013, 250). However, it does not tell us the factors and the mechanisms
that affect these uses. By contrast, the force indicator theory specifies the mechanism of
misfiring and the success conditions that interact with the usage of force indicators. Thus,
my theory does not collapse into expressivism because it has more explanatory power.
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6.6 Objection 6: Collapsing into the Register Theory
One common objection against the force indicator theory is that it collapses into the register
theory of slurs, a theory I endorsed in an earlier paper (Diaz-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton
2019). In this section, I will introduce the register theory and explain the advantages of the
force indicator theory over the register theory.
What differentiates slurs from their neutral counterparts, according to the register
theory, is their use-theoretic meaning. For example, what differentiates “chink” from
“Chinese” is neither its truth-conditional content nor the mental state it expresses; “chink”
has a derogatory use that “Chinese” lacks. Such a use, according to our meaning pluralism,
is a part of the meaning, i.e., use-theoretic meaning. However, what kind of use-theoretic
meaning do slurs have? There are two kinds of use-theoretic meaning. The first kind
specifies the illocutionary act a word is used to perform and the felicity condition of the
act. This is analogous to the use of chopsticks; to define the use of chopsticks is to specify
the act it is used to do, i.e., to eat foods. The second kind of use-theoretic meaning defines
the felicity condition without specifying the action it is used to do. This is analogous to the
use of academic regalia; it should be worn during a graduation ceremony, but it is not tied
to a particular act. The use of slurs is the second kind; their use-theoretic content is only
the felicity condition of using them, not the illocutionary acts they are used to perform.
The register theory borrows the notion of “register” of socio-linguistics to characterize
the felicity condition in the use-theoretic meaning of slurs. A register category specifies
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the contexts in which the use of a word is appropriate in a social and cultural sense. For
instance, the word “poop,” unlike “shit,” is a childish word marked with the register
[+child-oriented]. This is because the use of “poop” is to speak in a childish way; using
this word is appropriate only when talking to children. Likewise, slurs are always marked
with the register [+derogatory] (as well as the register [-polite]). In other words, it is
appropriate to use slurs only in the contexts where the speakers intend to insult the target
group or are indifferent about doing so. This is how the register [+derogatory] helps to
characterize the use-theoretic meaning of slurs.
One might argue that the force indicator theory ultimately collapses into the register
theory. Both theories agree that what differentiates “chink” from “Chinese” is the
derogatory use of the slur. Nevertheless, the force indicator theory takes the use of slurs to
be performing the illocutionary act of derogation, whereas the register theory takes the use
to be the context in which it is appropriate to use slurs. However, the register theory seems
to have no less explanatory power than the force indicator theory. If the features of slurs
are already explained by their registers, appealing to illocutionary acts of derogation seems
theoretically redundant. There is no need to go beyond the register theory. My response to
this objection is to illustrate two reasons to favor the illocutionary force indicator theory.
Here is the first reason. The [+derogatory] register of slurs itself requires further
explanation (and the best explanation is the force indicator theory). Consider an analogy of
sleeping pills. The appropriate context to use sleeping pills is the time before sleep.
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However, this gives rise to further questions. What makes it appropriate to take sleeping
pills before sleep? We need deeper explanations such as the biological effects of the pills.
Likewise, it remains to be explained why slurs have the register [+derogatory]. Why is the
appropriate context to use slurs one in which the speaker intends to insult the target group
(or is indifferent)?
Slur’s [+derogatory] register is very unlikely to be explained without appealing to
illocutionary acts. There are three major varieties of registers, but none of their
explanations apply to slurs. First, the [+derogatory] register cannot be explained like topic
area registers. For instance, a word is marked as [+technical], [+scientific], or [+medical]
because the rules of a discipline or a profession require using them. However, no discipline
or profession has rules that demand using slurs. 69 Second, the [+derogatory] register
cannot be explained like a communicative medium register such as classroom, journal
article, and text messages. Words have these registers because of the social rules that limit
their usages to a particular medium. However, unlike “LOL,” slurs can be used
appropriately in all of these mediums. Third, the [+derogatory] register cannot be explained
like a social relation register such as [+child-oriented] and [+formal]. For example, “poop”
is a [+child-oriented] word because social rules require using them for certain social
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It would be funny to have an association of racists that demands using slurs in professional occasions.
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relations. Unfortunately, this explanation is unavailable for a slur’s register because slurs
can be used by everyone in any social relation.
Consequently, the best explanation for a slur’s [+derogatory] register is very likely to
be the illocutionary force indicator theory. Even the formulation of the [+derogatory]
register appeals to illocutionary acts; we describe the appropriate context of using slurs to
be that the speaker wants to insult the targets. 70 It is almost the same as the felicity
condition of derogation in my force indicator theory. This is the appropriate context to use
slurs precisely because slurs are used for derogation (or insulting), the appropriate context
for which is that the speaker wants to derogate (or insult) the target.
The second reason to favor my theory is that identifying the use-theoretic content of
slurs with their felicity conditions oversimplifies the infelicities of using slurs. As I have
shown in § 3.1, using slurs can have two kinds of infelicities, misfire and abuse. Since the
register theory acknowledges only one kind of appropriate context to use slurs, it cannot
explain how using slurs can be a case of abuse. Consider the example in 4.2 again; a
captured person is forced by her kidnapper to insult the Chinese by calling them “chinks”
against her will. Although she has successfully used the slur, there is something unhappy
about it (just like an insincere promise). It follows from the force indicator theory that this
is a case of abuse because the sincerity condition is not met. The register theory, however,
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I take insulting to be a sub-variety of derogation. For the details of derogation, see section 4.1.
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cannot make sense of why the captive’s usage of “chink” is unhappy; it is, technically
speaking, felicitous and appropriate because the speaker does want to insult the Chinese so
as to satisfy her kidnapper.

6.7 Summary
In this chapter, I have defended the force indicator theory from potential objections. It has
been argued that derogation is not illocutionary because derogation has no corresponding
performative verb (§ 6.1). My response is to reject the assumption that illocutionary acts
must have corresponding performative verbs. Another objection is that force indicators,
unlike slurs, lose their illocutionary force when embedded (§ 6.2). I have replied to this
objection with counterexamples where embedded force indicators still provide
illocutionary force. Moreover, the force indicator theory faces the objection that it entails
the ambiguity of slurs between a derogatory and non-derogatory meaning (§ 6.3). I point
out the seeming examples of ambiguity are in fact cases of mixed quotations, which cannot
be taken as signs of ambiguity. Against my position, there are also counterexamples where
slurs seem to make different truth-conditional contributions (§ 6.4). I argue that these
counterexamples, like the ambiguity case, are also disguised mixed quotations. Therefore,
they mislead our intuitions about the truth-conditional content. I have responded to the
argument that my theory collapses into an expressivist theory of slurs by showing the
difference between the two (§ 6.5). Finally, I have replied to the objection that the force
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indicator theory collapses into the register theory; the use of slurs can be explained in terms
of registers without appealing to illocutionary acts (§ 6.6).
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7 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have proposed a force indicator theory of slurs; slurs are illocutionary
force indicators that make the illocutionary force of derogation explicit. In addition, they
are also propositional indicators that contribute the same to the truth-condition as their
neutral counterparts.
Before introducing the force indicator theory, I surveyed the features of slurs that it
has to explain. An adequate theory of slurs must be able to explain slurs’ derogatory power,
offensiveness, truth-conditional contribution, independence, descriptive ineffability,
perspective dependence, historical variability, non-derogatory utterances, appropriation,
non-displaceability, the Kaplanian puzzle, as well as self-defeating sentences. In addition
to introducing these features, I have clarified them by reformulating them into distinct
questions. Some features conflate different issues together, while some features collapse
into others. For instance, I have disambiguated the derogatory power of slurs into two
questions: (Q1) “Why is a slur such as ‘chink’ a derogatory word?” , (Q2) “Why is an
utterance like saying that ‘Chang is a chink’ derogatory?”. Moreover, explaining
appropriation turned out to be nothing but explaining historical variability and nonderogatory utterances.
I also introduced many competing theories to the force indicator theory. Instead of
surveying every theory in the literature, I introduced representative theories such as the
truth-conditional content theory, the conventional implicature theory, inferentialism, the
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prohibition theory, Mark Richard’s theory, and Hornsby’s gesture theory. These
competing theories endorse opposing positions than mine on certain issues. Consequently,
they are vulnerable to my arguments against them. Take Mark Richard’s theory for instance.
Unlike the force indicator theory, it takes utterances like “Chang is a chink” to have no
truth values. I argued that if “Chang is a chink” has no truth value, one cannot lie with it.
However, it is certainly possible to lie using slurs. The failure of these competing theory
paves the way for the force indicator theory.
Another prerequisite of the force indicator theory is illustrating the basic concepts of
speech act theory. I introduced illocutionary acts and their two components, illocutionary
force and propositional content. Illocutionary force indicators and propositional indicators
help to determine illocutionary force and propositional content respectively. In particular,
illocutionary force indicators determine the illocutionary force by providing the default
interpretation, until there are defeating factors.
With these preparations, I developed the force indicator theory in full detail. Slurs
play two roles. First, they are illocutionary force indicators of derogation. Second, they are
propositional indicators that make the same truth-conditional contribution as their neutral
counterparts. Derogation is a declarative illocutionary act. Its illocutionary point is to
enforce a norm which assigns an inferior normative status, which deprives some of the
rights and freedom enjoyed by equal members of society. Slurs determine the illocutionary
force by providing the default interpretation. That is, an utterance of “chink” is interpreted

178

as derogating the Chinese by default, until there are defeating factors. I applied this force
indicator to answer the questions I raised about slurs. It turned out that the force indicator
theory has great power in explaining the features of slurs such as their derogatory power,
truth-conditional contribution, descriptive ineffability, non-displaceability, etc.
After formulating the force indicator theory, I defended it from potential objections. I
addressed the first objection that derogation is not an illocutionary act because it has no
corresponding performative verb. I rejected the assumption that all illocutionary acts have
performative verbs. The second objection was that slurs behave differently than force
indicators when embedded within connectives. I pointed out that not all force indicators
lose illocutionary force when embedded. The third objection claimed that the force
indicator theory would make slurs systematically ambiguous, while the fourth objection
held that “chink” has a different referent than “Chinese” in certain non-derogatory, nonappropriated uses. I pointed out that these two objections rest on mistaken examples of
mixed quotations. Finally, I argued that the force indicator theory does not collapse into an
expressivist theory or a register theory.
These considerations, I hope, justify rethinking slurs from an alternative illocutionary
approach. The job of slurs is not to communicate derogatory messages about their targets,
but to perform the illocutionary acts of derogation.
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Appendices
The following two appendices address two theories that are left out of Chapter 5. Appendix
1 focuses on the presupposition theory, according to which slurs are presupposition triggers
of derogatory presupposition (Schlenker 2007). Appendix 2 introduces what I call “the
choice of words theory,” which explains the derogatory power of slurs in terms of the
speaker’s choice of slurs over neutral words (Bolinger 2015, Nunberg 2018). However, my
ad hoc arguments expose the flaws of the two theories, without helping to establish the
advantage of my theory. Therefore, the two theories should be left to the appendices.

Appendix 1: The Presupposition Theory
Schlenker (2007) proposes a presupposition theory which explains the features of slurs in
terms of presuppositions. The presupposition theory is proposed as a general theory for
expressives such as “damn,” “fuck,” “asshole.” Since Schlenker takes slurs to a kind of
expressive, his presupposition theory is also a theory of slurs. Let us label this theory (T8)
and formulate it as follows:

(T8) The Presupposition Theory of Slurs: Slurs carry derogatory presuppositions the
speaker believes that the targets of the slurs are despicable.
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If slurs are derogatory because of their presuppositions, what kind of presuppositions
is it? Schlenker (2007, 237) take slurs to be “lexical items that carry a presupposition of a
particular sort, namely one which is indexical (it is evaluated with respect to a context),
attitudinal (it predicates something of the mental state of the agent of that context), and
sometimes shiftable (the context of evaluation need not be the context of the actual
utterance).” For instance, “honky” can be given the following analysis: “(1) a. [[honky]]
(c)(w) ≠ # iff the agent of c believes in the world of c that white people are despicable.
If ≠ #, [[honky]] (c)(w) = [[white]] (c)(w)” (Schlenker 2007, 238). In other words,
“honky” presupposes that the agent of a context c believes in the world of c that white
people are despicable. The semantic value of “honky” is the same as “white” unless
presupposition fails.
The presupposition theory can answer the questions about the features of slurs
outlined in Chapter 2. Why is a slur such as “chink” derogatory (Q1)? Slurs are derogatory
simply because they are presupposition triggers for derogatory presuppositions. Why is an
utterance of a slur, e.g., “Chang is a chink” derogatory (Q2)? An utterance of slurs is
derogatory when the speaker presupposes that he believes that the targets of the slurs are
despicable. As for (Q5) the truth-conditional contribution, slurs make exactly the same
contribution as their neutral counterparts. The derogatory dimension of slurs is independent
of its descriptive content (Q6), simply because presupposition is distinct from the “regular”
content of an utterance. The derogatory dimension of a slur cannot be satisfactorily
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paraphrased (Q7), because it is presupposed, rather than asserted. The perspective
dependence (Q8) of slurs is a consequence of the presupposition; what is presupposed is a
belief of the speaker.
One of the most common objections to the presupposition theory is that it fails to
explain (Q11) the non-displaceability of slurs. Slurs remain derogatory no matter how they
are embedded within the scope of connectives. Their derogatory power even projects
through “plugs” of presuppositions, the connectives that block the presuppositions of its
components sentences. If slurs carried derogatory presuppositions, these would be blocked
by presupposition plugs. “Believes that” is usually considered a presupposition plug; what
is presupposed by the that-clause is not presupposed by the entire sentence. For example,
“Chang believes that my sister is rich” does not presuppose that the speaker has a sister.
However, consider the example “Chang believes that all chinks should be expelled from
Canada.” This is still derogatory. The derogatory power of slurs is not stopped by the
presuppositional plug. This suggests that slurs are not presupposition triggers (Hom 2010,
176).
I will raise a new objection against Schlenker’s presupposition theory: that
presupposing that the speaker has a certain belief is not derogatory in the same way that
slurs are derogatory. Consider a presupposition trigger, “my belief that the Chinese are
despicable.” This expression carries the same presupposition as what “chink” is said to
presuppose by Schlenker, i.e., the presupposition that the speaker believes that the Chinese
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are despicable. Therefore, Schlenker’s theory entails that “chink” should be derogatory
exactly in the same way as “my belief that the Chinese are despicable.” However, compare
the sentence “Chang is a chink” with “Chang challenged my belief that the Chinese are
despicable.” Unlike the former sentence, the latter sentence is not derogatory. To see this,
consider a hearer who opposes derogatory speeches against the Chinese. The hearer would
find “Chang is a chink” unacceptable because accepting it would amount to accepting racist
and derogatory speech. By contrast, the hearer would have no problem in accepting “Chang
challenged my belief that the Chinese are despicable.” Both the speaker and the hearer
could agree with the presupposition that the speaker has a certain belief and the assertion
that Chang challenged that belief. The hearer would not agree that the Chinese are
despicable. Nonetheless, he could have no problem in agreeing that the speaker believes
that they are despicable. I shall reformulate this objection as follows:

(A11) The Argument from Presupposition Triggers: If “chink” presupposes that the
speaker believes that the Chinese are despicable, “my belief that the Chinese are
despicable” should be derogatory in the same way as “chink.” Nevertheless, “my
belief that the Chinese are despicable” is not derogatory in the same way as “chink.”
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Appendix 2: The Choice of Words Theory
The choice of words theory, as its name suggests, explains why uttering slurs is derogatory
in terms of choices of words. The basic idea is simple. Consider the example utterance (1)
“Chang is a chink.” Calling Chang “Chink” is derogatory because the speaker could have
used the neutral word “Chinese” instead. Since the speaker chooses “chink” over “Chinese,”
his utterance signals his derogatory attitudes toward the Chinese. Let us define this theory
as follows:

(T9) The Choice of Words Theory: Utterances of slurs express derogatory attitudes
because of the speakers’ choice of using slurs over neutral words.

There are two major variants of the choice of words theory. The first one is the
contrastive choice account proposed by Bolinger (2015), who is inspired by the contrastive
choice accounts of politeness. Each competent speaker of a language has knowledge of cooccurrence expectations, i.e., the information associated with various terms. The speaker
signals his endorsement with the information associated with the term via the choice of
words. In Bolinger’s terms, “For some content φ, when it is common knowledge…that (i)
α is an expression for ψ associated with φ, and (ii) β is an expression for ψ not associated
with φ, then…selecting α in contrast to β signals that the speaker endorses or shares φ.”
(Bolinger 2015, 9).
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The second variant comes from Nunberg (2018), who invokes a special kind of
conversational implicature called “ventriloquistic implicatures.” These are conversational
implicatures generated by using a different word that is often conventionally used by
another group, rather than the word which would be normally used in the situation. A good
example is the New York Times’ choosing the French word “Scandale” over the English
word “Scandal” in reporting the Monica Lewinsky story; the word’s association with the
French is said to implicate that the scandal is about sex or money (Nunberg 2018). Likewise,
choosing to use slurs over neutral words implicates derogatory attitudes because these slurs
are often used by people with those derogatory attitudes. Despite the technical differences
between Nunberg and Bolinger, both share the same picture. Therefore, their theories can
be lumped together under (T9), the choice of words theory, and they face the same
objections.
My objection against (T9), the choice of words theory, focuses on the situation where
the slur is the only choice. It is possible that in a certain language in a certain period, the
only word for a group is a slur. Therefore, the speaker would have no choice but use the
slur. For instance, the only words for foreigners in ancient Chinese were slurring words
such as manyi (i.e., barbarians), because of the ancient Chinese belief that there is no
civilization other than the Chinese civilization. Therefore, an ancient Chinese speaker
would have no neutral words to call foreigners. Similar cases can be found throughout
history. It follows from the choice of word theory that no derogatory attitude is signaled
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since the speaker does not deliberately choose the derogatory word. Nonetheless, it still
can be derogatory to utter the slur. If this is the case, then the choice of word is unnecessary
for explaining why utterances of slurs are derogatory. Let us reformulate the argument as
follows:

(A12) The No Choice Argument: It follows from the choice of words theory that an
utterance of a slur is not derogatory if there is no neutral alternative to the slur.
However, utterances of a slur can be derogatory even if there is no neutral alternative
word for it.

A possible reply to my argument is that there is always a choice to use neutral
alternatives, even in my examples of limited vocabulary.71 Remember from section 2.5
that a feature of slurs is their independence; the derogatory dimension of a slur like “manyi”
is independent of its truth-conditional contents. Consequently, we can always make up a
neutral counterpart of a slur even if the vocabulary of a language has no word for it. For
instance, “people outside of China,” “people of a different country than China,” and
“people who are not from any of the provinces of China” all seem to be co-referring neutral
alternatives to “manyi.” This is why calling foreigners “manyi” in ancient China is
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Thanks go to David Bourget for raising this reply.
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derogatory; the speaker chooses to call foreigners “manyi,” but he could have used “people
outside of China” instead.
I will defend my argument by showing that this reply does not work for Bolinger and
Nunberg. I acknowledge the possibility of making up neutral counterparts when the
vocabulary lacks them. Ancient Chinese speaker indeed could have used “people outside
of China” instead of “manyi.” Nevertheless, the “always a choice” reply is not available to
Bolinger and Nunberg because this kind of choice of words is not the kind of choice they
invoke.
For Bolinger (2015, 9), it must be common knowledge in the linguistic community
that a phrase like “people outside of China” is an expression for “manyi,” and the speaker
must be aware of this neutral phrase in making the choice. Awareness of the neutral
alternative is crucial for ruling out cases like ignorant usages of slurs (e.g., mistaking a slur
to be a neutral word). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the ancient Chinese speaker is aware
of the made-up neutral alternatives such as “people outside of China,” and “people who are
not from any of the provinces of China,” in using the word “manyi.”72 After all, these
neutral alternatives are rarely used in ancient Chinese.
Likewise, this reply is unavailable to Nunberg (2018), who takes slurs to function
like foreign words such as “scandale.” Using slurs produces ventriloquistic implicatures by
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An (slightly inaccurate) analogy is people’s unawareness of “isobutylphenyl propionic acid” when they talk about

“ibuprofen.”
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violating the default linguistic convention of referring to something in a group (e.g. the
default English word for a scandal is “scandal”) and appealing to the convention of a
different group (e.g., the French call a scandal “scandle”). For Nunberg, the ventriloquistic
implicatures of using “manyi” cannot come from the choice between this slur and its madeup neutral alternatives like “people outside of China.” This is because “people outside of
China” is not the conventional default way to refer to foreigners in ancient Chinese. On the
contrary, the slur “manyi” is the default word.
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